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Introduction 
 
If one looked at the Arab world in the middle of the 20th century — newly independent of the 
colonial empires of Europe — one would not have thought it was destined to become a 
swamp. In fact, many observers at the time noted that, compared with other decolonizing 
countries, the Arabs were doing well. Beirut, Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad were more 
cultured, more commercial, more progressive than most Asian and African capitals. It made 
sense. The Arabs, after all, belonged to a great civilization, with a long history of science, 
philosophy — and military success. They invented algebra, preserved Aristotle when he had 
been forgotten in the West — and won wars against the greatest powers of the day. Islamic 
art and culture were sophisticated when Europe was in the Dark Ages. In the 1940s and 
1950s, there was much hope in the Arab world that it would recapture its past glory. 
—Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, 2003 
 The once-proud Arab Middle East has fallen on hard times. Over the past half-
century, the region has become synonymous with violence, dysfunction and oppression—or, 
in the preferred terminology of CNN1, Al-Jazeera2, The Washington Post3, The New York 
Times4, Foreign Policy5 and the Middle East Policy Council,6 simply a “mess.” The current 
civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya are only the latest developments; the last fifty 
years have also seen continuous Arab-Israeli conflict, fratricidal fighting in Algeria, Sudan 
and Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq war, and two U.S.-led invasions. Beneath the headline-grabbing 
violence lies a series of more mundane but similarly disheartening realities, including chronic 
youth unemployment and severe environmental crises. But perhaps nothing lies more at the 
heart of the region’s suffering than the stubbornly authoritarian nature of its politics; the Arab 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Frida Ghitis, “Why the Middle East is a Mess,” CNN.com, November 30, 2012 
2 Rami Khouri, “Regional Powers Are Making a Mess of the Middle East,” Al-Jazeera, August 10, 2015 
3 Liz Sly, “Is it Too Late to Solve the Mess in the Middle East?” The Washington Post, November 15, 2015 
4 Ross Douthat, “The Method to Obama’s Middle East Mess,” The New York Times, March 28. 2015 
5 Steven A. Cook and Amr T. Leheta, “Don’t Blame Sykes-Picot for the Middle East’s Mess,” Foreign Policy, 
May 13, 2016 
6 Chas W. Freeman Jr., “The Mess in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 4 (2011): 96 
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Middle East is the least democratic place on the planet.7  Since the end of the 20th century, 
when the “third wave” of democracy brought liberal governance to vast swaths of Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East has turned into 
an anomalous island of autocratic regimes.8 
 Why? What explains the region’s continued impregnability to democracy? This is a 
particularly important question in the rocky aftermath of the Arab Spring, which many 
observers initially hoped would usher in a democratic “fourth wave.” It is also a very 
complicated question—the Arab Middle East’s religious, economic and political history all 
contribute to its current predicament.  
 Dozens of scholars and commentators have attempted to explain the “Arab 
democracy deficit,” offering various plausible explanations for the region’s continued 
authoritarianism. One common interpretation, put forth by scholars including Bernard Lewis, 
Samuel Huntington and Elie Kedourie, focuses the blame on religion, arguing that Islam 
delegitimizes man-made legislation, leaving no room for democratic debate or representative 
institutions.9 A second school of thought contends that oil wealth explains most of the 
problem, leading to public complacency, corruption and over-centralization.10 A third, related 
interpretation, blames economics more generally—maintaining that even beyond the oil-
producing states, weak private sectors and small middle classes inhibit the Arab world’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See “Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy,” Freedom House, 2017 
8 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1993) 
9 See Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy,” The Atlantic Monthly, February 1993, Elie Kedourie, 
Democracy and Arab Political Culture (New York: Routledge, 2013), and Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of 
Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993 
10 See Larry Diamond, "Why Are There No Arab Democracies?" Journal of Democracy 21, no.1 (2010): 93-
112 
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democratic growth.11 In addition to these arguments, other observers have highlighted regime 
statecraft, foreign influences, and “neighborhood effects” as key reasons for the region’s 
exceptional lack of democracy.12  
 Each of these proposed explanations has its strengths. But there is also something 
subtly unsatisfying about them. In their intense focus on circumstance and background 
conditions—whether religious, economic, or institutional—they leave little room for the role 
of human agency, for the distinct historical choices made by Arab elites. What if the region’s 
woes were not preordained? What if the Arab states had what it took to move toward 
democracy, but were thrown off course by their own leaders?  
*** 
 Tristan Mabry, a scholar of language and nationality at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, does not specialize either in Arab politics or democracy. But when analyzing the 
linguistic situation in the contemporary Arab world, he is struck by elites’ stubborn 
adherence to Modern Standard Arabic—as opposed to unique local vernaculars.13 To Mabry, 
it is quite clear that insistence on MSA has undermined the growth of ethnolinguistic identity 
across the region, creating “di-national” peoples who cannot fully identify with the states in 
which they live. This situation, he suggests, might be problematic for the growth of 
democracy. By reducing the extent to which states can legitimize themselves based on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Mehran Kamrava, "The Middle East's Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective," Perspectives on 
Global Development and Technology 6, no. 1 (2007) 
12 See Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004) : 139-157. 
Debate around each of these explanations has largely focused on the role of Islam. As a result, scholars who 
blame something other than religion for the democracy deficit have tended to cluster together, positioning 
themselves relative to Lewis, Huntington and Kedourie rather than relative to one another. Indeed, it is common 
to see them share arguments, referring to the “oil curse,” “economics,” and “regime statecraft” all at the same 
time. Bellin, for example, focuses on coercive apparatuses but also credits oil rents with playing a major role. 
For his part, Diamond focuses on the oil curse, but acknowledges the importance of “authoritarian statecraft.” 
13 Tristan Mabry, "Arab Di-Nationalism," The Levantine Review 2, no. 1 (2013). 
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ethnolinguistic criteria, it may encourage elites to turn elsewhere—namely force and 
coercion—for the basis of their authority.  
 State linguistic policy alone likely cannot explain the Arab world’s democracy deficit 
or its perennially high levels of conflict. And ethnicity and language are not the only 
cornerstones on which a successful nation can be built. But perhaps, by honing in on state-
based national identity, Mabry is on to something. Perhaps language is just the beginning of a 
wide-ranging failure, on behalf of Arab elites, to embrace state-based patriotism and to 
institutionalize unique national identities. And perhaps this failure has indeed had dire 
consequences for stability and democracy in the region.  
 Even a brief glance at the connection between national identity and Arab democracy 
yields striking results. Tunisia and Lebanon, the Arab states whose leaders have historically 
gone to the greatest lengths to embrace local nationalism, are the region’s clearest 
“democratic exceptions.” Jordan and Morocco, whose monarchs have also worked 
consistently to encourage state-based nationalism, are not full democracies—but their 
citizens enjoy a much wider array of rights than is common elsewhere in the Arab world. The 
remaining states in the region, however, embraced pan-Arab nationalism in the mid-20th 
century, deemphasizing their own unique identities. From Syria to Sudan and from Iraq to 
Libya, they are today case studies in instability, autocracy and oppression.  
 The problem is not that Arab states beyond Tunisia and Lebanon somehow lack their 
own identities or the potential to develop them; rather, it is that in the mid-20th century, pan-
Arabist ideologues suppressed vibrant state-based nationalist movements across the region. 
This undermined the very foundations of most states in the Arab Middle East, disconnecting 
them from their own historical, cultural and linguistic roots. With a weakened sense of shared 
 ! 5 
heritage, precious little remained to provide political cohesion or to bridge the gap between 
competing factions. Islamists and secularists, for example, became much more polarized than 
they would have been in an environment of mutual patriotism. Absent even the most basic 
assumptions of goodwill and fair play, the political scene became increasingly volatile and 
fragmented, helping authoritarian regimes to present themselves as the only hope for 
stability. Today, would-be liberals feel unable to trust their fellow citizens; instead, they 
believe they must choose between freedom and safety. The outcome is what political scientist 
Daniel Brumberg calls “autocracy with democrats,” wherein “key groups that might choose 
democracy absent an Islamist threat now actively support or at least tolerate autocrats.”14 
Recent events underscore this point: from Egypt to Syria, the authoritarian backlash against 
the Arab Spring has sustained itself thanks to the educated middle class and its fear of 
Islamist extremism.15 
*** 
 The suggestion that nationalism and democracy might support one another strikes 
many Western ears as counterintuitive. This is especially true in Europe, where nationalism, 
blamed for two world wars, is widely regarded with wary skepticism. As the French theorist 
Pierre Manent writes, “at a time when humanity seems on the way to becoming unified, the 
nation, with its parochial character, its preference for itself, seems painfully archaic, vaguely 
ridiculous, probably immoral, in any case destined to fade away.”16 Such luminaries as 
Albert Einstein have called nationalism the “measles of the human race”; even well-trained 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Daniel Brumberg, "Islamists and the Politics of Consensus," Journal of Democracy 13 no. 3 (2002): 112 
15 See Noah Feldman, “Egypt Vote is a Sign of Arab Winter,” Bloomberg View, October 19, 2015 
16 Pierre Manent, A World Beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University 
Press, 2006): 42 
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political scientists have gone so far as to claim that nations are "[groups] of people united by 
a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of their neighbors."17 
 But of all the ways to organize humanity, are nation-states really so bad? In his 1992 
essay, “Jihad vs. McWorld,” Benjamin Barber weighs the other options. On one hand, the 
globe could see a “retribalization,” a renewed localism in which individual cultures and sects 
acquire much greater power and importance. On the other, the forces of globalization could 
bring ever-increasing integration and uniformity. To Barber, both outcomes are equally 
unappealing and equally undemocratic. The local option, which he dubs “Jihad,” threatens to 
create a future “in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against 
tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of 
interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality.”18 But the 
globalized option, which has to “a remarkable degree been realized,” has not brought the 
human flourishing many might expect. Instead, “yesterday's wishful cry for one world has 
yielded to the reality of McWorld,” an internationalism “that is commercialized, 
homogenized, depoliticized [and] bureaucratized.”19 While McWorld might appear on its 
face to be more appealing than “jihad,” its “primary political values…are order and 
tranquility, and freedom—as in the phrases ‘free trade,’ ‘free press,’ and ‘free love.’ Human 
rights are needed to a degree, but not citizenship or participation—and no more social justice 
and equality than are necessary to promote efficient economic production and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and its Alternatives (New York: Knopf, 1969).  
18 Benjamin Barber, “Jihad vs McWorld,” The Atlantic, March 1992 
19 Ibid. 
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consumption.”20 As a result, despots and oligarchs can thrive, “so long as they leave markets 
in place and refrain from making war on their neighbors.”21  
 Is a future torn between “Jihad” and “McWorld” the best one available? Or is there a 
happier alternative, a salutary middle way between these undemocratic poles? A growing 
body of theoretical literature suggests that there is—that old-fashioned state-based 
nationalism is not such an unattractive option after all. As Israeli political scientist Yael 
Tamir puts it, it is true that “certain types of nationalism are…morally repugnant, but the 
same could be said of almost any political theory.”22 Even democracy can verge into illiberal 
majority tyranny when its worst tendencies are indulged. Focusing on these instances can 
blind observers to broader truths. For example, while “national ideas” helped fuel some of 
the worst episodes of the twentieth century, “they…also inspired some of its most glorious 
moments, when the struggle against colonialism and imperialism was waged in the name of 
national self-determination.”23  
 Much of the alleged problem with nationalism is that it divides the world into ‘us’ 
and ‘them,’ irrationally exalting the former and denigrating the latter. But this is not 
necessarily, or even usually, the case. As Georgian political scientist Ghia Nodia observes, “a 
nation demands self-determination not as an exclusive privilege, but as a way of realizing the 
general proposition that each nation deserves a state of its own.”24 It is no accident that “the 
first organization to embrace almost the whole world is called the United Nations (not the 
Universal Church or the Communist International), and…is based on [nationalist principles 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995): 4 
23 Ibid. 
24 Nodia 12 
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such as] ‘respect for national sovereignty,’ [and] ‘inviolability of borders.’”25 The 
philosopher Gregory Jusdanis agrees, arguing that “nationalism fosters an interchange among 
groups by promoting self-confidence among them, by encouraging them to find strength in 
their own cultural resources, and ultimately to fight against oppression and for 
independence.”26 Far from encouraging narcissism and selfishness, nationalism thus 
“mediates in the interaction between the self and the other, between the individual and the 
universal, the old and the new.”27 
 Indeed, the danger with nationalism and national identity may lie not so much with 
recognizing and embracing it as with attempting to subvert it. As Nodia writes, 
“manifestations of nationalism's ugly side arise not from excessive ethnicity but from the 
lack of a robust political expression for national feeling. When they have no political or 
institutional achievements to take pride in, people may boast instead of their inherited racial, 
linguistic, or cultural identities.”28 According to this line of thinking, it is no coincidence that 
the Italians and Germans, who consolidated unified nation-states much later than their 
Western European neighbors, were the first to succumb to fascism in the run-up to World 
War II. It is also no coincidence that the European far right has thrived in an era when 
institutionalized outlets for nationalism have weakened.  
 In short, the more tangibly a national identity is manifested, the healthier it will be. 
As with other natural human tendencies, national feeling flourishes in the open and festers 
when repressed. When it is fully and properly nourished—when “individuals can share a 
language, memorize their past, [and] cherish their heroes,” national pride can be a powerful 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
26 Gregory Jusdanis, The Necessary Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001): 7 
27 Ibid. 
28 Nodia 15 
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tool for good.29 Indeed, in observing the third wave of democracy, Nodia notices that “the 
final push toward liberal democracy…is rooted in national as well as individual dignity.”30 
Nations wishing to be respected on the global stage are incentivized to pursue freedom at 
home. Whereas failure to create a liberal democratic polity would signal a shameful "national 
disgrace," success opens the door to “[joining] the prestigious international club of 
‘advanced’ or ‘modern’ nations.”31 
 This thesis argues that state-based nationalism had—and still has—the potential to 
help solve some of the Arab world’s problems. Yet it has largely been suppressed, leading to 
weak state legitimacy, civil strife, persecution of minorities, strong Islamist movements, and 
above all, a regional democracy deficit. Unless states embark on concerted efforts to build 
popularly-supported, inclusive, and border-based identities, the region will likely remain a 
“mess” for decades to come.  
 
Plan of this thesis 
 Chapter 1, “Democracy and the Nation,” offers preliminary definitions of democracy 
and the nation, explores what a healthy national identity might realistically look like, and 
explains how such an identity can lead to and support democracy. 
 Chapter 2, “Narrowing Down the Suspects,” argues that Islam, oil, economics and 
regime statecraft are all unsatisfactory explanations for the Arab democracy deficit, and 
suggests that investigating national identity might be a more fruitful approach. 
 Chapter 3, “Indicting Arabism,” lays out a potential model for understanding the 
democracy deficit in terms of national identity. It argues that by rejecting state-based !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Tamir 8 
30 Nodia 16 
31 Ibid.  
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nationalism and embracing messianic pan-Arabism, Arab leaders normalized authoritarian 
tactics, undermined their states’ internal cohesion, and set the stage for a showdown with 
Islamists. 
 Chapter 4, “Arabism on Trial,” compares Egypt with Tunisia and Syria with 
Lebanon, tracing the way different approaches to national identity have led to divergent 
political climates in these otherwise highly similar states.  
 Chapter 5, “Arabism on Trial, Part II,” investigates the cases of Algeria, Libya, 
Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Morocco, tracing the role of national identity in shaping the 
development of Islamism and democracy in each state.  
 Chapter 6, “The Case for Wataniyya,” recapitulates the key arguments made in the 
preceding chapters, revisits competing explanations for the Arab democracy deficit, 
addresses potential objections, discusses the implications for future research, and offers a few 
closing policy recommendations.  
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1   Democracy and the Nation 
 
 This chapter seeks to explore the theoretical rationale of the “national identity” 
explanation for the Arab democracy deficit. What would “healthy nationalism” look like in 
practice, and how would it contribute to democracy?  
Defining Democracy 
 Before continuing, it is essential to clarify what exactly is meant by “democracy.” 
This is a more complicated task than it seems, for it requires disentangling two often-
confused concepts: “democracy” and “liberalism.” The two are far from identical—indeed, 
theorists have warned for centuries that majority rule, associated with the former, poses a 
potential danger for individual rights and freedoms, connected to the latter.1 The West has 
sometimes been blind to this tension and has taken liberalism for granted, but many newer, 
non-Western democracies do not have the same luxury. This is because, while liberal 
societies often preceded and paved the way for democratic polities in the West, the pattern is 
reversed in other regions, where popular rule tends to be instituted before the consolidation 
of liberal norms.2 From Turkey to Russia to Venezuela, leaders supported by solid public 
majorities have thus been able to transform themselves into elected autocrats, using their 
mandates to infringe upon their opponents’ basic rights.  
 This has encouraged some analysts to step away from “democracy” as their favored 
standard for evaluating political systems. Fareed Zakaria, for example, insists that “the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1See for example, Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, which dwells extensively on the dangers democracy 
poses for liberalism—and how to mitigate them.  
2 Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third Wave Democracies,” 
Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1999. 
 ! 12 
absence of free and fair elections should be viewed as one flaw, not the definition of 
tyranny”; he would rather see “governments… judged by yardsticks related to constitutional 
liberalism.”3 This is certainly a valuable perspective to keep in mind when discussing the 
Arab democracy deficit. But Zakaria does democracy a disservice by reducing it to mere 
elections. True electoral democracy, as it is understood by most political scientists, is much 
more robust than the pale imitations put forth by the world’s Putins and Erdogans.  
 One of the most influential recent attempts to define democracy comes from the 
American theorist Robert Dahl. This is somewhat ironic, given that Dahl claimed to be 
defining “polyarchy” rather than “democracy,” regarding the latter as an unreachable ideal. 
Nevertheless, the seven “procedural minimums” he identified, listed in Table 1.1, have come 
to be regarded as the baseline requirements for any democratic regime.4  
Table 1.1: Robert Dahl’s Criteria for Democracy5 
1: Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected 
officials. 
2: Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which 
coercion is comparatively uncommon. 
3: Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 
4: Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government. 
5: Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment 
on political matters broadly defined. 
6: Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, 
alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. 
7: Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. 
  
 In short, to be a democracy, a state does not necessarily need to uphold every 
individual freedom—but it does need to ensure basic political rights. This is precisely the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: WW Norton, 
2007): 156 
4 See, for example, the way Dahl is discussed in Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy 
Is... and Is Not," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 75-88. 
5 Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982): 11 
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distinction adopted by Freedom House, the world’s most influential democracy-monitoring 
organization. The agency measures “electoral democracies” separately from “liberal 
democracies,” stipulating that the former do not necessarily have to protect all civil liberties. 
They are required, however, to feature a “competitive, multiparty political system,” near-
universal adult suffrage, regular, contested, elections that “yield results that are representative 
of the public will,” and “significant public access of major political parties to the electorate 
through the media and through generally open political campaigning.”6  
 As these criteria illustrate, free elections mean nothing unless norms are in place that 
allow voters to make educated choices between competitive candidates. Simply opening the 
polls every few years is not enough for a state to claim it represents the public will. Philippe 
Shmitter and Terry Lynn Karl expound on this theme in their influential article “What 
Democracy Is—and Is Not.” According to Shmitter and Karl, between elections, citizens 
must still be able to “influence public policy through a wide variety of [extra-electoral] 
intermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings, clientelistic 
arrangements, and so forth.”7 For their part, elected leaders must be willing to listen and 
respond, recognizing that they are responsible to all of society, not just the coalition that 
brought them to office.  
 Clearly, then, true electoral democracy is much more participatory and pluralistic 
than liberal skeptics imply. While it does not necessarily protect all civil liberties, democracy 
does give citizens a chance to choose and influence their leaders in an environment of open 
dialogue and debate. This is high standard, but also an attainable one. According to Freedom 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2016, Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom 
Under Pressure," 2016  
7 Schmitter and Karl 78 
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House, two thirds of the world’s nations—123 out of 195—qualified as electoral 
democracies in 2016.8 
 
Defining National Identity 
 The next definition to consider is the meaning of national identity. This is also a fairly 
complex task. Just as “democracy” and “liberalism” need to be differentiated, “national” and 
“ethnic” identities are similar but discrete entities that must be separated and distinguished. A 
great deal of ink has been spilled attempting to define the two concepts, and scholars disagree 
on the precise differences between them. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is not 
necessary to engage every argument on the matter. Suffice it to say that whereas an ethnic 
group is primarily a cultural community, “formed by common descent and sharing…features 
[such as] language [and] religion,” a nation is primarily a political community, dedicated 
above all to self-rule in a territorial homeland.9 An ethnic group—such as Kurds, Bengalis, or 
Jews—may be spread across multiple nations, and a nation—such as Iran, India, or the 
United States—may incorporate multiple ethnic groups. This is not to say that a nation has 
nothing to do with culture or that ethnicity has nothing to do with politics; as British political 
philosopher David Miller puts it, “a group of people without Norwegian passports, with no 
discoverable historical connections to Norway, and speaking no Norwegian, cannot simply 
arrive at the Norwegian border and have any expectation of mounting a plausible claim to 
Norwegian identity or nationality.”10 Some cultural characteristics—language, ethnicity, 
religion, history and the like—have to be held in common for nationality to exist, though 
there is no formula that defines which will be more or less important in a given nation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2016” 
9 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995): 19 
10 Ibid., 18 
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 Rather than attempting to precisely define what constitutes a nation, it may be more 
useful to build an idea of what a strong, healthy national identity might realistically look like. 
This is not a matter of distinguishing “false” nations from “true” ones; such a line almost 
certainly cannot be drawn. But some forms and expressions of national identity do appear to 
be more constructive than others. In particular, this thesis suggests that popular legitimacy, 
inclusivity, and respect for borders are all key components of strong, healthy nationalism.  
 
Popular Legitimacy  
 The first reasonable expectation for a healthy nation-state identity is that it enjoy 
substantial and widespread public support. This is because national identity is, at its root, the 
people’s identity; it presupposes a population that “identifies.” A would-be nationalist can 
attempt to tell his neighbors who they are, but unless they agree, there is no identity—just an 
ideology. True, a totalitarian dictatorship may attempt to impose its own narrative at the tip 
of a gun, but this strategy is unlikely to win many genuine adherents. For a sustainable, 
authentic identity to emerge, the people must be consulted. This is what the French 
intellectual Ernest Renan famously expressed when he described the nation as constituted by 
“present consent, the desire to live together, the desire to continue to invest in the heritage 
that we have jointly received.”11 A nation’s existence, he argued, is essentially “a daily 
plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.”12  
 Popular legitimacy is not always something that can be measured with scientific 
accuracy. This is because, as Miller points out, “the attitudes and beliefs that constitute 
nationality are very often hidden away in the deepest recesses of the mind, brought to full !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Ernest Renan, trans. Ethan Rundell, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992): 10 
12 Ibid. 
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consciousness only by some dramatic event.”13 Even the best identities will thus never be 
“pristine.” But this does not make popular legitimacy any less important or less real; 
regardless of measurement difficulties, “there is still a large difference between [national 
identities] that have evolved more or less spontaneously and those that are mainly the result 
of political imposition.”14 Naturally, there is some blurring over time—an identity that once 
had to be imposed might someday come to be naturally felt, and vice versa. But some 
versions of nationalism have historically relied on imposition to a far greater extent than 
others.   
 The Western-oriented nationalism promulgated in modern Turkey, for example, 
began as an elite-enforced identity and has generally remained as such, provoking immense 
struggles between secular Kemalists and traditionalist Muslims. With its emphasis on 
Turkish ethnic purity, this vision of identity has also prompted bloody persecution of 
minorities such as Kurds, Alevis and Armenians. Though Turkey’s state-sanctioned, secular 
identity was (and still is) genuinely supported by some, its proponents have had to go to great 
lengths to impose it on everyone else.15 Another example of top-down nationalism is the 
version of Chinese identity enforced by Mao and his lieutenants during the Cultural 
Revolution of the 1960s, which involved a concerted effort to undermine Confucian values 
and replace them with Communist ideology.16 As in Turkey, this imposed identity remained 
divisive, and by the 1980s was in full retreat in the face of more traditional expressions of 
Chinese nationalism.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 On the other hand, the development of national identity in the United Kingdom 
“involved competition between a number of groups—tradesmen, women, the Welsh and 
Scots, as well as the English aristocracy—each seeking to establish themselves as citizens.”17 
No single faction fully controlled or enforced British identity during its key period of 
development. Even today, the United Kingdom’s continued existence remains an explicit 
product of the consent of its constituent parts, a reality aptly illustrated by the 2014 
referendum on Scottish independence. Had the Scots voted to pursue nationhood on their 
own, they would have been allowed to do so. 
  Several other examples of intensely “grassroots” national movements emerged in the 
late 1980s in the Soviet Union. After decades of harsh repression from Communist Party 
authorities, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian activists took advantage of perestroika reforms 
to push for their right to political and cultural self-determination. These efforts culminated in 
August 1989, when nearly two million demonstrators—more than a third of the entire Baltic 
population—protested Soviet rule by taking part in a human chain linking the capital cities of 
Talinn, Riga and Vilnius.18 Within months, all three nations had declared independence.  
 Of course, many national identities fall somewhere between the grassroots 
spontaneity of the Baltics and the top-down imposition of Communist China. In France, for 
example, a relatively defined, state-sanctioned account of the secular Republic is taught to 
schoolchildren from an early age.19 However, this national identity also enjoys a considerable 
depth of popular support; especially for children from non-immigrant families, the narrative 
taught in schools is likely to be quite similar to the one children have learned from their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Miller 40 
18 Jānis Škapars, ed. The Baltic Way to Freedom: Non-Violent Struggle of the Baltic States in a Global Context 
(Riga: Zelta Grauds, 2005). 
19 See Beatrice Mabilon-Bonfils, “School and the Creation of National Identity in France,” Citizenship Teaching 
and Learning 8 no. 1 (2012): 41-54 
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parents and grandparents.20 In other words, France’s identity is both relatively imposed and 
relatively popularly legitimate.  
 Table 1.2 illustrates the diverse range of approaches a given version of nationalism 
can take toward the role of the public. Some national movements have clearly relied on 
broad-based, grassroots participation; others have been based on the power of the state. As 
the “Maoist,” “Kemalist” and “Francoist” qualifications in the leftmost column emphasize, 
“imposed” national identities have generally proven to be divisive and short-lived.  
Table 1.2: “Top-Down” vs. “Bottom-Up” National Identities 
 
More “imposed”  
(top-down) 
Major components of both More “spontaneous” 
(bottom-up) 
Maoist China 
Kemalist Turkey 
Francoist Spain21 
 
Republican France 
 
United Kingdom 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
Estonia 
 
Inclusivity 
 The second reasonable expectation for a healthy nation-state identity is that it be 
inclusive—that is, open to ethnic, linguistic or religious minority groups who wish to 
participate in it.22 Anyone ought to have a chance to feel at home in the nation-state in which 
they were born and raised, and they should not be forced to give up their own heritage in the 
process. This does not mean that every state should be expected to adopt open borders and 
unlimited immigration; it simply means that a national identity should be welcoming toward 
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currently present minority groups who are willing to respect the practices and values of the 
rest of the community.  
 Is such a degree of inclusion possible to put into practice? Or is it a pleasant-sounding 
but unrealistic ideal? Some theorists argue for the latter position—Ernest Gellner, to take one 
prominent example, famously defines nationalism as “a theory of political legitimacy which 
requires that national boundaries should not cut across ethnic ones.”23 Nationalism, in his 
understanding, is a fundamentally exclusive phenomenon. And Gellner has a point: all 
nation-states grapple with questions of pluralism. But the reality is that some struggle much 
less than others. India, Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, for instance, have national 
identities that are open to multiple ethnic, linguistic and religious groups.  In India, this plays 
out such that a Marathi-speaking Hindu, Bengali-speaking Muslim, or Malayalam-speaking 
Christian each has equal claim to Indian identity.  The example of the United States is also 
instructive. As Miller writes, Americans have found that it is “perfectly possible for ethnicity 
and nationality to co-exist, neither threatening to drive out the other.”24 Ethnic groups such as 
Italian-Americans, Mexican-Americans and Chinese-Americans value their distinct cultural 
identities, but have the chance to participate fully in American national identity.25  
 Healthy nation-state identities are not only inclusive in the present—they also take a 
pluralistic approach toward remembering the past. This is because nothing is more 
fundamental to national identity than history and memory. As Renan puts it, a nation is 
constituted by its awareness of “a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions.” Race, 
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language and ethnicity are much less important than a sense of “having suffered, rejoiced, 
and hoped together.”26  
 When determining the health of a national identity, it is thus vital to ask: Which past 
is commemorated? Whose “efforts and devotions” are celebrated? Certainly, it is 
unreasonable to expect that everyone be remembered. Some details are inevitably lost—as 
Renan said, “Forgetting, I would even say historical error, is an essential factor in the 
creation of a nation.”27 There is nothing wrong with the fact that “no French citizen knows 
whether he is a Burgund, an Alain, a Taifala, or a Visigoth.”28 But forgetting details should 
not mean forcibly writing any group out of the historical record. If the national identity of the 
United States denied the historical presence of Native Americans or the enslavement of 
African-Americans, it would not qualify as fully inclusive—even if both groups enjoyed the 
same present-day political and civil rights as other Americans. As Miller writes, “Where the 
occurrence of certain events is explicitly denied, this is likely to signal a nation gripped by a 
monolithic ideology.”29  
 This is a high standard, and many nation-states fail to meet it fully. The good news, 
however, is that national identities are not static. The example of the United States illustrates 
this fact—minority experiences that were once marginalized can become part of mainstream 
national narratives. National identities have the opportunity to become more inclusive and 
authentic, and are never condemned to permanent “backwardness.” Benedict Anderson—
arguably the most influential scholar of nationalism in the 20th century—was deeply attuned 
to this fact, clarifying that “communities are to be distinguished not by their 
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falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”30 Depending on who is 
allowed to contribute, this “style” can change. The key divide, then, is not between “good” 
and “bad” national identities. Instead, as Miller suggests, it is “between national identities 
that emerge through open processes of debate and discussion to which everyone is potentially 
a contributor, and identities that are authoritatively imposed by repression and 
indoctrination.”31 In short, a national identity is always a work in progress, and the more it 
opens itself to multiple inputs, the healthier its growth will be. 
 
Based on Borders 
 Beyond popular support and inclusiveness, the third reasonable expectation for 
nation-state identity is that it be based on and enclosed within a clearly defined territory. 
States ought to respect and recognize their borders and the groups living within them. This 
does not completely preclude a state from seeking to change its frontiers; discrete territorial 
claims such as those made by India, China and Pakistan over Kashmir are to be expected. 
Similarly, separatist groups claiming sovereignty over clearly defined regions often institute 
healthy, state-based national identities upon winning independence, and their efforts should 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. But a problem arises when borders are seen as 
predominantly illegitimate or irrelevant to national self-conception. Deemphasizing borders 
reduces the importance—and unifying potential—of a shared physical homeland, shifting the 
foundation of nationhood to racial, ethnic or ideological criteria. As a result, the incentive for 
accommodating minorities or the sovereignty of other states is badly weakened.  
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 It can be difficult for some idealistically-minded thinkers to accept the legitimacy of 
borders. After all, international boundaries are almost always inelegant products of 
realpolitik, and on their face can seem to be arbitrary ways of delineating communities. As 
Miller writes, “no one wants to think of himself as roped together to a set of people merely 
because the ambitions of some dynastic lord in the thirteenth century ran thus far and no 
further.”32 Thankfully, however, history does not stop at the moment frontiers are defined; 
the imperfect border-drawing process is just the beginning of the story. Indeed, according to 
Miller, “the effect of the ruler’s conquests may have been, over time, to have produced 
people with real cultural unity.”33 What really matters happens after the borders are set, not 
before.  
 Sometimes it is said that the nations of the Middle East are particularly “artificial” 
because their borders were drawn by European imperialists who were fixated on their own 
interests. Regardless of the veracity of the second claim, a cursory examination reveals that 
Europeans’ own borders are no more “natural” than those of the Arab states. Germany, for 
example, was drastically and forcefully reshaped by the victorious Allied Powers after World 
War II, who determined its frontiers with very little regard for Germans’ own preferences. 
Germany is not alone in its “artificiality”; as famed nationalism scholar Rupert Emerson 
writes, “Even for the oldest and most fixed of nations, such as France, the further back the 
inquiry is pressed, the less inevitable does it appear that this particular France should have 
emerged from the long course of history.”34 Ghia Nodia elaborates: “The development of 
premodern ethnic communities into modern nations has always been mediated by historical 
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contingencies and conscious political effort; there simply are no God-given or naturally 
preordained national borders.”35 The boundaries of all nation states were determined by 
political expediency, and the fact that some regions were “carved up” more recently does not 
necessarily mean that the resulting states’ identities are illegitimate. 
 This is not to suggest that the placement of borders remains unimportant—far from it. 
At some point, a nation is likely to crystallize within a set of frontiers; in Emerson’s words, a 
population that was once “malleable” acquires a “national imprint” of considerable strength, 
becoming profoundly resistant to further national remolding.36 What may have begun as a 
somewhat arbitrary amalgamation has the potential to quickly acquire almost unbreakable 
solidarity. The situation is similar to that faced by an assortment of college freshmen 
randomly assigned to live together on the same hallway: there might be nothing inherently 
“authentic” about their group, but before long, they form a close bond and have made plans 
to continue living together the following year. 
 A key difference between the “college dormitory” analogy and a nation-state is, of 
course, that the factors working to build a common identity are much stronger in the latter 
environment.37 Within the new borders, shared laws, politics, economics and education are 
profoundly powerful unifying tools. These forces are so strong that “the nation is in a very 
large number of instances a deposit which has been left behind by the state.”38 From France 
and England to Hungary and Bulgaria, it is generally political unity that has produced 
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national unity, not the other way around. Yes, there are exceptions like Italy and Germany, 
where political unity did not precede national consciousness. But according to Emerson, 
“outside of Europe the role of the state as the molder of nations is at least as great as within it 
and perhaps even greater.”39 In the Philippines and Indonesia, to name just two examples, 
“the boundaries drawn on the map by the imperial power were the determining element in 
establishing the boundaries within which peoples have developed national awareness.”40 In 
short, regardless of who draws the borders of a nation-state, the mere experience of living 
together in the same marked-off polity is more often than not enough to transform a people 
into a nation. 
 This process takes time, and skeptics would be right to point out that the nations of 
Western Europe would be far less well-defined today had they had not enjoyed centuries of 
sustained unity. But other states have managed to form highly developed national 
consciousnesses after mere decades of existence. Dutch Indonesia, for example, only took 
recognizable form after major colonial expansions in 1862 and 1920, yet rapidly built a 
cohesive national identity and has endured only relatively minor incidences of separatist 
conflict since independence in 1945.41 This is all the more astounding for the fact that 
Indonesia includes thousands of inhabited islands and hundreds of distinct ethnic and 
linguistic groups. And Indonesia is far from the only instance of quick national development 
in a diverse setting. Similar illustrations abound, particularly in Africa, where very few 
nations had experienced more than a few decades of political unity before independence, but 
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many—from Tanzania to Botswana to Senegal—have nonetheless overcome ethnic and tribal 
divisions and developed into relatively cohesive polities. To be sure, many states have not 
been so lucky, but it is difficult to argue that their problems were predetermined by the way 
their borders were drawn. Other, more insidious dynamics must be at work.  
*** 
 Ultimately, a healthy national identity will be popularly supported, and include all 
groups historically found within a nation’s borders. No version of nationalism meets all three 
criteria perfectly, but some come much closer to fulfilling them than others. It is thus quite 
possible to assess the health of a given identity.  
 
 
How can national identity lead to democracy? 
 
 There are at least four central ways that state-based national identity supports and 
facilitates democracy. First, it defines the demos, setting the context within which democracy 
is to proceed. Second, it reminds citizens of their fundamental equality and their right to 
political self-determination. Third, it builds trust across diverse and potentially conflicting 
groups. Finally, it encourages active, participatory citizenship by elevating the status of 
popularly-spoken vernacular languages.  
 
The need for a defined body 
 For democracy to work—for the people to rule—it needs to be clear who precisely 
“the people” are. Who will vote? In whose names will their leaders act? Whose interests will 
the system attempt to weigh? “Popular rule” remains a vague, unreal concept until these 
tangible—and often difficult—questions are answered.  As political theorist Pierre Manent 
puts it, “democracy, in order to become a reality, needs a body, a population marked out by 
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borders and other characteristics, namely a defined realm.”42 In other words, it is necessary to 
“give flesh to the democratic abstractions of the sovereignty of the people.”43 Many other 
political theorists grasp this point. In Dankwart Rustow’s famous theory of democratization, 
for example, the only precondition for democratic flourishing is “national unity.” To Rustow, 
“democracy is a system of rule by temporary majorities. In order that rulers and policies may 
freely change, the boundaries must endure.”44 Democratic competition will be contentious 
enough on its own without controversy over who is allowed to participate, so if compromises 
or concessions are to be possible, “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must 
have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”45  
 A healthy nation-state identity is clearly one way to build this consensus, serving as a 
powerful unifying and defining force for the democratic unit. As Rustow writes, “This 
implies nothing mysterious about Blood and Soil or daily pledges of allegiance, about 
personal identity in the psychoanalyst's sense, or about a grand political purpose pursued by 
the citizenry as a whole.”46 Rather, it simply means that the table is set for democracy: all 
citizens recognize one another as players, and the game can begin.    
 
The nation-state as the body for democracy 
 
 Even if it is granted that democracy requires a clearly defined body, why does this 
body have to be a nation-state? Wouldn’t a continental confederation like the European 
Union serve a similar purpose? Manent forcefully argues that it could not. While such an 
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arrangement can generate prosperity and defend itself against external threats, it is simply too 
large to harness its citizens’ democratic energy.  
 This is because, as Manent puts it, “only an individual can govern himself.” If a 
society wishes to govern itself, “it must become as much as possible like an individual.”47 
Historically, this meant that self-government was only ever viable in small communities, 
rarely extending beyond the confines of tiny city-states. But with the advent of the “national 
form” and the unity and homogeneity it wrought, it finally became possible for self-rule to 
“include and embrace millions”—including, crucially, in rural areas.48 It is no accident, then, 
that democracy swept across Western Europe at the same time as nationalism: it was 
precisely “thanks [to] the national form that democracy could be embodied in large states.”49  
 As a Frenchman, Manent is alarmed by the growth of the European Union and its 
attempt to unmoor democracy from its national roots. To do so, he argues, is a dangerous 
denial not only of history but also of human nature. For no matter what idealistic “post-
national” thinkers claim, if “the human sentiment [is to] have force, a lasting force…it needs 
to be concentrated…if you extend it to the whole of humanity, it is surely more just and 
moral, but it is much weaker, too weak to sustain a tolerably just and happy human 
association.”50 According to this logic, it is entirely unsurprising that the European Union has 
developed into a body that is “not democratic in the sense that any neutral observer would 
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use the word.”51 The Union is simply too large and unwieldy for its decisions to be subject to 
democratic accountability.  
 
National identity unleashes the people’s desire for freedom  
 Beyond defining the demos, state-based patriotism also contributes to democratic 
development by fostering shared expectations of rights and responsibilities. Membership in a 
nation asks a great deal, so it also must promise a great deal; a “national duty” implies a 
“national birthright.” In the assessment of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, 
nationalism has thus historically “played a functional role in the implementation of 
citizenship,” empowering individuals from all backgrounds to demand equal status in 
society.52 As he puts it, “general conscription [is] only the other side of the civil rights 
coin.”53 
 This alone is a powerful argument for the connection between nationalism and 
political rights. But Habermas understates the case. National identity is not only useful to 
democracy: in a sense it is founded on the same idea as democracy—the idea of popular 
sovereignty. When applied in international politics, this concept is called self-determination; 
a nation has the right to rule itself. When applied in a domestic context, popular sovereignty 
means that leaders must adhere to the public’s democratically-expressed will.  
 To be sure, nationalism can move in undemocratic directions—but whenever it does 
so, it is abandoning its logical foundation.54 As Manent puts it, “it is not enough to say that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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democracy and the nation are two [different] ways of expressing the project of self-
government.”55 Rather, “the social dynamism induced by both nationalism and democracy 
are superimposed upon and reinforce one another…the peasants become Frenchmen at the 
same time as they become citizens.”56 Samuel Huntington agrees. In his assessment, the 
“conservative aristocratic doctrines” that dominated in premodern Europe were also 
fundamentally “antinational, [based on the] assumption that there was more in common 
between two aristocrats, one of whom was a foreigner, than between two nationals, one of 
whom was an aristocrat.” 57 By upending this aristocratic consensus, nationalism linked 
together previously disparate social classes and economic strata, accomplishing a 
fundamental “democratization” of European political attitudes.  
 It should thus be no surprise that for England, France, the United States, and other old 
Western nations, national identity was originally often indistinguishable from democratic 
identity; in Manent’s words, “national pride was fused with democratic pride.” 58 This laid 
the groundwork for what many scholars claim constituted an explicitly ‘civic’ approach to 
nationalism. Rather than basing their shared identity on blood, language or religion, the 
argument goes, these states came to regard liberal values themselves as the foundation of the 
national community.59  
 National identity’s full role as fuel for democratic growth becomes particularly 
evident when looking beyond the West. The fall of colonialism provides a number of 
especially instructive cases. Writing in the late 1950s, while much of the world was still !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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under European rule, Emerson could already see that “imperialism’s…most important result” 
had ironically been “to rouse against itself the nationalisms—and in some instances even to 
create the nations—which worked to make its continuance impossible.”60 The imperialist 
powers learned that while it is possible to rule over a disconnected, disaggregated mass of 
people, it is almost impossible to subjugate a nation. Accordingly, even though Emerson is a 
critic of nationalism, he has to grant that 
 “in many of the newly rising Asian and African countries…the association 
between nationalism and democracy has been as intimate and the democratic 
character of the nationalist movements as unmistakable as in the earlier 
Western European models. Particularly countries with a considerable 
European colonial experience, such as India, Burma, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Ghana, took a full scale and immediate leap into democratic 
institutions…the record clearly shows that the nationalist movements saw 
themselves also as the champions of democracy.”61 
 
 Writing more than thirty years later, Ghia Nodia observed a similar process unfold in 
the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. From Czechoslovakia to Siberia, he argues that “there is no 
denying” that the fall of totalitarianism was driven in large part by nationalism.62 Just as 
Asian and African anti-colonial activists had framed their demands in explicitly national 
terms, proponents of democracy in Eastern Europe protested communist subjugation of their 
local identities as much as—and often more than—they objected to the USSR’s political and 
economic policies. As discussed above, this emphasis clearly struck a resonant chord, 
mobilizing such massive crowds that the authorities in Moscow had little choice but to 
acquiesce to their demands.  
 Reflecting on the course of post-colonial and anti-communist activism, Nodia 
concludes that “in emergent democracies, movements for democracy and movements for 
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independence are often one and the same.” 63 History has shown that a people conscious of its 
own nationhood is also conscious of its right to self-rule, and is likely to fight fiercely to 
secure it.  
 
Trust  
 
 Discussion thus far has focused on the ways national identity sets the table for 
democracy. A healthy national identity creates and defines a demos capable of self-rule, and 
it also galvanizes the public in favor of freedom and independence. But this is just the 
beginning of the story. National identity is even more important in the way it supports the 
day-to-day democratic process.  
  Like all political systems, democracies unleash forceful disagreements between rival 
factions. But democratic disputes are unique for two reasons. First, competition is actively 
encouraged in democracies, leading to particularly drawn-out and particularly public 
political debates. Second, democracy requires leaders to periodically relinquish or share 
power. The system hinges on their willingness to peacefully step aside—even if it means 
handing the reins to their bitter opponents. The essence of democracy is thus its ability to 
manage the contradiction between deep, persistent divisions on one hand, and smooth, 
peaceful transfers of power on the other.  
 What can hold democratic states and societies together, ensuring that these divisions 
never grow too deep? To start with, rival factions will have to get into the habit of mutual 
compromise. Somehow, they must begin to trust one another to play by the rules, keeping 
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faith that when they accept costs to their own interests and agendas, their opponents will do 
the same.64  
 This democratic “good faith” has to come from somewhere. There has to be an 
extremely powerful reason for rival parties to accept positions of vulnerability relative to one 
another. As British philosopher Roger Scruton puts it, “democracies owe their existence 
to…the loyalties that are supposedly shared by government and opposition, by all political 
parties, and by the electorate as a whole.”65 In other words, democracies require that society 
be united by shared values powerful enough to transcend regional, linguistic, religious and 
racial divides. Without them, there is no foundation for compromise, and democracy will 
rapidly disintegrate.  
 Seymour Martin Lipset’s trailblazing 1960 book Political Man addresses exactly this 
point. Lipset extolls “cross-cutting cleavages”—forces that transcend religion, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic class—as the lifeblood of democracy.66 These prevent factions from 
becoming exclusive and insular, and encourage the formation of inclusive political parties 
rather than of segregated blocs concerned only with their own health.  
 The greatest “cross-cutting cleavage” of all, of course, is shared national identity. 
Indeed, this might be the only way to instill trust across a large, diverse society. Ethnicity, 
religion and class are all powerful grounds for trust, and serve valuable purposes of their 
own. But unless a state is entirely homogenous, they are insufficient. As David Miller 
observes, in the absence of a national identity that transcends ethnic, religious and class 
divisions, “politics at best takes the form of group bargaining and compromise and at worst 
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degenerates into a struggle for domination. Trust may exist within the groups, but not across 
them.”67 In such a situation, as soon as the opportunity to “cheat” arises, there is little to stop 
a given faction from ignoring—or even actively undermining—democratic processes. 
Politics becomes a zero-sum game, an arms race between groups seeking to out-muscle one 
another.  
 The indispensability of nationally-rooted trust is particularly striking in the 
experiences of postcommunist states. After decades of totalitarian rule, these societies were 
sorely lacking in traditional forms of human association, especially religion. In such an arid 
and atomized environment, renewed authoritarian takeover was a distinct possibility. In some 
cases, this is what occurred—but in many others, democracy managed to take root. What 
contributed to these divergent outcomes? Certainly not populations’ innate receptiveness to 
liberal or democratic ideas; across the board, Nodia writes, these ideals alone had “almost no 
prospect of seriously influencing political discourse.”68 Instead, the true distinguishing factor 
may well have been whether or not advocates of democracy embraced strong, state-based 
national identities. When they turned to nationalism as the unifying principle for their newly 
independent societies, making their appeals for freedom in the name of “our political 
traditions” and “our identity,” democrats repeatedly succeeded.69 From Georgia to Poland to 
the Baltic states, the trust and goodwill created by national solidarity provided the fuel for 
compromise, accommodation and power-sharing, turning formerly totalitarian states into 
burgeoning democracies. Meanwhile, in Belarus and the Central Asian nations, where 
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67 Miller 92-93. He adds that “Belgium, Canada and Switzerland work as they do partly because they are not 
simply multinational, but have cultivated common national identities alongside communal ones.” (96) 
68 Nodia 18-19 
69 Ibid. 
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significant nationalist movements never took off, leaders remained paranoid, states remained 
corrupt, and the people have continued to languish under authoritarian rule.70  
 
“Democracy needs a vernacular”: the importance of popular language  
 
 A healthy national identity’s salutary role in the day-to-day democratic process is not 
limited to generating trust and shared loyalty. It also can facilitate democratic functioning by 
elevating and institutionalizing popularly-spoken languages. This is more important than it 
might initially seem. For if democracy is to be genuinely participatory—if the public is to 
discuss and decide on key political issues—citizens will have to be able to understand one 
another. In the words of Canadian political scientist Will Kymlicka, “Democratic politics is 
politics in the vernacular. The average citizen only feels comfortable debating political issues 
in their own tongue.”71 While educated elites might be able to maintain and develop fluency 
in multiple languages, members of the general public usually cannot. As a result, “the more 
political debate is conducted in the vernacular, the more participatory it will be.”72 This does 
not mean that the entire polity must share the same idiom; dozens of cases show how 
democracy can work in multilingual contexts. But it does mean that democracy is more fair 
and participatory when individuals can use their own dialects in formal political contexts. 
The most advanced multilingual democracies—Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and Spain—
have increasingly grasped this reality, and have moved steadily toward the recognition and 
institutionalization of minority languages.73  
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 Healthy national identities have historically worked to raise the status of “languages 
of the people.” Vernaculars once regarded by educated aristocrats as impure “slang” have 
become respected, codified national tongues. The Czech language, for example, was once 
“spoken only by peasants, while the nobility and middle classes spoke German.” But a with 
the “emergence of a distinct Czech nation” came “the elevation of Czech into a literary 
language, involving…the compilation of a grammar, a history of the language, and a Czech-
German dictionary”74 This empowered peasants to become full citizens for the first time, 
paving their way into national political life. 
 When popularly-spoken languages are repressed or denied, on the contrary, 
democracy can be severely harmed. In his 2006 book Language, Religion and National 
Identity in Europe and the Middle East, John Myhill argues that if those in power insist on 
maintaining a “standard language that artificially unites a large variety of [mutually 
unintelligible] dialects,” the results are likely to be disastrous.75 With an eye towards specific 
European and Middle Eastern case studies, he contends that attempts to erase linguistic 
diversity have been deeply inimical to peace and democracy, and have regularly contributed 
to oppression and war. And he may well be right. As ensuing chapters will show, the divide 
between standard language and dialect is particularly strong—and particularly damaging for 
democracy—in the Arab world.  
 
*** 
 The sections above have identified the form a healthy national identity might 
realistically take, and explained how such an identity is an important factor in the emergence 
of democracy and in its continued survival. But how does national identity compare to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Miller, 33 
75 John Myhill, Language, Religion and National Identity in Europe and the Middle East (Philadelphia: J. 
Benjamins, 2006): 280 
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other factors influencing democracy in the Arab world?  The next chapter will address this 
question.  
   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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2   Narrowing Down the Suspects 
 
 Dozens of scholars have attempted to explain the Arab democracy deficit, and the 
scope of the current work does not allow for an exhaustive review of every argument that has 
been made on the subject. However, even a limited analysis of the key competing 
explanations is highly revealing. Such an investigation shows that while Islam, economics, 
oil and regime statecraft do present challenges to democratization, their effects may be much 
less significant than has been alleged. Moreover, the evidence suggests that these challenges 
are neither independent nor fundamental. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, they are in fact each 
symptoms of a greater, more foundational disease infecting the Arab world: the plague of 
weak state-based national identity.  
Figure 2.1: How National Identity Underlies Other Explanations for the Democracy 
Deficit 
Islam 
 Those who blame Islam for the Arab democracy deficit would be surprised by this 
formulation. Yes, they would admit, Arabs have been slow to develop state-based loyalties—
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but the reason for this delay is that Islam undermines nationalism. With the value it places on 
a politically unified umma, they argue, the religion is simply opposed to the formation of 
independent Muslim nations.1 Further, they maintain, nations are just the tip of the iceberg: 
on a fundamental level, Islam rejects the legitimacy of man-made legislation, representative 
institutions, collective decision-making, and ultimately popular sovereignty itself. As 
Bernard Lewis writes, “for believing Muslims, legitimate authority comes from God alone, 
and the ruler derives his power not from the people, nor yet from his ancestors, but from God 
and the holy law.”2 In his estimation, Islam is conceptually opposed to the core ideas of 
democracy.  
 To be sure, Islam is “exceptional” in many respects. The faith does take a different 
view of government than the historically Christian West. Unlike the New Testament’s call to 
“render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s,” or its insistence that 
Christ’s kingdom is “not of this world,” traditional Islam very much seeks to impose divine 
sovereignty on the temporal realm. Moreover, because Muslims consider their holy book to 
be the “direct and literal speech of God,”3 the Qur’an’s less-than-democratic prescriptions for 
women and religious minorities pose unique challenges to the emergence and spread of 
liberal norms. 4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy,” The Atlantic Monthly, February 1993. As Lewis writes, 
“almost all aspects of Muslim government have an intensely personal character. In principle, at  
least, there is no state, but only a ruler; no court, but only a judge. There is not even a city with defined powers, 
limits, and functions, but only an assemblage of neighborhoods.” In other words, Islam rejects nearly every 
form of human association that fills the space between individuals and God, nations very much included. See 
also Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (New York: Routledge, 2013): 5 
2 Bernard Lewis, Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010): 66 
3 Shadi Hamid, Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2016): 49 
4 Regarding the status of women, see verse 4:11, which specifies that a woman is to receive half the inheritance 
of a man, verse 2:282, which proclaims that her legal testimony counts for half as much, and verse 4:3, which 
allows Muslim men to marry up to four wives and to own an unlimited number of concubines. Regarding 
religious minorities, see verse 9:5, which commands Muslims to “fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find 
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 At the same time, however, the Islamic tradition also features highly egalitarian 
elements. Unlike Christianity, there is no formal clerical establishment, no attempt at 
mediation between God and individual believers. This means that any Muslim has the 
authority to challenge temporal authority on religious grounds—an authority he is 
encouraged to use if he believes a ruler to be insufficiently Islamic. The faith thus features a 
sort of allergy to hierarchy, a leveling impulse that is compatible with—or even conducive 
to—democracy. 
  But the true indication that Islam is not the main driver of the Arab democracy deficit 
is in empirics. Whatever Islam’s theoretical positions are, in actual practice, it is clear that 
Muslims can and do form strong national identities, and that they can and do organize 
democratic forms of government. For while the Arab world has struggled to build state-based 
patriotism and democracy, the broader Muslim world has experienced much more success in 
both regards. Concerning national identity, examples from Pakistan to Kurdistan to Central 
Asia vividly demonstrate that “non-Arab Muslims are in no way resistant to ethnic 
nationalism.”5 The Kurds, for example, are among the most world’s most fiercely patriotic 
peoples, tenaciously fighting to maintain their language and culture in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and 
Syria. In the latter three cases, both the Kurds and their neighbors are Sunni Muslims. Yet 
this shared faith has done little to limit Kurds’ consciousness of their own distinct 
ethnonational identity. Indeed, many highly active Kurdish nationalists remain devout 
Muslims, even in historically secular, left-wing parties such as Turkey’s PKK.6   
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them,” and verse 9:29, which enjoins them to fight Christians and Jews until they pay the jizya (religious tax) 
with “willing submission” and “feel themselves subdued.”  
5 Tristan Mabry, Nationalism, Language, and Muslim Exceptionalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2015): 4 
6 Galip Dalay, “Kurdish Nationalism Will Shape The Region’s Future,” Al Jazeera, July 12, 2015 
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 With respect to democracy, the distinction between Arab and Muslim experiences is 
even sharper. This is convincingly demonstrated in a 2003 analysis by Alfred Stepan and 
Graeme Robertson, which examines the systems of governance in sixteen Arab and thirty-
one Muslim-majority, non-Arab countries over a thirty-year period. Stepan and Robertson 
point out that, according to rankings by the Polity Project and Freedom House, eleven of the 
Muslim-majority states enjoyed at least three years of high political rights between 1972 and 
2002, but only one Arab country did.7 Approached in terms of “country-years,” Arab 
countries were electorally competitive for only 3 out of 434 possible country-years, whereas 
non-Arab Muslim-majority countries met this criteria in 97 of a possible 697 years.8 Non-
Arab Muslim-majority countries were thus nearly 20 times more ‘electorally competitive’ 
than their Arab counterparts during the period of Stepan and Robertson’s analysis. As a 
result, there can be no doubt that there is “an Arab more than Muslim democracy gap.”9 
 Six years after the Arab Spring, the Arab-Muslim divide remains in place. According 
to Freedom House’s index (see Table 2.1), Tunisia is the only electoral democracy in the 
Arab world. But among the non-Arab Muslim-majority states, ten are classified as “electoral 
democracies”: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Indonesia, Kosovo, 
Pakistan, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.10 Polity’s most recent ranking (Table 2.2) shows very 
similar results, identifying one Arab and eleven non-Arab Muslim states as “institutionalized 
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7 Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "An ‘Arab’ More Than a ‘Muslim’ Democracy Gap," Journal of 
Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003): 30-44. 
8 It is interesting to note that all three years of “Arab electoral competitiveness” were in pre-Civil War Lebanon, 
where Christians largely controlled politics. But since the analysis was conducted in 2002, Tunisia’s strides 
toward democracy demonstrate that Arab Muslim states can experience democracy as well.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2017.” Arab Muslim states are defined as the members of the Arab 
league minus Comoros, Djibouti, Somalia, and Mauritania, while 28 “non-Arab Muslim-majority states” are 
determined according to figures in “The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Center, January 2011 
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democracies.”11 The two rankings agree that that while barely five percent of the Arab world 
can be called “democratic,” at least a third of the broader Muslim world earns this 
appellation. 
 
Table 2.1: Freedom House Democracy Rankings for Arab and Muslim states (2016) 
Freedom House 
non-Arab Muslim-
majority “electoral 
democracies” (10) 
Freedom House non-
Arab Muslim-majority 
“other” (20) 
Freedom House 
Arab “electoral 
democracies” (1) 
Freedom House Arab 
“other” (17) 
Albania, 
Bangladesh, Bosnia, 
Burkina Faso, 
Comoros, 
Indonesia, Kosovo, 
Pakistan, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Brunei, Chad, Djibouti, 
Gambia, Guinea, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Somalia, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Tunisia Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Palestinian 
Authority, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen 
 
Table 2.2: Polity Democracy Rankings for Arab and Muslim states (2014) 
Polity non-Arab 
Muslim-majority 
“institutionalized 
democracies” (11) 
Polity non-Arab Muslim-
majority “other” (16) 
Polity Arab 
“institutionalized 
democracies” (1) 
Polity Arab “other” 
(16) 
Albania, Comoros, 
Indonesia, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Malaysia, Niger, 
Pakistan, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, 
Turkey 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Djibouti, Gambia, 
Guinea, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Mali, 
Mauritania, Somalia, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Lebanon Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen 
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11 Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, “Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Stability,” Center 
for Systemic Peace.  
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 What explains the intra-Muslim divide in democratic outcomes? Could it be that Arab 
Islam is more menacing to democracy than Islam elsewhere? In his response to Stepan and 
Robertson, Sanford Lakoff contrasts the “intolerant triumphalism rampant in the [Arab] 
Islamic heartland” with the more moderate strands of the faith found on its geographic 
periphery.12 But drawing such a strong internal distinction between the “heart” and “fringes” 
of Islam undermines the entire case for Islamic exceptionalism. Even Lakoff seems to sense 
this, later reversing his position and contending that “the general bias of Muslim thinking, 
Arab and non-Arab, is in principle against the individualism, pluralism, and secularism 
characteristic of modern democracies.”13 Shadi Hamid, who agrees with Lakoff that Islam is 
exceptional and largely illiberal, is less equivocal on the matter of the faith’s regional 
divides. In his estimation, “Islam’s distinctive relationship to politics goes well beyond the 
Arab world or the Middle East.”14 To Hamid, the existence of Muslim democracies such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia is not thanks to “some readiness to embrace liberalism or 
secularism.”15 Rather, these countries are fundamentally distinguished by the fact that “the 
passage of Islamist legislation is less controversial domestically.”16 In other words, 
democracy can work in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia because of unity in the 
electorate. These countries boast “a [strong] middle…settled around a relatively 
uncontroversial conservative consensus,” with trust between factions so strong that even 
secular parties regularly promote sharia-based regulations.17  
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12 Sanford Lakoff, "The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism," Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 134 
13 Ibid., 136 
14 Hamid 33 
15 Ibid., 33-34 
16 Ibid., 34 
17 Ibid., 32 
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 Hamid calls the situation that prevails in Muslim democracies such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia “Islamism [without] Islamists”—a very different reality from the Arab Middle 
East, where he argues that proponents of political Islam are a distinct faction who often find 
themselves in conflict with the rest of the polity. According to Hamid’s argument, Islam 
itself is the same everywhere, but its political footprint varies according to the unique 
circumstances at work in each individual society. While the faith causes few problems among 
the relatively unified Indonesians and Malaysians, in the fragmented and fragile environment 
of the Middle East, it is much more likely to cause democracy-killing conflict.  
 As suggested in the preceding chapter, a strong, unifying national identity is one of 
the most powerful forces that can be marshaled against fragmentation and fragility. If 
Hamid’s theory is true, the existence of such an identity should thus be correlated with 
significantly less Islam-related conflict. And, on an empirical level, it is. In his analysis of 
Muslim national movements, Tristan Mabry finds that across Muslim contexts “a strong 
ethnonational identity correlates with a conspicuous absence of Islamism.”18 Studying the 
Kurds of Iraq, the Uighurs of China, the Sindhis of Pakistan, the Kashmiris of India, the 
Acehnese of Indonesia, the Moros of the Philippines and the Arabs of the Middle East, he 
concludes that “Islamism…functions as a kind of opportunistic infection: it infects citizens 
who are not immunized by an ethnonational bond.”19 The groups with the strongest 
ethnolinguistic “print cultures”—the Kurds, Uighurs and Sindhis—are also the least 
receptive to Islamist politics. In Arab states, by way of contrast, it is precisely “the lack of a 
coherent national identity” that simultaneously gives Islamists strength and makes their 
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18 Mabry 4 
19 Ibid., 5 
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proposals so divisive.20  Ultimately, Mabry goes so far as to argue, “the prescribed 
‘treatment’ for Islamism may, in effect, be nationalism.”21  
 
Economics 
 Focusing on Islam is, of course, only one possible way to explain the Arab democracy 
deficit. A very different way of analyzing the problem is to hone in on the region’s economic 
circumstances. Scholars who take this approach argue that Arab countries have resisted 
democratization not because of ancient texts or mindsets, but as a result of market forces. 
Mehran Kamrava, for example, contends that the Arab countries have failed to develop 
sufficiently “autonomous and powerful” private sectors or middle classes.22  As a result, they 
lack actors sufficiently independent enough to “push for state accountability and 
democratization.”23 In other words, the problem is not necessarily that the Arab states are 
poor; it is that their economies are too top-heavy and state-centric to produce the independent 
power bases necessary to meaningfully challenge the ruling regimes. Fareed Zakaria agrees 
with this assessment. “There is a dominant business class in the Middle East,” he grants, “but 
it owes its position to oil or connections to the ruling families. Its wealth is that of feudalism, 
not capitalism, and its political effects remain feudal as well.”24 Until “a genuine 
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20 Ibid., 84. Some may question whether Islamism was simply stronger to begin with in the Arab world, and 
whether this initial strength prevented the growth of national identity. Later chapters will show that this was 
decidedly not the case: Islamism grew, flourished and became divisive only after time and only in states that 
failed to build cohesive national identities.  
21 Ibid., 5 
22 Mehran Kamrava, "The Middle East's Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective," Perspectives on 
Global Development and Technology 6, no. 1 (2007): 205 
23 Ibid. 
24 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom : Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2003): 153 
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entrepreneurial business class” emerges, he is doubtful that the region will be able to 
transition to democracy.25  
 Like the argument blaming the democracy deficit on Islam, the “economics” 
explanation is founded on some truth. But in many ways, it is a perfect example of what Ghia 
Nodia calls the “Western [tendency toward] economic determinism” in comparative 
politics.26 A myopic focus on “development” misses the fact that democracy is more than a 
mechanical system. As Nodia puts it,  
 “it is far from certain that all countries have to wait until they are "ripe" for 
democracy before taking the final step. Rare are the cases like those in East 
Asia or Chile where the socioeconomic conditions needed for democracy were 
met before authoritarian regimes were dismantled like so much useless 
scaffolding. Rather, democracy has more often been spread in a much less 
rational way—like a contagion or the latest fashion from Paris.”27 
 
By comparing the spread of democracy to a “contagion” or “fashion,” Nodia is of course 
referencing the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, his own area of special 
expertise. In most of these erstwhile communist states, there was no private sector in the run-
up to democratic revolution. There was no entrepreneurial business class agitating for 
freedom. But while this may have slowed transitions to democracy, it did not stop them.  
 Even if democratization did depend on the presence of a strong private sector and 
middle class, economic development is not an a priori phenomenon; it depends on a number 
of contributing factors. And in many regards, a strong national identity would support 
precisely the changes Kamrava and Zakaria call for. For the trust created by shared national 
bonds is not only important on a political level—it is also deeply valuable economically. As !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Kamrava, Zakaria, and others who focus on economics are representatives of the general “modernization 
school” of democracy scholarship, which argues that democracy only emerges when certain conditions of 
development are present. For an overview of this position, see Ronald Englehart and Christian Welzel, “How 
Development Leads to Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 88 no.2 (2009):33-48. 
26 Nodia 4 
27 Ibid., 16 
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David Miller writes, “Certain kinds of trust are required to support the ground rules of a 
market: individuals must have confidence in one another to deal fairly, to keep contracts, and 
to refrain from using their industrial or financial muscle to oblige the state to intervene in the 
market on their behalf.” A society divided into exclusive factions of religion, ethnicity or 
class has a much smaller basis for such trust than one unified by an “encompassing [national] 
community.”28  
 Trust is far from the only way that state-based patriotism would benefit economic 
development. Ernest Gellner—who, along with Benedict Anderson, is widely regarded as the 
nationalism scholar par excellence—explains that a strong national identity also has far-
reaching consequences in the modernization and industrialization of agrarian economies. 
This is because modern economies depend on workers who are able to do more than just 
“plough, reap and thresh.” Instead, they “must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity 
to another, and must…be able to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free 
messages.”29 For such a flexible, skilled workforce to arise, “literate high cultures” must 
merge with “illiterate low or folk cultures,” integrating all of society into one relatively 
homogenous composite.30 From Western Europe to East Asia, the way this has occurred is 
through the “nationalist principle,” which has again and again linked previously disparate 
aristocrats and peasants into unified economic and political communities.  
 Gellner’s analysis is highly relevant to the situation of the modern Middle East.31 As 
the previous chapter suggested, the slow growth of state-based national identity has resulted 
in a situation where the divide between “high” and “low” cultures is as strong as ever, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Miller, On Nationalism, 91 
29 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 35 
30 Ibid., 77 
31 Something that should not be surprising, given that he did his early fieldwork in the Atlas Mountains of 
Morocco.  
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where literacy is abnormally low.32 There can be little doubt that this holds the region back 
economically, inhibiting the growth of a strong private sector and middle class. The 
continued primacy of Modern Standard Arabic is at the heart of the problem: as Mabry 
writes, “while there is no debate on the exquisite sophistication and eloquence of MSA, its 
immutability and exclusivity in the public sphere is…a liability [and] a competitive 
disadvantage in an age of industrialization, modernization and globalization”33 It is a 
“standard impediment to literacy,” and even for those who can read and write, its distance 
from vernacular Arabic serves as a profound barrier to efficient self-expression. A good 
snapshot of the problem is provided by global university rankings; according to The Times of 
London's 2017 assessment, no Arab university can be counted among the world’s top 200 
institutions, and two Saudi schools are the only Arab representatives in the top 500. The 
latest Shanghai Ranking agrees, putting no non-Saudi Arab universities among the best 500 
global institutions. This paucity of educational excellence is particularly debilitating in an era 
where the global economy increasingly values knowledge, information and communication, 
and is an apt illustration of the developmental problems that emerge as a result of weak state-
based national identities.  
 
Oil 
 
 Blaming the Arab democracy deficit on an oil-driven “resource curse” is a variation 
of the economics-centric argument articulated by Kamrava and Zakaria. This explanation is 
based on rentier theory, which holds that if a state relies on “rents” from natural resources 
rather than on taxes, its citizens will not demand government accountability. As Larry 
Diamond argues, the state apparatus in a major oil-producing country will likely be “large, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Up to 100 million “Arabs” lack proficiency in Modern Standard Arabic. See Mabry 60-61 
33 Mabry 68 
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centralized, and repressive, [able to] support any number of bloated bureaucracies as de facto 
employment programs meant to buy political peace with government paychecks.”34 These 
states are also generally “intensely policed, since there is plenty of money to lavish on a huge 
and active state-security apparatus.”35 To make matters worse, they tend to be “profoundly 
corrupt,” because the money from oil rents is “no one’s tax money,” and is in a sense is “free 
for the taking.”36 Ultimately, Diamond fears, the effects of the oil curse are almost 
insurmountable, severely damaging the chances for democracy in the eleven Arab countries 
he deems to be “reliant on oil and gas rents…to keep their states afloat.”37 
 The “oil curse” is undoubtedly important in certain countries. But it is not as 
fundamental to the region’s woes as Diamond suggests. While it is true that eleven Arab 
countries are significant oil exporters, the reality is that only six qualify as full rentier states: 
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These are the 
only Arab countries that can afford not to tax their citizens, and, along with Lebanon, are the 
only ones with unemployment rates below ten percent or per capita incomes in the top 100 
globally (see Table 2.3).38 In other words, they are the only states that are “buying off” their 
citizens in any meaningful sense.  
 Even among the rentier states, there is some internal variation regarding democracy. 
Some nations are decidedly less “cursed” than others. Kuwait, for example, has long featured 
a semi-constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system where a degree of meaningful 
debate and decision-making does take place. Open opposition to the ruling regime is often !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Diamond 98 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid., 97 
38 “GDP Per Capita PPP,” Trading Economics, accessed December 21, 2016 
“Unemployment Rate by Country,” Trading Economics, accessed December 20, 2016 
“List of Countries by Personal Income Tax Rate,” Trading Economics, accessed December 20, 2016 
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tolerated. Accordingly, the state’s Freedom House political rights rating (where 1 is the best 
and 7 is the worst) has fluctuated in recent years between 4 and 5, earning it a consistent 
designation of “partly free”—far better than any of its rentier state counterparts.39 And, 
perhaps not coincidentally, Kuwait is also the Gulf monarchy with the most highly developed 
state-based nationalism. As Jill Crystal puts it, “Kuwait is unusual among its neighbors in 
that it has a well-established national identity and a long history as a nation.”40 Kuwaiti 
patriotism is well-defined enough that when Iraq invaded the country in 1990, it was unable 
to find even a few dozen native citizens willing to staff a puppet government—a pitfall it 
certainly could have avoided “had Kuwait’s national identity been more fragile.”41 Kuwait’s 
status as an outlier regarding both democracy and national identity is an intriguing indication 
that, even in an extremely difficult environment created by high oil rents, the trust and 
solidarity fomented by state-based patriotism can still be highly relevant.  
 Beyond the Gulf, the other major oil producers in the Arab world—namely Algeria, 
Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Yemen—do not qualify as rentier states. Their high populations (see 
Table 2.7) mean that they must levy substantial income taxes and must contend with high 
levels of poverty and unemployment—undermining the case that any of them is actually 
financing “political peace with government paychecks.”42 Per capita income in these five 
countries ranges from $2,700 (Yemen) to $15,200 (Iraq)—similar to the range in non-oil-
producing Arab states, which is $5,100 (Syria) to $18,300 (Lebanon), and far below the 
range in the Gulf monarchies, which is $43,700 (Oman) to $132,900 (Qatar).43  
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 As Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate, the Gulf monarchies are clear outliers regarding 
taxation, unemployment and per-capita income. The “oil curse” is likely operative among 
them, and may explain a significant portion of their resistance to democracy. But these 
wealthy petrostates contain a very small proportion of the Arab world’s population. When 
migrant guest workers are not counted, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and 
Kuwait have a combined population of less than six million; adding Saudi Arabia raises the 
“rentier-state” population to just 25.7 million.44 Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 highlight the fact that 
this is barely seven percent of the Arab world’s total non-immigrant population of 
approximately 350 million. 
 The “oil curse,” then, is not the driving force behind the democracy deficit in the vast 
majority of the Arab world. From Egypt to Iraq and from Yemen to Algeria, something else 
must be at work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 “The World Factbook,” United States Central Intelligence Agency, accessed December 18, 2016 
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Table 2.3: Economic indicators in oil-producing rentier states45 
 Top personal 
income tax rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Per capita 
income (PPP) 
Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Bahrain 0% 4% $49,600 7 
Kuwait 0% 2% $70,500 5 
Oman 0% 7% $43,700 6 
Qatar 0% 0% $132,900 6 
Saudi Arabia 0% 6% $53,800 7 
UAE 0% 4% $67,200 6 
 
Table 2.4: Economic indicators in oil-producing but non-rentier Arab states 
 Top personal 
income tax 
rate46 
Unemployment 
rate 
Per capita 
income (PPP) 
Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Algeria 35% 10% $14,500 6 
Iraq 15% 15% $15,200 5 
Libya 10% 20% (prewar) $14,700 6 
Sudan 15% 20% $4,400 7 
Yemen47 15% 29% $2,700 7 
 
Table 2.5: Economic indicators in non-oil-producing, non-rentier Arab states 
 Top personal 
income tax rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Per capita 
income (PPP) 
Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Egypt 25% 13% $11,800 6 
Jordan48 14% 15% $10,900 5 
Lebanon 20% 6% $18,300 5 
Morocco 38% 10% $8,200 5 
Palestine49 20% 27% $5,300 6 
Syria 22% 15% (prewar) $5,100 (prewar) 7 
Tunisia 35% 16% $11,500 1 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Data in all tables from previously cited Trading Economics databases and 2017 Freedom House country 
reports 
46 Although the rates reported here are for the highest income bracket, all of these states begin taxing citizens at 
relatively low income levels. For example, according to Santander Bank’s Trade Portal, Algeria implements a 
20% income tax on annual incomes above $1,000. Moreover, all five states levy taxes on consumption and 
corporations.  
47 Yemen is an extremely impoverished country, and few analysts regard it as a rentier state. However, most of 
its exports come from oil extraction, and for this reason Diamond treats it as one of his eleven “Arab rentier 
states.”  
48 Some have argued that Jordan—which has no oil reserves—is a rentier state because of the high proportion of 
aid it receives from the Gulf and from the United States. But Jordan has a top tax rate of 14%, an 
unemployment rate of 15%, and a per capita income of $10,900—very comparable statistics to those found in 
the other non-oil producing, non-rentier Arab states. 
49Information on Palestine comes from the World Bank “Doing Business” project, as well as from the US State 
Department’s 2013 Investment Climate Statement for the West Bank and Gaza. The political rights data is for 
the West Bank.   
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Table 2.6: Population in non-oil producing, non-rentier states50 
Egypt 94,700,000 
Jordan 8,100,000 
Lebanon 6,200,000 
Morocco 33,700,000 
Palestinian Territories 4,400,000 
Syria 17,100,000 
Tunisia 11,100,000 
Total 175,300,000 
(Data in this and following two tables from the CIA World Factbook) 
 
Table 2.7: Population in oil-producing, non-rentier states51 
Algeria 40,200,000 
Iraq 38,100,000 
Libya 5,700,000 
Sudan 36,700,000 
Yemen 27,400,000 
Total 148,100,000 
 
Table 2.8: Population in oil-producing rentier states52 
Bahrain 700,000 
Kuwait 1,200,000 
Oman 2,100,000 
Qatar 300,000 
Saudi Arabia 20,000,000 
United Arab Emirates 1,400,000 
Total 25,700,000 
 
 
 
Regime Statecraft 
 The final major explanation for the Arab democracy deficit is in some ways related to 
the “oil curse” argument. Posed by Eva Bellin, this account of the region’s woes holds that 
Arab authoritarians have survived thanks to an exceptional combination of willingness and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Many Syrian citizens are currently living as refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, increasing those states’ 
populations and decreasing Syria’s.  
51 Libya’s population is listed in the CIA World Factbook as around 6.5 million, but 12% are described as 
migrant workers, leaving a citizen population of 5.7 million.  
52 All six populations figures are for citizens, and do not include non-citizen migrant workers  
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ability “to suppress democratic initiative.” 53 On one hand, she argues, Arab states’ resource 
wealth and adeptness at capturing international aid gives them the financial capacity to build 
highly effective “coercive apparatuses.” On the other, most of the regimes rely on sectarian 
and ethnic support rather than on institutional backing, making them uniquely willing to use 
these tools of oppression. As Bellin writes, the fact that elites are chosen on a personalistic 
and sectarian basis means that they would lose their positions—and even their lives—if faced 
with “political opening and popular accountability.”54 They thus have a very high incentive to 
maintain the authoritarian status quo.  
 Writing in 2004, Bellin observed that they had been very successful in this effort. 
Most Arab authoritarians had successfully engineered their societies such that genuine 
challenges to their rule did not even arise. As she writes, the truly unique fact about the Arab 
world was not that democracy had failed to consolidate; it was that most states had “failed to 
initiate transition at all.”55 In her analysis, something about the Arab world simply precluded 
the formation of “mammoth, cross-class coalitions [mobilizing] on the streets to push for 
reform.”56 
Since 2004, times have changed—as Bellin acknowledged in 2012, the uprisings of 
2011 were a “jarring …empirical surprise,” forcing scholars to dispense with arguments 
based on the supposed “complacency” of the Arab public.57 But she argues that her core 
observation—that is, that a regime’s survival depends on its willingness and ability to build 
and use a powerful coercive apparatus—has been vindicated. When a “coercive apparatus” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 152 
54 Ibid., 149 
55 Ibid., 142 
56 Ibid., 150 
57 Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab 
Spring," Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127-49.  
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refused to fire on protestors, as in Egypt and Tunisia, regimes quickly fell; when it forcefully 
repressed demonstrations, as in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya, dictators proved much 
more resilient. To her, then, the central lesson of the Arab Spring is that coercive apparatuses 
drive the region’s fate. If a regime’s security forces are drawn from a narrow, “patrimonial” 
pool, they will employ violent repression and fight fiercely against forces of change. But if 
an authoritarian system empowers elites from across society, it will yield more quickly when 
challenged.  
But what creates the conditions favorable to the emergence of a patrimonial elite in 
the first place? Long before the Arab Spring, what conspired to ensure that Tunisian security 
forces would be less removed from the protestors than their Egyptian counterparts—and what 
made the Egyptians, in turn, much “closer to the people” than the Libyans or Syrians?  
Could it be that a strong, healthy national identity worked against the consolidation of 
narrow, oppressive interests and in favor of more open, inclusive political dynamics? The 
next chapters will examine the Arab nations on a case-by-case basis and test the validity of 
this hypothesis.  !!!!!! !
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3   Indicting Arabism 
 ! It is almost common knowledge that, in most of the Arab world, state-based national 
identity is quite weak. As Israeli political scientist Benjamin Miller puts it, “the nation-building 
enterprise has not succeeded” in the region; especially in the Fertile Crescent, citizens identify 
with their states at much lower rates than is common in the rest of the world.1 According to 
polling by public opinion expert Shibley Telhami, while Arabic-speakers juggle “multiple 
identities,” they currently identify “less with their countries and…more with Islam and as 
Arabs.”2 As of 2010, he found that respondents in North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf 
expressed support for “Muslim” and “Arab” interests at more than twice the rate they advocated 
for their own nations (see Table 3.1). And while identities are clearly fluid, anti-state patterns 
shows few signs of abating soon; many analysts argue that regional satellite media and other 
forms of transnational electronic communication are serving to reinforce Arab identity at the 
expense of local nationalism.3  
Table 3.1: Shibley Telhami’s Polling on Arab Identities4 
“Do you think your government should base its decisions mostly on what is best for:” 
 2008 2009 2010 
Muslims 22% 14% 39% 
Arabs 29% 22% 23% 
The world 11% 4% 5% 
Your country 38% 50% 31% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Benjamin Miller, "Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-
Propensity," Security Studies 15, no. 4 (2006): 683 
2 Shibley Telhami, “Egypt’s Identity Crisis,” The Washington Post, 16 August 2013 
3 See, for example Khalil Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism: McArabism, Al-Jazeera, and Transnational Media in the 
Arab World (Lanham MD, University Press of America, 2006). 
4 Shibley Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East. 
(New York: Basic Books, 2013): 28 
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 It is worth noting that Telhami’s poll—already indicative of weak national identity—in 
fact overestimates the strength of state-based patriotism. This is because his sample of six states 
includes Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco, which Chapters 4 and 5 will argue have prioritized 
local identity to a greater extent than any other Arab state save Tunisia. The true balance of 
regional sentiment is thus probably even less favorable for individual nation-states than Telhami 
indicates.  
 This weakness of state-based national identity sets the Arab Middle East apart from 
other regions of the world. Table 3.2 highlights data from the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), which found in 2004 that across 21 European countries, 88% of respondents 
felt “very close” or “close” to their nations; only 2% did not feel close at all.5 Other years of 
ISSP data, as well as Eurobarometer polling, yield very similar results.6 
 
Table 3.2: State-based national identity in Europe (ISSP 2004) 
 “Very close” “Close” “Not very close” “Not close at all” 
To nation 45% 43% 10% 2% 
To Europe 19% 38% 29% 14% 
 
 Low identification with state-based patriotism thus appears to be a defining feature of 
the modern Arab world. But was the current state of affairs inevitable? Or did it arise as a result 
of distinct and reversible choices? Many commentators and analysts of the Middle East are 
quick to side with the former position. According to their argument, “the boundaries of the 
[Arab states] were set without any correlation to the populations therein and thus [did not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Max Haller and Regina Ressler, “National and European Identity,” Revue Française de Sociologie 47, no. 4 
(2006): 817-850 
6 Marco Antonsich, “Territory and Identity in the Age of Globalization,” (doctoral thesis, University of Colorado, 
2007): 124 
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promote] any sense of solidarity.”7 As a result, the states currently in place have little or no 
authentic national heritage to which they can appeal. They were doomed from the start, destined 
to fail as soon as border-drawers failed to take into account that Arabs “subscribed to a 
panregional, surprastate form of nationalism that did not accord with the reality of nation-
states.”8  
 History, however, tells a different story. Prior to World War I, Middle Easterners who 
agitated against Ottoman control generally did so through the framework of “societies 
promoting regional interests, such as independence for Syria, Lebanon, or Iraq,” rather than 
from a pan-Arab standpoint.9 This trend toward local nationalism accelerated after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. From Cairo to Damascus to Beirut, vibrant movements inspired by wataniyya 
(local, state-centered nationalism) grew and flourished, rapidly replacing tribal and sectarian 
identities as Middle Easterners’ primary means of self-identification. As later chapters will 
show, by the 1930s, nearly all of the Arabic-speaking states appeared to be well on their way to 
articulating distinctive national identities.  
 What reversed this trend, weakening wataniyya and undermining the legitimacy and 
cohesiveness of Arab states? The answer, in a word, is qawmiyya, or pan-Arab nationalism. 
That qawmiyya would one day become a powerful, regionally defining force would have 
shocked most observers after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Arabism began as a small 
minority viewpoint, advocated by scarcely more than a hundred individuals. These proponents 
were outliers in their societies, “men who were kindled by the incendiary ideas of European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Joseph Kostiner, "Solidarity in the Arab State—an Historical Perspective," in Challenges to the Cohesion of the 
Arab State (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2008): 21, 23 
8 Ibid., 22 
9Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 30.  
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nationalism,” and believed that the Arab world should emulate the “German” vision of the 
nation.10  
 For decades, this small band of pan-Arabists struggled to find a foothold. Would-be 
leaders of an “Arab nation” were frustrated at every turn, met by groundswells of localized 
nationalism in each of the states they attempted to influence—even in internally divided, newly 
cobbled together polities such as Iraq.11 Across the region, “many insisted they were not Arabs 
at all, professing an attachment to an altogether different identity.” They regarded the language 
they spoke as an “accident of history, of little consequence, hardly warranting an association 
with the despised and uncouth Bedouin who to many urbanites constituted the true definition of 
an Arab.”12 As American-Israeli political scientist Martin Kramer writes, the Arab nationalists 
were “faced with masses of people who had not chosen to be Arabs,” and had no way forward 
except to “develop a doctrine that denied them any other choice.”13  
 This doctrine would be provided by pan-Arabism’s foremost ideologue, Yemeni-born 
educator Sati’ al-Husri. His concept was simple: “Every person who speaks Arabic is an 
Arab.”14 Even if he believes himself to be Egyptian, Lebanese or Syrian, “he is an Arab 
regardless of his own wishes.”15 Husri understood this premise would not originally draw much 
support—after all, writes renowned Arab nationalism scholar Adeed Dawisha, he knew that the 
“Arab dialects were so varied as to make nonsense of the notion of linguistic unity.”16 However, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This vision, advocated by the likes of Herder and Fichte, essentially held that the nation should be delineated 
based on exclusively ethnolinguistic criteria. 
11 Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2009), 128. 
12 Dawisha 72 
13 Martin Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 (1993), 180. 
14 Translation by Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, 72. 
15 Ibid., 72 
16 Ibid., 67. As Tristan Mabry writes, “Incomprehension between native speakers of different demotic Arabics is 
more rule than exception. A simultaneous conversation in the mother tongues of people from Rabat, Algiers, Cairo, 
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organic support did not matter: if Arab nationalists could manage to “teach [objectors] the truth” 
or “work to limit [their] selfishness,” opposition would rapidly dissipate.17 These prescriptions 
were euphemisms for a range of totalitarian tactics, including educational indoctrination and 
denigration of demotic forms of Arabic. In essence, the success of Arab nationalism would 
depend on cutting people off from their local roots, replacing their historical memories with a 
manufactured Arabist narrative. In Dawisha’s analysis, “Husri and the other custodians of the 
nationalist narrative would go out of their way to exaggerate, obfuscate, and even invent historic 
fact, and then use their official power to impose their version of this ‘doctored’ history on 
successive generations of people.”18 
They had remarkable success. By the 1950s, educational indoctrination, widespread anti-
Western sentiment, and increasing sympathy for Arabic-speaking Palestinians had combined to 
make the Middle East significantly more receptive to Husri’s ideas. In Iraq, for example, where 
Husri served as education minister, “doctored history…was the prime agent in the socialization 
of Iraqi citizens to Arab nationalist culture.”19 The groundwork was thus laid for a decisive 
turning point, which came in 1954 with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to 
reverse his country’s traditional position toward Arab nationalism. Suddenly, the Middle East’s 
most eloquent leader became a full-throated voice for Arab unity. In part due to the influential 
Egyptian media, and in part due to his opportune historical timing, Nasser was able to rally a 
generation of supporters to his cause. The ensuing acceptance of “Nasserism”—based as it was 
in Husri’s explicitly authoritarian ideology—had immediate consequences for democracy across 
the region. In Syria, supporters of wataniyya and liberalism were cleared aside by the 1958 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Sana and Tikrit is a nonstarter.” See Tristan Mabry, Nationalism, Language, and Muslim Exceptionalism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015): 77 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 74 
19 Ibid., 78 
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union with Egypt, which “dealt a mortal blow to political pluralism, opening the way to decades 
of Ba’athist dictatorship.”20 Syria was not alone: within a decade, Arabist military dictators had 
also swept to power in Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Libya and Sudan. Reflecting on this sequence of 
events in his book The Second Arab Awakening, Adeed Dawisha writes,  
“Revolutionary nationalism…operated in a sea of authoritarianism throughout its 
glory days not because of some unfortunate circumstance. Indeed, it was the way 
that Arab nationalism was defined that was to blame, if not wholly then at least 
partially, for the absence of democracy.”21  
 
Husri’s definition of the nation met none of the criteria for “healthy” national identity outlined 
in Chapter 1. It was not based on popular support, not inclusive, and not respectful of borders. It 
encouraged—and even demanded—top-down, authoritarian tactics. And it thus proved to be a 
decisive force for the de-liberalization of politics whenever and wherever it was adopted.  
The sudden rise of qawmiyya had an extremely deleterious effect on the Arab world’s 
long-term democratic development. From their early stages, Arab nationalist regimes—
committed to separating supporters of wataniyya from their own deeply-felt identities—had 
refused to tolerate political dissent. This became increasingly true after the failed 1967 conflict 
against Israel fatally undermined pan-Arabism’s credibility and cost the ideology most of its 
revolutionary appeal. Dictators who had once enjoyed significant support no longer could count 
on qawmiyya to justify their oppressive measures.  
But rather than returning to an emphasis on wataniyya, the region’s autocrats did not 
retreat significantly from their adherence to the battered Arabist standard. While most 
qawmiyya-supporting regimes did assert a degree of individuality, especially in foreign 
relations, none of them “[went] so far as to equate the importance of their distinct territorial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 William Harris, "The Crisis of Democracy in Twentieth-Century Syria and Lebanon," in Challenges to 
Democracy in the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.: Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, 1997), 6 
21 Adeed Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from Tunis to 
Damascus (New York: Norton, 2013), 68 
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qualities with that of pan-Arab unity…and they certainly did not dare sever their ties with 
Arabism.”22 As a result, political scientist Joseph Kostiner argues, “the search for a distinct 
identity was left in a state of suspended animation,” and “the level of state-specific nationalism 
[remained] a far cry from the European model.”23  
One key manifestation of this attitude was the regimes’ insistence on maintaining the 
official status of Modern Standard Arabic. Even though none of their citizens spoke MSA 
natively, the language had been the cornerstone of Sati’ al-Husri’s ideology, and the region’s 
autocrats were loath to compromise its exalted place in their societies. As discussed in Chapter 
1, insisting on linguistic homogeneity and repressing popularly-spoken dialects is highly 
inimical to democratic governance. And sure enough, the regimes’ continued emphasis on MSA 
has had far-reaching consequences, alienating citizens from the state and from one another. This 
alienation is based on the fact that—as demonstrated by researchers at the University of Haifa—
speakers of Standard Arabic process it as a second language, experiencing a “cognitive 
disparity” between their mother tongues and the idiom they are expected to use in official 
settings.24 Like second languages the world over, MSA remains the sole preserve of the well-
educated—even today, upwards of 100 million “Arabs” lack adequate proficiency in Standard 
Arabic.25 The regimes’ insistence on MSA has thus created vast populations “in states but not of 
states,” predicating citizenship on a language few feel comfortable using and many cannot use 
at all. Whereas elevating and standardizing popularly-spoken forms of Arabic would have built 
national solidarity and encouraged active citizenship, the continued dominance of MSA foments 
internal division and inhibits political participation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Kostiner, "Solidarity in the Arab State,” 33 
23 Ibid. 
24 See research from the University of Haifa: "Literary Arabic Is Expressed In Brain Of Arabic Speakers As A 
Second Language," ScienceDaily, November 5, 2009.  
25 Mabry 60-61 
 ! 62 
Absent the cohesion and dynamism that could have been provided by wataniyya, it is 
entirely unsurprising that the Arabist regimes after 1967 came to rely more and more on 
“centralized and authoritarian [structures] to stay in power.”26 From Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to 
Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya, qawmiyya-supporting leaders across the region hastened to 
consolidate what political scientist Daniel Brumberg calls “harmonic states.”27 Such states 
“attempt to create unity or its appearance through repression, oppression, cooptation, or 
distraction”—an originally enticing proposal that eventually becomes a trap, “creat[ing] a 
unipolar field that can easily become a place for deadly games of ‘winner takes all’ between 
rulers and their opponents.”28 As later chapters will show, every single one of the Arab 
nationalist regimes followed this pattern, doggedly attempting to eliminate ideological diversity 
within their societies. There was, of course, one exception: the reigning despots knew that 
Islam’s social and cultural roots were too deep to simply be stamped out. Rather than attempting 
to erase the religion, they thus attempted instead to co-opt its dynamism.  
 
From Arabism to Islamism 
As the only viable alternative ideology in Arabist states, Islamism attracted a growing 
range of supporters, including many groups that had not traditionally aligned themselves with 
religion. According to political scientist Bassam Tibi, “[after] the Iranian revolution, many 
secularist Arab intellectuals…shifted away from Arab nationalism and in many cases even from 
Marxism as they have rediscovered Islam as a political ideology of opposition.”29 This influx 
dramatically increased the power of Islamist groups—most of which explicitly reject both the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid., 51 
27 Daniel Brumberg, "Islamists and the Politics of Consensus," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (2002), 113 
28 Ibid. 
29 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State, Third Edition (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1997), 229  
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nation-state and democracy.30 The rise of Islamism, then, has meant that across the Middle East, 
one powerful anti-nation-state ideology has taken the place of another.  
Before it reaches its full strength, ascendant Islamism serves regimes’ purposes by 
helping silence advocates of liberalism.31 As Islamist movements fracture and radical factions 
accumulate power, however, their “absolute denial of the legitimacy of the existing regimes” 
inevitably sets off violent conflict with Arabist and ex-Arabist autocrats.32 Though their enemies 
are fighting one another, liberals are further undermined in this stage of Islamist development. 
For, unable to fall back on shared wataniyya, they have little in common even with moderate 
Islamists, and are forced into reluctant alliances with police states. Fear of Islamist victories has 
produced what Daniel Brumberg calls “‘autocracy with democrats,’ as key groups that might 
choose democracy absent an Islamist threat now actively support or at least tolerate autocrats.”33 
This narrative has largely characterized the course of the Arab Spring, preventing a democratic 
flowering in states where national identity is not robust enough to create trust between Islamists 
and democrats.34 
 
Democratic Exceptions 
In the sea of autocracy that has stubbornly persisted across the Middle East, the nations 
of Tunisia and Lebanon provide a pair of democratic bright spots. At first glance, Tunisia and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 “Islamism rejects the modern order of a nation-state. It views it as an imposition on the Islamicate and envisions 
its replacement by the shari’a state.  In the footsteps of the late Qutb, the leading Egyptian Islamist of today, the 
Muslim Brother Yusuf Qaradawi, regarded as Qutb’s heir, addresses the issue by rejecting nation-building 
altogether. In his three-volume Hatmiyyat al-Hall al-Islami/The Islamic Solution, Qaradawi dismisses wholesale 
any adaptation or adoption based on cultural borrowing from Western civilization. At the top of the list of these 
rejections are democracy and the nation-state.” Bassam Tibi, The Shari’a State: Arab Spring and Democratization. 
(New York: Routledge, 2013): 104 
31 Matti Steinberg, "Anarchical Order in the Arab World," In Challenges to the Cohesion of the Arab State (Tel 
Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2008), 50 
32 Kostiner, "Solidarity in the Arab State—an Historical Perspective," 36. 
33 Brumberg, "Islamists and the Politics of Consensus,"112. 
34 Egypt and Syria are clear examples of this pattern. Algeria went through the same process in the 1990s. 
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Lebanon do not seem to have much in common: the former is almost uniformly Sunni Muslim, 
and from independence until 2011 had been persistently autocratic, whereas the latter is 
religiously diverse and has the longest democratic tradition in the Middle East. However, under 
this surface, Tunisia and Lebanon have charted similar post-independence paths, rejecting 
Arabism in exchange for state-based national identities. Unlike their neighbors, both states 
opted to cultivate multilingual, Mediterranean-oriented characters, tolerant and pluralistic 
foundations on which to build national politics. The two states have certainly had their 
difficulties, but today their regimes are the most liberal and democratic in the region, offering a 
salutary example to the entire Middle East.  
The comparative success of the Lebanese and Tunisians is not a function of the mere 
fact that they have distinct national identities—as was discussed earlier, nearly every state in the 
Middle East was in the process of developing and institutionalizing an organic wataniyya by the 
1930s. Rather, what has set Tunisia and Lebanon apart has been their ability to nurture their 
national identities despite the challenges posed by Arabism. By emphasizing their unique local 
roots, the two nations have increased internal cohesion, cultivating the trust necessary for 
democratic flourishing. 
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4 Arabism on Trial 
 
 The indispensible role played by wataniyya becomes particularly evident when the 
“success stories” of Tunisia and Lebanon are compared with their closest Arab counterparts. 
Egypt and Syria, respectively, share a great deal in common with the “democratic exceptions,” 
but have made entirely different choices regarding national identity. As this chapter will show, 
this has led them down a path of dictatorship, instability, and sectarian strife.  
 
Comparing Egypt and Tunisia 
 
 Of all the Arabic-speaking states, Tunisia’s closest counterpart is Egypt. The two North 
African countries are both highly ethnically and religiously homogenous; while Tunisia 
features a small minority of ethnic Berbers and Egypt is home to millions of Coptic Christians, 
the vast majority of citizens in both countries are Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims. Neither 
nation possesses major oil resources, and the two countries have long had similar rates of 
unemployment, per capita GDP, and population density (see Table 4.1). To be sure, Tunisia 
and Egypt had somewhat different colonial experiences; whereas Egypt was directly ruled by 
Great Britain for just eight years, Tunisia was under French control for a full three-quarters of 
a century. However, the period of close British involvement in Egyptian affairs (1882-1956) 
almost exactly coincided with Tunisia’s years under the French (1881-1956).  
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Table 4.1: Comparing Egypt and Tunisia  
 Tunisia Egypt 
European colonial contact 1881-1956 1882-1956 
2016 Per capita GDP (PPP)1 $11,500 $11,800 
2016 Unemployment rate2 16% 13% 
2015 Population density3 72 per km2  92 per km2  
Religious breakdown4 99% Sunni 90% Sunni 
 
Egypt 
 In 1920, Sati’ al-Husri and a group of his fellow Arab nationalists arrived in Egypt, 
expecting to receive “widespread support” from a population they saw as the “natural leaders” 
of Arab nationalism.5 But they were quickly disappointed. As an ancient people with a strong 
sense of place and a history of self-rule, Egyptians were overwhelmingly, and stubbornly, 
aligned behind their own unique identity.6 As Dawisha writes, “to most Egyptians, there had 
always been an ‘Egypt’ which was as ancient as the Nile, and whose sociopolitical roots could 
be traced all the way back to Pharonic times.”7 Husri himself was forced to acknowledge this: 
as he later wrote, the Egyptians “did not possess an Arab nationalist sentiment; did not accept 
that Egypt was part of the Arab lands, and would not acknowledge that the Egyptian people 
were part of the Arab nation.”8 Instead, as Arab historian Nicola Ziadeh affirms, “from the end 
of the nineteenth century until World War II, nationalism to the Egyptian meant essentially !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Egyptian nationalism and the nationalist struggle was perceived as exclusively an Egyptian 
struggle against foreign control.”9 
 For most Egyptians, this state-based national consciousness formed an integral part of 
daily life. According to historian Ziad Fahmy, newspapers, magazines, theater and music from 
early 20th century Egypt “facilitated a sense of collective camaraderie,” reflecting and 
reinforcing patriotism and shared identity.10 Throughout mass culture, Egyptians were 
portrayed as speaking and acting distinctively, and were “clearly, though tacitly, differentiated 
from non-Egyptians.”11 One of the most important characteristics of this vibrant identity was 
its emphasis on colloquial Egyptian Arabic. Whereas speaking Modern Standard Arabic was 
portrayed as “haughty and incomprehensively distant from everyday Egyptian life,” Cairene 
Arabic was lauded as the comprehensible and familiar tongue of an ibn al-balad, or “son of the 
nation.”12 Indeed, from the 1870s to 1940s, hundreds of Egyptian newspapers and magazines 
took the radical step of using the Arabic alphabet to publish in the local vernacular, earning the 
ire of conservative Muslims, but further cementing a widespread sense of wataniyya 
throughout society.13  
 State-specific nationalism was not limited to mass media and popular culture; 
wataniyya was arguably even stronger among Egypt’s leading thinkers. As Adeed Dawisha 
writes, throughout the 1920s, 30s and 40s, “the weight of considered intellectual opinion in 
Egypt was in favor of a uniquely Egyptian identity at the expense of an all-encompassing Arab 
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identity, which was depicted as spiritually bankrupt and intellectually backward.”14 For 
example, the journalist, poet and literary critic Abbas Muhamed al-‘Aqqad “differentiated the 
‘cultured Egyptian nation’ from ‘bedouin’ nations [and] wrote of the existence of a wide gulf 
between the retrogressive mentality of the Arabs and the progressive outlook of twentieth 
century Egyptians.”15 ‘Aqqad argued that Egyptians should move beyond “[their] past Arab 
centuries lest [they themselves] be asphyxiated by the dust of these centuries.”16 Another 
intellectual, Salame Musa, opined, “we do not owe the Arabs any loyalty. Our youth should 
not spend too much time on Arab culture. We need to get them accustomed to writing 
according to modern Egyptian methods rather than to archaic Arab styles.”17 Legendary 
novelist and philosopher Tawfiq al-Hakim agreed, holding that “Egypt and the Arabs were 
diametrically opposed in spirit and intellect,” a position he advanced in his most celebrated 
novel, ‘Awdat al-Ruh (The Return of the Soul).18  
 But the most important of the wataniyya-supporting Egyptian intellectuals was Taha 
Husayn, who was revered as Egypt’s “leading man of letters,”19 and earned a reputation as 
“the greatest thinker of [his] generation.”20 In Husayn’s conception, the Arabs were little more 
than “one of the many invaders of Egypt.”21 They were only one of the tribes that had tried and 
failed to suppress Egyptian civilization—a civilization that had existed continuously since the 
age of the Pharaohs. While each incoming group had left its mark, they had joined the 
Egyptian nation rather than subsuming or eliminating it. The result was a diverse, multifaceted 
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population that nonetheless remained distinctly Egyptian. As James Jankowski writes, 
“Husayn’s definition of Egyptian nationality was highly liberal and inclusive, extending to all 
dwellers of the Nile Valley—irrespective of their ethnic origin, language, and religion.”22 In 
other words, a Muslim, a Christian, a Jew, or a member of any other ethnic or religious 
community all had the same claim to Egyptian identity. This approach had explicit political 
implications: it was fundamentally democratic in that it valued all citizens equally. As a result, 
Husayn firmly believed that “Egyptians…should elect their representatives through the 
institutions and mechanisms of multiparty parliamentary government.”23 
 Husayn was not alone in his liberal, democratic bent. According to Israel Gershoni, he 
was part of the “mainstream current within the intellectual community”—a current that 
“[galvanized] and [institutionalized] a strong tradition of liberal democratic thought in 
Egypt.”24 Backed by such significant intellectual support, parliamentary government was able 
to serve from 1923 to 1952 “as the basic framework within which Egyptian political, social, 
and cultural life evolved.”25 And with multiple competitive political parties vying for seats in 
periodic national elections, parliamentary rule successfully “eroded the authoritarian political 
culture of the late Egyptian-Ottoman oligarchy…weakened British colonial rule…encouraged 
ethnic pluralism and religious tolerance, reduced the presence of the police and army, and 
cultivated rich cultural activity with minimal state intervention.”26 During these democratic 
decades, Gershoni writes, the public and civil spheres were open to and involved “old and 
young, men and women, Christians, Jews and Muslims, and elite and non-elite strata.”27 While 
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the situation was not perfect, Egypt existed for years as a relatively democratic state at the 
heart of the Arab world.  
 But this liberal interlude was not to last forever—and neither was the strength of 
wataniyya in Egyptian political life. In July 1952, a military coup overthrew the elected 
government, deposing the monarch and dissolving political parties. By 1954, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser had emerged as the leader of the revolutionary government. Convinced that “Arab 
disunity guaranteed Arab defeat,” he turned the full force of the state—and of his own 
considerable personal charisma—toward promulgating pan-Arab nationalism. 28 Though he 
was not an ideologue in the mode of Sati’ al-Husri, Nasser believed that “an Egyptian 
campaign to galvanize the citizens of other Arab states against Western alliances had to tap the 
most readily acceptable bond that drew Egyptians and the other Arabs together,”29 and that the 
only way to do this was “to subsume Egypt’s identity within the overall Arab identity.”30  
 This was a significant departure from Egypt’s past, but the Egyptian people’s support 
for the Palestinian cause, their distress over the failed Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, and their 
deep-rooted anger over the British occupation all pushed them towards Nasser’s pan-Arabist 
camp. The speed of ideological change was spurred by an overhaul and expansion of Egypt’s 
educational system; the revolutionary government built hundreds of new schools and trained 
thousands of new teachers, all of whom became “a living testimony…to Nasser’s policies and 
principles.”31 In the words of regional expert Laurie Brand, the state’s educational efforts 
amounted to “a program to rewrite modern Egyptian history,” purging it of so-called 
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“impurities” that contravened the Arabist narrative.32 By the early 1960s, accordingly, Nasser 
had successfully transformed “Egyptian perceptions” of Arab nationalism.33 
 The explicitly political manifestation of pan-Arabism—that is, the demand that all 
Arabic-speaking peoples be united under one government—was relatively short-lived. Within 
a decade, Nasser’s failed union with Syria and Yemen, his long, bloody war in the latter 
country, and his disastrous provocation of Israel combined to severely discredit calls for 
immediate Arab unity. However, qawmiyya’s effect in Egypt has lived on, badly damaging the 
country’s prospects for democracy.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, Arab nationalism was an inherently illiberal ideology, 
disdaining individuals’ right to choose—or even have a role in choosing—their own identity. 
In Nasser’s new order, liberal democracy and its associated institutions were seen as nothing 
more than Western impositions designed to divide Arabs from one another. Slogans like “Arab 
nationalism exterminates the Western political parties” regularly rang out in the streets and 
over the airwaves.34 Since “all Arabs supposedly adhered to one unifying vision,” there was no 
need for political parties, which would only “sow divisions in Arab ranks.”35 As a result, 
Egypt’s once-vibrant multiparty political scene was eliminated, replaced by the unitary state. 
A similar change occurred in the media. Before the revolution, there had been 28 daily and 30 
weekly newspapers published between Cairo and Alexandria alone, all of which were privately 
owned or produced by political parties.36 After the revolution, these were replaced by a 
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“handful of state-owned dailies…distinguished from each other only by the title on the front 
page.”37   
 One of the most important long-term results of Nasser’s years in power was a 
revolution in the status of colloquial Egyptian Arabic. According to Fahmy, pressure from the 
state meant that colloquial Egyptian had “almost entirely disappeared from print by the 
1950s,” ceding its once prominent status to MSA.38 A long process began whereby the 
popularly-spoken dialect was “vulgarized, belittled and marginalized by the intellectual 
elite.”39 The Egyptian government began to insist on using MSA in all official settings, 
including as the medium of education. It became common for Egyptian children to hear at 
school that their native dialect was “weak,” “corrupt,” and “[without] grammar”—epithets that 
remain widespread today.40 This pervasive denigration of Egyptian Arabic and its exclusion 
from official spheres had far-reaching consequences. With citizenship defined by “a language 
that is nobody’s mother tongue,” a psychological disconnect naturally emerged between the 
state and the people, especially the less-educated.41 And on a more tangible level, sociologist 
Niloofar Haeri argues, since “most Egyptians find speaking and writing in classical Arabic 
difficult,” the state’s newfound insistence on MSA began to act as a profound “obstacle to 
their participation in the political realm.”42  
 This aridly authoritarian climate remained in place long after the end of Nasser’s years 
in power. His successor, Anwar Sadat, inherited a totalitarian state that had been built on and 
legitimized by the promise of Arab nationalism. While the revolutionary ideology itself had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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lost much of its appeal, Sadat still had at his disposal the oppressive machinery it left behind. 
This meant that he did not have to find a new ideology to fill the “Arabist-sized hole” in 
Egyptian politics; it was possible to remain a hold on the country without it. While he did 
loosen some restrictions on civic participation and adopt a subtly more Egypt-centric stance 
than his charismatic predecessor, Sadat did not come close to executing a meaningful return to 
either democracy or wataniyya.43  
 Sadat’s repression-centered strategy prevented most forms of potential dissent, but it 
was impossible to fully rein in Egyptian Islam. He thus attempted to co-opt the energy of 
Islamist movements, corralling them into the regime’s camp and deploying them against his 
leftist rivals. He freed thousands of Islamists from state prisons, funded the construction of 
thousands of new mosques, and increased Islamic programming in state media and state 
universities.44 In the words of political Islam expert Mohammed Ayoob, “an unwritten 
compact with the regime [allowed] the religious establishment…free rein as far as cultural and 
religious matters [were] concerned in return for its acquiescence into the state’s near total 
control of the political and economic spheres.”45 While the regime succeeded in buying 
“political sterility,” it came “at the cost of cultural and social conservatism and de facto 
censorship of views that [ran] counter to those of the religious establishment.”46 This 
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ultimately led to “the increasing Islamization of society,” which “created fertile ground for the 
propagation of Islamist political views.”47  
 By the time Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency, strengthened Islamists began to 
openly challenge the regime, which they resented for its increasingly pro-Western stance. Even 
though Mubarak continued and intensified Sadat’s concessions to Islamists on cultural matters, 
when it came to politics, his repressive approach meant that Egypt gradually found itself 
locked in a bipolar standoff between the secular regime and its Islamist antagonists.  
 Vitally, neither side of this confrontation advocated either wataniyya or democracy. 
For his part, Mubarak doubled down on Egypt’s Arab identity. He regularly referred to Egypt 
as “the heart of Arabism,” or even simply as “the Arab nation,” and oversaw the publication of 
educational materials that “in promoting qawmiyya and railing against imperialism, could 
easily have come from the Nasser period.”48 Meanwhile, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
branded democracy and the nation-state as Western innovations and “[dismissed them] 
wholesale.”49 Indeed, to the extent that Arabism had lost popular legitimacy, the Muslim 
Brotherhood entered into the wataniyya-denying space it prepared, becoming the primary 
group undermining Egypt’s state-based national identity. Economist Hafez Ghanem is one of 
many who have come to identify the Brotherhood as such, succinctly asserting, “political 
Islam could be considered the antithesis of Egyptian nationalism.”50 His stance was bluntly 
underscored by the Brotherhood’s spiritual leader in 2006, when he said “Tuz fi Misr”—“to 
hell with Egypt.”51 
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 In an environment where neither the regime nor the Islamists embraced a unifying 
vision of Egyptian national identity, precious little remained to inspire trust or goodwill 
between the two camps. For the most part, Egyptian liberals and patriots were caught in the 
middle, with very little power to significantly shape the course of politics. This dynamic was 
on full display through the events of the Arab Spring. While liberals and Islamists ostensibly 
worked together to bring down the Mubarak regime, only the latter had the organizational 
capacity to exploit the opening and consolidate control of the country. The Brotherhood, 
unconstrained by any meaningful degree of wataniyya, proceeded to rule in an enormously 
polarizing fashion, pushing the liberals back into the arms of the security establishment they 
had originally overthrown. Today, the situation is essentially the same as it was before the 
2011 revolution. As one despondent Egyptian told a Foreign Affairs correspondent, “it’s still 
the military versus the Muslim Brotherhood. There’s no third option.”52 
 
Tunisia 
After a prolonged struggle led by lawyer Habib Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour Party, 
Tunisia won independence from France in 1956. Hailed as a national hero, Bourguiba became 
the country’s first president, and remained in power until 1987. During his tenure, the Tunisian 
state adopted a dramatically more favorable approach to wataniyya than that pursued by 
Nasser in Egypt. As American journalist Georgie Anne Geyer puts it, Bourguiba’s “policies 
were directly designed to root Tunisians in their own, real and distinguished identity.”53 His 
administration actively avoided overemphasizing the Arab and Islamic aspects of the nation’s 
character, worried that such an orientation would “alienate Tunisia from its more cosmopolitan !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Carthaginian past.”54  
To a far greater degree than his Egyptian Arabist counterparts—for whom the power to 
“rewrite history” was an indispensible political tool—Bourguiba based his ideology on a 
commitment to accurately representing historical fact. Indeed, as Princeton Tunisia expert L. 
Carl Brown emphasizes, the most essential characteristic of “Bourguibism” was to “avoid self-
deception.”55 The only way to “set national sentiment on firm foundations,” Bourguiba argued, 
was to “give the people a full picture of their past.”56 His approach to nationalism thus refused 
to “seek refuge in an unreal ‘Golden Age’ when ‘we’ were strong or civilized and ‘they’ weak 
or barbaric.”57  
This open approach to memory, which continued even more enthusiastically under 
Bourguiba’s successor Zine El Abedine Ben-Ali, meant that Tunisians paid attention both to 
their Islamic and non-Islamic roots. As Geyer observes, Tunisia saw “a conscious and 
deliberate process…of reaching back into the richly layered cultural heritage of the country—
Berber, Carthaginian, Roman, Arab-Muslim, Moorish, Djerban-Jewish, French, Italian and 
Spanish.”58 This remarkably pluralistic vision of the nation’s history was integrated into 
everyday life through a variety of cultural and social initiatives, the most important of which 
were national educational policies. Geyer writes that “Tunisia…revived its education system 
by bringing back the country’s rich, but long forgotten pre-Islamic past”; in this effort, “the 
key identifying words were modernity, identity and authenticity.”59 Tunisia’s determination to 
engage with the full diversity of its national roots set it apart from its neighbors on multiple !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fronts. One concrete manifestation of this spirit, argues Arabic language expert Yasir 
Suleiman, was that “a positive association [was] set up between the identity of Tunisia as a 
modern nation state and its dialect, called tunsi locally.”60 Unlike the Arabist policy pursued in 
Egypt, Tunisia pursued a nationalism that incorporated its population’s natively spoken 
language, thus managing to avoid many of the alienating pitfalls of MSA-focused state policy.  
The Tunisian divergence from the Arabist path was not limited to historical and 
linguistic questions alone; it also resulted in major political disagreements. Bourguiba rapidly 
earned the ire of his Arabist neighbors, notably Egypt’s Nasser, who worked constantly to 
undermine both the Tunisian president and his vision for national identity. Nevertheless, 
Bourguiba stuck steadfastly stuck to his course, convinced that creating a “mosaic of all the 
early Tunisians” would be both “legitimate and legitimizing.”61  
His gamble paid off. Despite Nasser’s efforts, a meaningful Arabist movement never 
took off in independent Tunisia. According to Israeli-American political scientist Jacob Abadi, 
this was fundamentally because “the Tunisian regime was far more successful than most of its 
counterparts in the Middle East in creating legitimacy to its rule.”62 Georgetown’s Michael C. 
Hudson agrees, arguing that Bourguiba successfully “fashioned a penetrative, broadly-based 
political movement,” which he maintained long into his tenure as president. 63 This trajectory 
stood in sharp contrast to the Arabist approach; even within Egypt, “Nasir’s structure-building 
took place ‘from the top down’ and was never as successful as Bourguiba’s in bridging the gap 
between elites and masses.”64 While part of this success was due to Bourguiba’s charisma and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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practical leadership style, Hudson writes that his true legitimacy “derive[d] from his historical 
embodiment of the most cherished symbols and values of Tunisian national identity and 
independence.”65 In other words, Bourguiba’s popularity was rooted in the resonance of the 
message he delivered—not reliant only on his own personal appeal.  
Beyond undergirding the state’s legitimacy, Tunisia’s embrace of wataniyya resulted in 
a much more stable and peaceful social environment than that found in Egypt in other Arabist 
states. Writing in 1977, Hudson goes so far as to describe the nation as characterized by 
“harmony, balance, cohesion, tolerance, [and] contentment,” and emphatically differentiates it 
from the “volatile, bitter, and tragic politics of the pan-Arab core.”66 And as Abadi explains, 
“under Bourguiba’s guidance Tunisia emerged as a pro-Western, moderate and tolerant 
country lacking major ethnic or religious disputes.”67 With key questions of communal identity 
settled, animosity between rival factions was kept to a minimum, ensuring that violent political 
tactics remained well outside of the Tunisian mainstream.  
To be sure, Bourguiba’s tenure in power was not pristine. His aggressive attempt to 
modernize the country alienated many traditionally-minded Muslims. And his authoritarian 
leadership style—which was imitated by his successor, Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali—meant that 
Tunisia was, until 2011, not a democracy. This record serves as a reminder that strong, 
inclusive wataniyya is on its own not enough to ensure political rights. It should nevertheless 
be acknowledged that, as Abadi points out, “drastic measures such as the persecution and 
execution of political enemies, such as Nasser applied in Egypt, were unknown to the 
Tunisians.”68 In other words, even as it failed for decades to produce democracy, wataniyya 
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simultaneously restrained potential excesses on the part of the Bourguiba and Ben-Ali regimes 
and reduced the violence with which dissident leaders were willing to oppose them.   
The moderation of Tunisia’s political culture can be clearly seen in the trajectory 
charted by the nation’s Islamists. When they first gathered strength in the 1970s, Tunisian 
Islamists shared a great deal of their ideology with Egypt’s radical Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, writes Tunisian journalist and human rights activist Salaheddine Jourchi, the 
position of radical Islamists grew increasingly untenable as “a contradiction between [their] 
ideology and the Tunisian cultural, social, and political reality became obvious.”69 Tunisian 
society, buttressed by a popularly-supported and pluralistic national identity, was simply too 
stable for a revolutionary ideology to gain significant traction. As a result of these realities, 
Jourchi writes, “the discourse of [Tunisian Islamists]…changed in form and content” between 
1970 and 1990, becoming increasingly liberal and moderate—especially on “questions 
concerning women, the West, and society.”70 This was not enough, however, for Islamism to 
carve out a sustainable place in Tunisia’s politics, and in 1992 an alleged takeover attempt 
caused them to lose “virtually all sympathy among the people.”71 Thoroughly rebuffed, the 
movement’s leaders would go to great lengths to appear moderate and accommodating when 
they returned from exile in 2011. 
 The ability of state-based nationalism to constrain Islamists has been indispensible 
during Tunisia’s successful democratic transition. Ennahda, the largest religious party in the 
country, has clearly been mindful of its past failure to challenge the nation’s identity, and has 
been careful to present a restrained image in line with Tunisia’s proud history of 
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modernization. When it won elections in 2011, Ennahda shared parliamentary control with a 
coalition of secular parties, and when it lost in 2013, it calmly stepped aside—the first Islamist 
party anywhere in the world to voluntarily give up power. The group has deliberately 
emphasized its Tunisian bona fides, arguing that it has followed a “very nationally grounded 
trajectory” and even going so far as to call Bourgiba—once its sworn enemy—a “symbol of 
our beloved nation.”72 By 2016, it became questionable whether the party could still even be 
called “Islamist” at all. In an explicit "Tunisification" of its identity, it separated its religious 
and political wings, “renouncing political Islam” altogether.73  
 These actions have sharply distinguished Ennahda from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, 
which, as discussed above, spent its short stint in office aggressively consolidating authority 
and persecuting its opponents. Operating in a society where wataniyya had been suppressed 
and could not link together disparate groups, the Egyptian Islamists followed a much more 
divisive path than their Tunisian counterparts. This discrepancy in Islamist behavior likely 
explains most of the divergence between Tunisia’s now-thriving democracy and Egypt’s return 
to harsh authoritarianism. Even as key Tunisian economic indicators, such as unemployment 
and GDP growth, have fallen behind Egypt’s,74 wataniyya-rooted consensus over religion has 
allowed the former country to move into an unprecedented era of political openness and 
stability. 
 
Comparing Syria and Lebanon 
 
 Lebanon’s closest counterpart in the Arab world is Syria, its neighbor to the east. Both 
nations remained under Ottoman control until the end of World War I, and were ruled by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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France from 1923-1946. They both feature very high levels of sectarian diversity, including 
substantial contingents of Christians, Sunnis, and non-Sunni Muslims. While Lebanon has for 
decades enjoyed a higher per capita GDP and lower unemployment, the economic disparity 
between the two states was less pronounced during and immediately following the Mandate—
the years in which both Syria and Lebanon chose their respective approaches toward Arabism 
and state-based national identity.  
Table 4.2: Comparing Syria and Lebanon 
 Syria Lebanon 
Years of French Mandate 1923-1946 1923-1946 
Sectarian makeup75 74% Sunni, 13% Alawi and 
Shi’a, 10% Christian 
27% Sunni, 27% Shi’a, 
40% Christian, 6% Druze 
Early GNP per capita76 $250 (1953) $235 (1950) 
 
Syria 
 The first leader of post-Ottoman “Greater Syria” was King Faysal I, a Mecca-born 
member of the Hashemite dynasty. Worried that his legitimacy “could be tarnished by his 
Hejazi origins,” Faysal “vigorously extolled the virtues of the larger Arab identity.”77 This 
effort was met with stiff resistance from most native-born Syrians. According to Dawisha, “the 
population…[was] intellectually very distant from Faysal and his…cadres,” demonstrating a 
clear preference for “Syrian over Arab identity.”78 A striking illustration of this orientation 
was the reaction of native Syrians to the proliferation of Iraqis in Faysal’s army. Rather than 
embracing them as fellow Arabs, Syrians began to complain that they “had become strangers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in their own country.”79 Slogans such as “Syria for the Syrians” began to appear regularly in 
the press, and several wataniyya-supporting organizations were founded, including al-Shabiba 
al-Suriya (the Syrian Youth) and Hizb al-Watani al-Suri (the Syrian National Party).80  
 In 1920, the French deposed Faysal and established control over the lands that would 
become modern-day Syria. Though most welcomed the king’s departure, Syrians soon began 
to challenge French rule. Many, especially in rural areas, did so through a tribal or religious 
framework—and others, inspired by the writings of Sati’ al-Husri in neighboring Iraq, 
grounded their arguments in pan-Arab nationalism. However, most Syrians continued to 
identify with “a specifically local Syrian nationalism…at the expense of the larger Arab 
nationalism.”81 The chief theorist of Syrian wataniyya was Antun Sa’ada, a philosopher, writer 
and political activist. Sa’ada argued that “any identification with Arab nationalism…was a 
surrender of Syria’s uniqueness, and an acceptance by its gifted people of an inferior status.”82 
This position was not founded on contempt for the Arabs—rather, argues Australian historian 
Adel Beshara, it was “a reflection of a deep and profound pride in Syria’s antiquity.”83 
  The vision of Syrian national identity put forth by Sa’ada bears many resemblances to 
the framework for a “strong, healthy national identity” sketched in Chapter 1. Unlike the 
restrictive vision of nationalism advocated by Husri and the Arabists, Sa’ada believed that 
“particular attributes of a nation are important, but none of them is an exclusive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq (London: Frank Cass, 1995): 174. According to 
Dawisha, “Even…supposedly Arab nationalist societies intermittently felt the strains of regional loyalties.” The 
organization al-‘Ahd “disintegrated into a Syrian faction, al-‘Ahd al-Suri, and an Iraqi faction, al-‘Ahd al-‘Iraqi” 
(Dawisha 30) 
80 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century, 46 
81 Ibid., 97 
82 Ibid., 97 
83 Adel Beshara, The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity (New York: Routledge, 
2011): 348. Beshara continues, “In Sa’adeh’s reasoning, Syria is an Arab nation, but not necessarily the Arab 
nation or part of an Arab nation” (350).  
 ! 83 
determinant.”84 No single group had sole claim to “Syrianness”—the nation was, in Sa’ada’s 
view, “an ethnic melting pot of diverse variety.”85 Rather than searching for national roots in 
race, language, or ethnicity, Sa’ada believed that Syria’s unique nationhood “was defined by 
geography as well as history.”86 He placed special emphasis on territory, assigning great 
importance to “the uniqueness of the Syrian national homeland.”87 In other words, Sa’ada’s 
vision was both inclusive and territory-based, offering a framework for Sunnis, Alawites, 
Christians, Kurds and Druze all to claim rights based on a single shared Syrian identity.88  
 Sa’ada’s well-articulated wataniyya clearly resonated with his contemporaries. 
According to Dawisha, he successfully “spearheaded [a] rise in popularity of Syrian 
nationalism,” winning support especially among educated urbanites.89 The Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party (SSNP), which he founded in 1932, “rapidly gained adherents” and built “a 
broad popular base” despite relentless persecution from the French authorities.90 Sa’ada 
himself was imprisoned multiple times, but his party enjoyed a “meteoric rise,” emerging as a 
key player in Syrian politics following independence in 1946.91  
 The zenith of the SSNP and of wataniyya coincided with Syria’s first experience with 
democracy; multiple parties and factions contended for power in an environment of relative 
freedom and openness. Kevin Martin finds that “an astonishing number and variety of 
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periodicals” were published during these “democratic years,”92 to say nothing of what Tabitha 
Petran calls the “first free election in the Arab World.”93 However, the years after 
independence were also marked by continuous political turmoil. By 1956, the country had 
cycled between three different constitutions, and a series of military coups meant that civilian 
politics were gradually stripped of meaning. At the same time, the SSNP’s vision for an 
inclusive Syrian nationalism was increasingly challenged by pan-Arabists, who gained energy 
and support following the failed Arab-Israeli war and especially after Egypt’s conversion to 
the Arabist cause. 
 Advocates of qawmiyya were led by the Ba’ath party, whose founder Michel Aflaq 
“candidly identified ‘cruelty’ as the most effective instrument to effect the desired 
transformation [to Arab nationalism].”94 In Aflaq’s own words, “when we are cruel to others, 
we know that our cruelty is in order to bring them back to their true selves, of which they are 
ignorant.”95 The full force of this philosophy was turned against the SSNP and supporters of 
wataniyya in 1955, after the mysterious assassination of Arabist Colonel ‘Adnan al-Malki. 
According to Martin, the murder and its aftermath “inspired numerous conspiracy theories and 
provided both the impetus and the justification” for “punishing the enemies of Arabism.”96 
During the concerted campaign of persecution that followed, the SSNP and its sympathizers 
were blamed for the crime, and were “depicted as subhuman, monstrous creatures displaying 
repulsive and terrifying defects of thought, deed and character.”97 The party was dissolved and 
its assets confiscated; its members were tortured, subjected to Soviet-style “show trials,” and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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executed.98 This campaign led to a “sea change” in the nation’s politics, securing the full 
“renunciation of Greater Syrian nationalism in favor of its pan-Arab variant.”99  
 In 1958, moved by a combination of ideology and domestic political constraints, the 
leaders of Syria’s military arranged for the nation to merge with Egypt and form the United 
Arab Republic, bringing a decisive end to the “democratic years.” The union soon failed, but 
Syria’s subsequent Ba’ath rulers continued to emphasize Arabism, resulting in what Israeli 
political scientist Eyal Zisser calls the “almost total obfuscation of any distinctive Syrian 
identity.”100  
 This policy continued under Hafez al-Assad, who found it “difficult to put the [Arabist] 
genie back in the bottle” after taking power in 1970.101 According to Levant expert 
Christopher Phillips, there are two key reasons why the Ba’ath regime has to this day “shown 
no desire to change the discourse away from supra-national Arabism.”102 First, “Arabism 
[proved] valuable to the regime” in pre-civil war Syria because it built citizens’ affinity for 
turmoil-stricken Palestinians, Lebanese and Iraqis. This greatly increased Syrians’ own sense 
of “threat and fear,” encouraging them to “see their own communities in the blood-lined streets 
of Baghdad and Beirut” and convincing them that only the regime in Damascus could protect 
them from the same fate.103 Second, given that some Syrians—including members of the 
regime itself—were genuinely convinced by Arabist ideology, “de-Arabizing” the discourse 
ran the risk of provoking divisive opposition.104  
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 Indeed, far from scaling back its support for Arabist ideology, the Assad regime began 
its tenure by “beating the drums of Arab nationalism at every opportunity.”105 Using Ba’ath 
party machinery and the military as tools for indoctrinating a “‘new generation of Syrian Arab 
Patriots,’” it portrayed Hafez al-Assad as the heir to Gamal Abdel Nasser and the leader of the 
Arab nationalist movement.106 Operating under a much more exclusive vision of the nation 
than that advocated by Sa’ada and the SSNP, it went so far as to target Syria’s Kurdish 
minority as non-Arabs, prohibiting them from operating schools in their own language and 
even banning them from speaking Kurdish in government schools.107 But this rigidity was not 
consistent; by the 1980s, as pan-Arabism lost its luster, the regime began to employ some 
Syria-specific national symbols. It shifted to a more ambiguous approach to identity, ensuring 
that the only symbol that remained constant was “the image of Hafez al-Assad himself.”108  
 After taking power in 2000, Hafez’s son Bashar continued this ambiguous approach to 
national identity. According to Zisser, he “frequently stressed his loyalty to the Arab nation in 
public statements and depicted Syria as a fortress of Arabism.”109 His regime often referred to 
the state as “the Syrian Arab region”—not a self-contained entity but “a region that is part of 
the whole—the Arab homeland.”110 When Bashar did emphasize Syria’s uniqueness, it was 
often to advance the argument that Syrians were “more Arabist than other Arabs.”111 Indeed, 
Phillips contends, “what makes Syrians special” in Bashar al-Assad’s discourse is precisely the 
state’s status as the “‘beating heart of Arabism.’”112  
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 In other words, under both father and son, the highly personalized Assad regime did 
not appeal to any consistent national ideal. It simultaneously avoided Syrian wataniyya and 
sensed it could not fully rely on pan-Arab qawmiyya, and instead turned to stifling dissent and 
portraying itself as the only guarantor of Syria’s security. This left little room for any sort of 
unifying identity that could bridge the divides between the country’s many ethnic and sectarian 
groups. While this forced the smaller, less powerful factions—especially the Christian 
communities— to accept the regime’s hegemony, it all but invited Islamists from the Sunni 
Muslim majority to step into the ideological void.  
 The Assads went much further than their Egyptian counterparts in their effort to 
suppress the Islamist challenge. In 1982, the regime brutally crushed an armed uprising by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, killing thousands and leveling large parts of the city of Hama. However, 
as in Egypt, the regime was unable to bring Islam fully under its control, and thus worked to 
“co-opt” Islamist narratives. In order to “[enhance] his own Islamic credentials,” Hafez al-
Assad increased his own public observation of prayers, funded mosques and provided state 
support for Qur’anic and Sharia study institutes.113 This ultimately led to an “Islamization 
from above,” which intensified under the rule of Bashar al-Assad.114 The younger Assad 
released hundreds of Islamist prisoners and began to actively accommodate political parties 
that “[advocated] the creation of an Islamic state in Syria.”115 
 Despite its increasing tolerance toward Islamists, the Assad regime maintained tight 
control over other potential forms of dissent.116 As a result, Islamists dominated opposition in 
pre-war Syria. After the uprising of 2011, their superior organizational strength and extensive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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support networks meant that they rapidly came to command the rebel landscape. While many 
liberals and religious minorities initially participated in anti-regime activism, the primacy of 
Islamists in the opposition meant that these would-be supporters of democracy were pushed 
back into the regime’s camp. To an even greater extent than in Egypt, the weakness of 
wataniyya means that nothing but military force can constrain these Islamists or their vision 
for Syria. The Assad regime’s reluctant supporters understand this reality. They are trapped in 
the grip of their totalitarian protector, and will likely remain there for the foreseeable future.  
 
Lebanon 
 
Syria’s western neighbor has charted a very different approach to national identity. 
Divided into 18 discrete sectarian communities, the tiny state would seem to be difficult 
ground for cohesive nationalism to take root; wataniyya in Lebanon certainly has a more 
challenging task than in relatively homogeneous Tunisia. 117  Nevertheless, Lebanon has 
succeeded in overcoming these steep odds, developing an overarching national ideology that 
accommodates each of its individual communal identities. This ideology—alternately called 
“Phoenicianism,” or “Chihism”—was originally articulated in the early to mid-20th century by 
the Christian Lebanese thinkers Charles Corm and Michel Chiha.118 Corm, a businessman and 
poet, took a literary approach to the nation, ultimately cementing himself as a key architect of 
“Phoenician” Lebanese identity. His writings, as analyzed by political scientist Asher !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kaufman, portray “the Lebanese as one people unified in their [Phoenician] ancestral past”; 
Corm “begs this past…to be a bridge for all Lebanese and to teach them—Muslims and 
Christians—their place of glory in human history.”119 In a body of work that both reflected and 
shaped Lebanese thought, Corm was especially vehement that while Lebanon incorporated 
Arab influences, it was not fundamentally Arab. As with its Tunisian counterpart, then, 
rejection of authoritarian Arabism was of paramount importance to the Lebanese national 
movement. However, “Phoenicianism” was more than a negative reaction to Arab nationalism. 
According to Kaufmann, “The preoccupation with the Phoenician past in Lebanon and the 
identification of intellectuals from Beirut as “Phoenicians” commenced decades before ‘anti-
Arab’ sentiments were even a possibility, simply because Arabism was not yet a dominant 
identity that had to be reckoned with.”120 
Corm’s inclusivist ideal was put into political practice by lawyer Michel Chiha, the 
chief framer of Lebanon’s 1926 constitution. Kaufman relates that Chiha prescribed a fluid 
national identity constructed “in the image of the cosmopolitan, [multilingual] atmosphere of 
Beirut.”121 For all of its cultural inclusivity, however, Chiha’s vision for the nation was no less 
Lebanese than Corm’s. In his conception, tolerance and shared understanding were not merely 
virtues; they were also irreducible building blocks of a distinct national personality. To him, 
Lebanon’s very identity derived from its commitment to pluralism, to being a meeting-ground 
of peoples “living together in a spirit of co-operation and mutual respect.”122  
Built on this proudly unique and liberal foundation, Lebanon held regular, free and fair 
elections for its first thirty years of independence; according to Adeed Dawisha, “Lebanese 
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politics, while imperfect, were liberal enough to make the country the most politically tolerant 
in the Arab world.”123 Kaufman concurs—in his analysis, the 1950s and 60s were the “high 
noon” of Lebanese national identity, years during which “the vision of Michel Chiha appeared 
to be fulfilled.”124 Muslims and Christians shared power and prosperity, both bound together 
and distinguished by their Lebanese identity. Until 1975, “Phoenicianism was a symbol of 
Lebanon’s pluralism, of its liberal propensity and its triumph.”125 
What helped Phoenicianism succeed where Antun Sa’ada’s Syrian nationalism failed? 
The primary answer is that Lebanese nationalists were spared the brutal crackdown endured by 
their counterparts to the east. Contrary to the Syrian experience, key levers of power were 
continuously controlled by committed supporters of wataniyya. A striking illustration of this 
dynamic came in 1958, when President Camille Chamoun felt that his democratically-elected 
government was at risk of an armed insurrection on the part of Lebanese Arabists. Rather than 
taking his chances with these increasingly powerful rivals and their Egyptian and Syrian 
backers, Chamoun requested military assistance from the United States. President Eisenhower 
gladly obliged, sending a contingent of Marines to defend Chamoun and the pro-wataniyya 
system he represented. With force on their side, Phoenicianists weathered the pan-Arab storm, 
protecting the Lebanese state and its distinctive identity from the forces of qawmiyya sweeping 
through the rest of the region.  
Despite its strongly-rooted national identity, Lebanon has suffered severe setbacks on 
the route to democratization. The nation’s 1975-90 civil war, though instigated by Palestinian 
refugees and sustained by intense Syrian and Israeli involvement, is a dark stain on the 
country’s political history. The war thoroughly radicalized the previously tolerant bastions of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Lebanese society, and the 1989 Ta’if accord “marginalized the socio-political forces within 
Lebanese society that advocated for a distinct, non-Arab identity.”126 Until 2005, the country’s 
identity remained spiritually and politically under the control of Arabist, autocratic Syria. But 
while some observers were quick to pronounce the death of Lebanese identity and democracy, 
wataniyya survived, and eventually sparked a democratic revival.  
It is difficult to overstate the degree to which the resurgence of Lebanese democracy 
was inspired by local, state-based nationalism. The 2005 “Cedar Revolution,” which expelled 
the occupying Syrians, was driven by popular protests attended in equal measure by 
Christians, Muslims and Druze—all of whom conspicuously waved Lebanese flags and 
demanded a return to what they saw as Lebanon’s democratic birthright.127 Since then, while 
the polity has remained divided between pro- and anti-Syrian elements, both sides have 
respected the integrity of the electoral process, refraining from attempts to impose their will 
via violence.128 This commitment to peaceful resolution of political disagreements has been 
due in large part to the continued strength of state-based national identity. Unlike Syria, where 
both the ruling regime and its Islamist opponents believe they can seize the state by force, no 
Lebanese faction has any realistic hope of dominating the others.  
This reality is particularly important when analyzing the development of Hezbollah, 
the Iranian-backed Shiite militia that is Lebanon’s largest Islamist organization. As Daniel 
Brumberg puts it, while “Hezbollah is not, philosophically speaking, a champion of pluralism, 
in practice its leaders do not and cannot favor the imposition of an Islamic state”; such a 
proposal would simply be too drastic a departure from Lebanon’s pluralist ethos.129 Far from 
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pursuing an Islamic revolution, Hezbollah acts within the confines of the nation’s political 
system, sending deputies to Parliament, participating in the Cabinet, and engaging in day-to-
day coalition-building with other parties and sects. Indeed, the group’s Lebanese credentials 
are so strong that a significant portion of the country’s Christians, including current president 
Michel Aoun, have felt comfortable collaborating with the “party of God.” The difference 
from Syria, where fear of Islamists pushes Christians and other minorities into the service of 
the authoritarian regime, could not be more pronounced.  
Today, while Lebanon remains unstable and divided, the pluralist national identity 
articulated by Chiha continues to be enshrined in the national imagination. According to 
Shibley Telhami’s polling, in a region fixated on Arab and Islamic identity, more than 60% of 
respondents in Lebanon consistently rank “Lebanese” as their most important identity, and 
more than 90% rank it as one of their top two identities.130 This result holds for every one of 
Lebanon’s sects. In Telhami’s analysis, the Lebanese people have a sense that they “are in it 
together”; despite their deep sectarian differences, they are united by their shared loyalty to the 
state.131 This loyalty has proved indispensable over the turbulent years since the Arab 
uprisings, during which Lebanon has been buffeted by the war in neighboring Syria, inundated 
by refugees, and even forced to function without a president from 2014-2016. In the face of 
such towering difficulties, the nation has remained remarkably calm, with major political 
disturbances limited to protests over garbage collection and electricity outages. In other words, 
Lebanese democracy continues to survive, serving as a stubborn testament to the power and 
democratic potential of wataniyya in the Arab world.
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5 Arabism on Trial, Part II 
 
 The previous two chapters have identified a framework for understanding the absence 
of democracy in the non-rentier states of the Arab Middle East. Until the mid-20th century, the 
narrative goes, ascendant wataniyya helped to lay the groundwork for political rights across the 
region. However, in the 1950s and 60s, state-based nationalism was suppressed and ultimately 
overwhelmed by pan-Arabism—a much more authoritarian and exclusive ideology. By the 
1970s, Arabist regimes had lost most of their own legitimacy, but they did not enact a 
meaningful return to wataniyya. Instead, they offered little more than lip service to the 
uniqueness of their states, and mixed this lukewarm patriotism with a continued commitment 
to many of the same old Arabist principles. This resulted in a discordant, confused approach to 
national identity, which worked in regimes’ favor by helping them justify increasingly 
repressive techniques.  
 Though regimes were mostly successful in their effort to create “harmonic states” and 
eliminate credible challenges to their rule, Islam had a deep enough social basis to prevent 
secular autocrats from confronting it directly. Many regimes thus attempted to co-opt the faith 
as a tool against leftist domestic rivals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this strategy soon backfired, 
resulting in extremely strong Islamist movements that began to challenge regimes for control 
over their states. Without a unifying national identity, regime vs. Islamist battles have been 
entirely “winner-take-all”; in societies sorely lacking in internal cohesion, there is little to no 
room for power-sharing. Today, liberals and would-be democratic reformers are trapped 
between Islamists and secular autocrats, drastically curtailing their potential influence.  
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 This model clearly describes the experiences of Egypt and Syria, the two non-
democracies discussed in the previous chapter. But how well does it apply to the rest of the 
region? This chapter provides an overview of the political and national development of the 
other non-rentier, non-democracies: Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Morocco, 
exploring how well each case fits the model.  
 As Table 5.1 indicates, the chapter proceeds by addressing four key problems. First, 
what was the status of state-based national identity before and immediately after 
independence? Second, how did each state interact with pan-Arabist ideology? Third, how 
strong are Islamists in each state? Finally, what is the history of democracy in each state?  
Table 5.1: National identity, Islamism and democracy in non-rentier Arab states 
State: Strength of post-
independence 
wataniyya 
Strength of 
Arabism 
Current strength 
of Islamism 
Mean Freedom House 
Political Rights Rating  
(1973-2017) 
Egypt High High High 5.44 
Tunisia High Very low Low 5.261 
Syria Medium High Very high 6.42 
Lebanon High Low High 4.93 
Algeria High High High 5.98 
Libya Very low High Very high 6.60 
Sudan Medium Very high Very high 6.40  
Iraq High High Very high 6.55  
Yemen Medium Medium High 5.54 (unified); 
5.41 (North); 6.47 (South) 
Jordan High Low Low 5.22  
Morocco High  High Low Low 4.69 
 
 
Algeria 
 France invaded and occupied Algeria in 1830, and formally incorporated it into the 
French Republic in 1848. French authorities justified this annexation by consistently denying 
that Algeria had “ever been a real nation”—instead, they argued, it had experienced “only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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chaos and deterioration” since the end of Roman rule.2 Local Algerian nationalists forcefully 
contested this narrative, contending that “Algeria had been a nation since ancient times, with 
its population and borders well established before the arrival of the Arabs.”3 The pioneering 
theorists of Algerian nationalism, Tawfiq al-Madani and Mubarak al-Mili, regarded Algeria’s 
Berber heritage as central to its unique identity. Mili, for example, claimed that a distinct 
Algerian nation could be traced back to the classical kingdoms of Masinissa and Jugurtha, 
Berber leaders who resisted Rome in the second century B.C.  
 The French seized on the Berber-Arab divide, attempting to drive a wedge between the 
two linguistic groups and “Frenchify” Berber-speakers.4 But while Berbers accepted a 
“difference or dichotomy between an indigenous people and Arab invaders who had sought to 
repress or replace indigenous culture,” they did not generally accept the French divide-and-rule 
strategy.5 Instead, they “subverted” it, painting the French as little more than the next in a long 
line of foreign occupiers. When open insurrection began in 1954, the Berbers offered 
substantial support to the anti-French cause.   
 The Declaration of 1 November 1954—which Laurie Brand calls “the foundational 
document” of the Algerian national movement—spoke on behalf of Arabs and Berbers alike.6 
It addressed itself to “all the Algerian people,” and to “all purely Algerian parties and 
movements,” regardless of religion or ethnicity.7 The document explicitly extended an 
invitation to “all Algerian patriots, from all social backgrounds…to join in the liberation 
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struggle, without any other consideration.”8 The brand of nationalism it expressed was thus 
profoundly state-based, and was also decidedly “open and inclusive.”9  
 But this orientation would not last long. Algeria’s post-independence leaders decided to 
drive their nation down a much more “Arabist” path than it had previously followed. In 1964, 
the ruling Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) declared an approach to national identity that 
“[refused] to include a recognition of Berber identity,” instead emphasizing Algeria’s essential 
“Arabo-Muslim” character. This change reflected a broader shift in regional politics; in the ten 
years since the inclusive, wataniyya-focused proclamation of 1954, pan-Arabism had become a 
much more prominent narrative, especially in the Middle East’s anti-Western circles.  
 What ensued was an unprecedented campaign to “Arabize” the country, both culturally 
and linguistically—an effort so dramatic that Ernest Gellner cites Algeria as a paradigmatic 
example of a nation attempting “the ardours of cultural self-transformation.”10 In his analysis, 
Arabization was “extremely painful,” as it meant “imposing a distant literary language on local 
Arab and Berber dialects.”11 Other observers agree. The Algerian revolutionary activist 
Mohammed Harbi, for example, calls the leaders of the Arabization campaign “apostles of 
linguistic Jacobinism,” criticizing them for attempting to obscure “the diversity of the roots 
and cultures at the base of Algerian society.”12 Brand, likewise, argues that Arabization “by 
definition involved the suppression of aspects of Berber identity,” and that it “tried to impose 
unity by denying diversity.”13 
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 The Arabization campaign also included an explicit “program of ‘Writing and 
Rewriting History.’”14 This effort was designed to “give weight or value to an Algerian 
identity…generally reduced to its Arabo-Islamic character”; other narratives were excluded 
from school textbooks. This was deeply ironic, because in the decades immediately following 
the revolution, many Algerian students were not fluent enough in Modern Standard Arabic to 
read the official history being presented to them.15 Textbook authors were thus forced to 
include simplified summaries at the end of every chapter.16 Not all Algerians approved of these 
measures—many citizens “preferred an Algerian Algeria that, without denying its Arab or 
Islamic heritage, sought to preserve other elements of the country’s identity, whether ethnic, 
non-Islamist, secularist or French-language-related.”17 Yet Arabists were undeterred, and 
continued through the 1980s to vigorously suppress alternative expressions of Algerian 
identity.  
 Indeed, Algeria increasingly came to resemble a classic Arab “harmonic state,” in 
which alternatives to officially-sanctioned identity were strictly forbidden. According to 
Maghreb specialist Jonathan Hill, the ruling FLN regime “attempted to control public 
discourse on…national identity by systematically extending its authority over the country’s 
media, political system, and social space.”18 A key illustration of the regime’s willingness to 
crush competing narratives came in 1980, when Berber activists pressing for linguistic rights 
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and improved recognition were violently suppressed—hundreds were killed and many more 
were injured or arrested. 
  Like dictatorships elsewhere in the region, however, the FLN government hesitated 
from using the same forceful tactics against growing Islamist opposition. Instead, it attempted 
to co-opt and outflank its religious critics.19 To this end, the regime offered “dramatic increases 
in support for funding for religious education at all levels,” implemented an Islamist-
influenced family code, opened dozens of Islamic cultural centers, and built an immense 
mosque-university complex in the city of Constantine.20  
 In the late 1980s—in a situation not altogether different from the wave of protests that 
would sweep the Arab world 20 years later—increasing economic difficulties led to a 
nationwide wave of riots and demonstrations. The FLN responded to the upsurge in discontent 
by removing its ban on political parties, and in 1991 allowed for general parliamentary 
elections. But the decades in which Islamists had held a monopoly over the non-governmental 
sphere meant that they were the sole faction prepared to compete in a national campaign. In 
December, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won massive electoral victory, and appeared 
poised to enact dramatic changes in Algerian life.  
 In an environment where the state had imposed a unitary identity of secular Arabism 
rather than nurturing a sense of inclusive wataniyya, there was very little to allow for trust 
between the FIS with the other factions competing for power. The Islamist party referred to its 
secular opponents not as fellow citizens but as “those whom France has nursed with her 
poisoned milk,” promising that Algeria would soon “be done [with them] for once and for 
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all.”21 The FIS’ co-leader, Ali Benhadj, suggested that those who voted for another party were 
“nonbelievers” and thus deserving of death.22 Observers agreed that once the FIS took power, 
it would likely never relinquish it peacefully: Algeria’s elections would thus reflect the 
principle of “one man, one vote, one time.” 
 Rather than hand over control of the state, the military responded to the FIS’ electoral 
success by dissolving parliament and cancelling future elections. This triggered a spiral of 
assassinations, arrests, and eventually a brutal civil war between the army and radical 
Islamists. After a decade of fighting and up to 100,000 deaths, the government emerged as the 
clear victor, and reestablished the prewar military dictatorship. As in Egypt and Syria, it was 
the urban middle class that helped swing the conflict in favor of the regime. Though they had 
never prospered under the FLN’s corrupt rule, secular and liberal Algerians were nonetheless 
profoundly afraid that they would be persecuted by an Islamist government, and reluctantly 
chose the familiar status quo over an uncertain, potentially disastrous radical takeover.23  
 Since the end of the civil war in the early 2000s, Algeria has remained under military 
control, with Abdelaziz Bouteflika serving as president. The regime has adopted a more open 
approach to national identity than the one that prevailed before the war; in 2002 it recognized 
Berber as a state language and in 2016 named it Algeria’s second official language. 
Democracy, however, remains a long way off, with political freedoms substantially curtailed 
and elections marred by massive fraud.24 In 2014, President Bouteflika won election to a fourth 
term, garnering 82% of the officially-counted vote despite making only one campaign 
appearance. These conspicuously skewed results sparked little in the way of large-scale 
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protests or other forms of democratic activism. For the time being, it appears, most Algerians 
are simply too exhausted by war and too wary of Islamists to risk fighting for major political 
change.  
 
Libya 
 
 Of all the nations considered in this thesis, Libya may very well have experienced the 
weakest early development of wataniyya. Italy occupied the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica in 1911, but only administered them jointly under the name of “Libya” between 
1934 and 1943. These sparsely-populated provinces had been relatively tightly controlled by 
the Ottoman Empire, and thus had little prior history of self-rule. Accordingly, locals under 
Italian rule generally emphasized their status as members of the Islamic umma and were 
hesitant to discuss a local watan.25 Indeed, according to North Africa expert Lisa Anderson, 
Islamic identity was “inestimably more important [for Libya] than…for the Ottoman successor 
states of the Arab East, whereas the traditions of both Arab and Libyan nationalism [were] 
considerably weaker.”26 This is not to say that national thinking was completely absent: after 
the Allies seized Italy’s African holdings and Libyan independence became a possibility, some 
organizations, notably the Jamiyyat al-Wataniyya al-Libiyya (Libyan National Association), 
did attempt to assert a form of state-based nationalism, and others advocated for pan-
Arabism.27   
 The development of nationalism was slowed by the post-independence rule of King 
Idris, who did not emphasize either Libyan or Arab identity. The king “made no secret of his 
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primary loyalty to Cyrenaica and of his distrust of political ideologies of all sorts.”28 He 
outlawed political parties shortly after independence, suppressing the development of civil 
society and instead emphasizing clan-centric patronage networks. Despite Idris’ hostility and 
indifference, however, both Arab and Libyan nationalist movements continued to grow 
independently of the regime. According to Ronald Bruce St. John, “a degree of Libyan 
nationalism began to develop,” especially as oil revenues expanded and the state began to 
prosper.29 This group gained a significant number of followers, focusing its energies primarily 
on “the need to develop and modernize the country.”30 However, local nationalists were 
generally outmatched and overwhelmed by their Arabist counterparts. This was mostly due to 
Egyptian influence. As St. John relates, “short of trained Libyan teachers, the monarchy looked 
to Egypt to provide both teachers and textbooks, and the [Arabist] curriculum the Egyptians 
brought to Libya amounted to a form of pedagogical imperialism.”31 Egypt’s Arabist 
orientation also seeped into public consciousness via widespread circulation of Egyptian 
newspapers and via Radio Cairo’s popular Voice of the Arabs program. By the 1960s, 
Egyptian dominance was so thorough that “Nasser’s portrait was almost as widely displayed as 
that of the king.”32 
 The stage was thus set for an Arabist coup, which occurred in 1969 under the 
leadership of the 27-year old Muammar al-Gadhafi. Gadhafi mimicked much of the identity 
discourse favored by Nasser, arguing that the entire Arabic-speaking world constituted a single 
nation, and that the divisions within it were artificial results of imperialism. Perhaps more fully 
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than any 20th century Arab leader, Gadhafi positioned himself as an opponent of wataniyya, 
flatly “[rejecting] Libyan state patriotism” and persecuting its supporters.33 
 While there was no doubt that “Arab nationalism was the core element of Gadhafi’s 
ideology,” he also portrayed himself as a protector and enforcer of Islam.34 Unlike the much 
more secular Arabists in power elsewhere in the region, Gadhafi restored traditional criminal 
codes, appointed religious scholars to major governmental positions, banned the sale and 
consumption of alcohol, and shut down Christian places of worship.35 Indeed, until the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, it was Gadhafi who “held [global] pride of place as the principal ruling 
spokesman of Islam as a political force.”36 By the mid-1970s, however, it became increasingly 
clear that Gadhafi’s interpretation of Islam was not an orthodox one. He announced that his 
own “Green Book,” was “the new gospel,” and initiated a campaign to “seize the mosques” 
from those who did not share his ideology.37  
 As Gadhafi’s rule wore on, he thus “alienated all the potential constituencies to whom 
he originally directed his appeal,” and found himself forced to “rely increasingly on simple 
repression.”38 Meanwhile, according to Lisa Anderson, his idiosyncratic and personalistic 
approach “left the questions of identity and legitimacy in Libya unanswered.”39 The dictator’s 
conflation of himself with the state was so complete that from 1977 onward, he replaced the 
national flag with a plain green banner, the color he had chosen to symbolize his personal 
ideology. Given that he oversaw bloody repression of any attempt to initiate or explore a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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different approach to identity, everyday Libyans had few grounds for cohesion or solidarity 
beyond shared opposition to the regime.  
 When Gadhafi was finally deposed in 2011, Libyan rebels managed to hold just one 
successful election before devolving into a chaotic mosaic of warring militias. This occurred 
even though the country boasts a higher degree of ethnic and religious homogeneity than 
almost any other Middle Eastern state; close to 97% of the population adheres to Sunni Islam, 
and the only ethnic minority is the miniscule Berber population.40 In the absence of a widely 
accepted national identity, however, Libya’s short-lived democratic government quickly found 
that there was very little to hold together the country’s various regions and tribes.  
 Unencumbered by serious competing identities, and in the fertile ground prepared by 
Gadhafi-era Islamization, radical jihadist groups have enjoyed substantial success in 
contemporary Libya. In addition to the Islamists operating in and around Tripoli, the Islamic 
State is active throughout the country, and held the major city of Sirte for almost two years. 
Their opponents have gravitated toward militarized secularism, which is championed most 
prominently by General Khalifa Haftar. Haftar controls much of eastern Libya, and “promises 
to purge Libya of Islamists”—a term he applies to his moderate political opponents and violent 
jihadists alike.41 Libyan liberals thus increasingly find themselves in the same position as their 
counterparts in Syria, Egypt and Algeria, trapped between Islamist revolutionaries and 
repressive security forces. 
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Sudan 
 Even after its 2011 partition, Sudan continues to be a tremendously diverse country, 
with dozens of ethnic and linguistic groups and significant animist and Christian populations. 
Despite such heterogeneity, and despite the territory’s lack of prior political unity, Sudanese 
state-based nationalism began to grow and develop shortly after the beginning of British rule in 
1898. This nationalism incorporated both Arabs and non-Arabs. The first prominent nationalist 
leader, Ali ‘Abd al-Latif, came from Sudan’s “black” population; he led a 1924 revolt calling 
for independence and power-sharing among the country’s various groups. By the 1930s, he 
was followed by a wave of educated Arabs, who rapidly began “not only to identify 
themselves as Sudanese, but to write and speak openly of Sudanese nationalism.”42 They 
“[sought] out and praised indigenous folk customs,” arguing, for example, that Sudan’s 
Bedouins had “preserved cultural legacies that other parts of the Arab world had lost.”43 The 
Sudanese dialect of Arabic was a particular point of pride for local nationalists, who contended 
that it was especially “pristine.”44  
 Like expressions of wataniyya elsewhere in the Arab world, Sudanese nationalism was 
relatively inclusive toward ethnic and religious minorities. As leading nationalist and future 
Prime Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub expressed it, Sudan was a result of “the fusion of 
indigenous blacks with immigrant Arabs, as well as Turks…Abyssinians, Egyptians, Nubians, 
and Maghribis.”45 This ideology had tremendous staying power. Even as the post-
independence government veered sharply toward pan-Arabism, patriotic intellectuals 
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continued for decades to “[stress] Sudan’s unique Afro-Arab hybridity, cultural tolerance, and 
capacity for internal coexistence” as the foundation of national identity.46 
 True to the pattern followed by most Arab states, however, Sudan’s political elite 
gradually shifted away from inclusive, state-based patriotism. There were many reasons for 
this change of heart, but the most important, according to Sudan specialist B.G.V. Nyombe, 
was an “obsession…with the political need to project the Sudan to the outside world as a 
homogeneous Arab nation; a nation with one language (Arabic), one religion (Islam), one 
culture (Arab-Moslem culture), and most importantly, one race (Arab).”47 Sudan’s Arab elites, 
this argument goes, became increasingly convinced that the rest of the Arab world “[did] not 
really consider them as Arabs, but rather as ‘abid, slaves.”48 The extreme zeal with which they 
ultimately pursued a national policy of top-down Arabization was thus, at least in part, rooted 
in a growing sense of racial and ethnic self-consciousness.  
 Regardless of their rationale, there is little denying that successive Sudanese regimes 
harshly enforced top-down policies of Arabization and Islamization. Like Gadhafi in Libya, 
they generally pursued both goals at once. In state-run schools, for example, they insisted on 
Arabic language instruction and mandated Qur’anic study, regardless of the ethnic and 
religious makeup of the students. These policies were not only directed toward children: the 
government in Khartoum made no secret of its desire to “convert southerners into Moslems 
and Arabic language speakers in the shortest time possible,” resorting to violence whenever 
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necessary.49 This approach quickly garnered strong resistance, especially in South Sudan, 
which battled the north in near-perpetual civil war from 1956 until 2005.  
 For a brief time in the mid-1980s, Sudan’s political elite responded to this resistance by 
loosening political restrictions and allowing for a semblance of democracy. However, in 1989, 
after the elected government moved toward a “campaign for national reconciliation” and 
walked back Islamization and Arabization efforts, Islamist military officers seized control of 
the state.50 Under the leadership of Omar al-Bashir, they returned to earlier regimes’ identity 
policies, exhibiting what Sahel expert Yehudit Ronen calls a “relentless drive to impose [their] 
hegemonic vision on the state despite the polycentric character of Sudanese society.”51 Despite 
lacking significant public support, the new regime eliminated potential opposition by turning 
to a range of brutally repressive measures.52 Bashir and his followers immediately carried out a 
wave of purges and executions, targeting intellectuals and members of the non-Islamist middle 
class in order to “prevent them from constructing any sort of alternative” to the official pan-
Islamic and pan-Arabist identity discourse.53 Beyond persecuting its opponents, the regime 
enforced its own ideology by operating a religious “morality police” similar to that active in 
Iran, and by overhauling the education system to focus on Qur’anic memorization and “the 
glories of Arab and Islamic culture.”54 
 The most disturbing expressions of the Bashir regime’s intolerance for alternative 
identities are the genocidal campaigns it has overseen in Darfur. Though the tribes native to the 
region are predominantly Muslim, they have historically resisted Arabization. Since the 1990s, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Khartoum thus armed and funded various Arab militias, including the Tajammu’ al-’Arabi, a 
Libyan-sponsored group that openly aspired to “change the demography of Darfur and empty 
it of its African tribes.”55 Aided by government airstrikes, these militias began a “scorched 
earth” campaign in 2003, burning villages, poisoning wells and slaughtering upwards of 
400,000 ethnic Africans.56  
 Like Gadhafi, Bashir has gradually stepped back from his initial affiliation with 
Islamists. But this has not meant a move towards wataniyya, inclusion or democracy—far from 
it. Instead, the dictator has simply strengthened his own power, apparently unbothered by what 
the International Crisis Group calls the growing “ideological vacuum at the heart of [his 
regime].”57 Sudan’s fractured national identity thus shows few signs of imminent recovery. As 
Ronen puts it, there is a deeply entrenched “lack of trust and a deep hostility between the state 
and its various communities.”58 Heather Sharkley agrees, observing that “non-Arab Sudanese 
today…look upon Northern riverine Arab elites as outsiders, enemies, colonizers, and usurpers 
– certainly not as compatriots.”59 In other words, scars run so deep that even after Bashir’s 
long rule comes to an end, democracy will likely remain elusive.  
 
Iraq 
 
 Iraq is sometimes regarded as among the most “artificial” of the Arab states, a 
haphazard attempt by British authorities to cobble together three disparate Ottoman provinces. 
But this narrative is not, strictly speaking, true. Even Said Aburish—a Palestinian journalist 
who is elsewhere more than ready to criticize Britain’s colonial blunders—has acknowledged 
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that Iraq “as a geographic unit was always united by the [Tigris and Euphrates] rivers, and 
except for a relatively brief period towards the end of Ottoman Turkish rule, authority in them 
was centered in Baghdad.”60 Indeed, the territory that would become Iraq was often 
administered by Ottoman authorities as a single province.61  
 Iraqi intellectuals began to advance a fairly well-developed version of wataniyya by the 
1920s and 1930s. Iraq expert Eric Davis argues that, “despite the newness of the nation-state,”  
‘Iraqist’ nationalists were able to mobilize support by drawing upon “a historical memory 
linked to Iraq’s ancient civilizations, Iraq’s central role in the rise of Islam and Arab culture, 
and Iraqi efforts to oppose British colonialism during the 1920 revolution.”62 Like local 
nationalists elsewhere in the Arab world, Iraqists tended to adopt a liberal approach to politics 
and emphasize the inclusion of minorities. For example, the Ahali Group, the most prominent 
local nationalist organization, consistently “focused on expanding civil society through 
enhancing democratic rights.”63  
 The Iraqists’ inclusive orientation allowed them to draw on a “larger and more diverse” 
coalition than their pan-Arabist rivals. 64  However, their “more complex and nuanced vision of 
the future was less easy to package politically” than simple appeals for Arab unity.65 A further 
disadvantage was the fact that pan-Arabists held a number of key administrative positions. 
Sati’ al-Husri himself was the education minister during the 1920s and the director of the 
national teacher’s college in the 1930s, and used his perch to inculcate a generation of 
educated Iraqis with Arabist ideology. To make matters worse, the British-supported monarchy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was itself Arabist in orientation, viewing qawmiyya as a convenient way to make its own non-
Iraqi roots more palatable to the local population.  
 Indeed, given the advantages enjoyed by Iraq’s Arabists, it is striking that they did not 
achieve more success. But they were limited by the exclusiveness of their ideology. Like 
opponents of wataniyya across the region, their refusal to accept borders as a valid basis for the 
nation meant that their “imagined political community” depended on other, more sinister 
criteria. As Davis relates, pan-Arabists “substituted ethnic purity for a more precise territorial 
definition of space,” and displayed a disturbing penchant toward “vilification of the Other.”66 
In 1944, for example, members of the Arab nationalist Muthanna Club led a bloody pogrom 
against Baghdad’s Jewish community, sending a message that Jews—once “fully integrated 
into Iraqi society”—were no longer welcome in the country.67 Jews were far from the only 
alienated group: Shiites, Kurds and Christians were also targeted, ensuring that “pan-Arabism 
became for many Iraqis a metaphor for the political, economic and cultural exclusion of the 
bulk of the populace from national life.”68  
 In 1958, the monarchy was overthrown in a military coup, and the ensuing events 
illustrated the extent to which “Pan-Arabism…was not somehow ‘destined’ to dominate 
conceptions of political community in Iraq.”69 At a moment when Nasser and his followers 
were ascendant throughout the region, the new government conspicuously “eschewed the 
symbols of Pan-Arabism,” choosing instead to highlight Iraq’s pre-Arab and pre-Islamic 
heritage on the new national flag and coat of arms.70 This heralded a full-scale embrace of 
explicitly Iraqi nationalism, which the new leadership, headed by General Abd al-Karim !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Qasim, hoped would “bridge the ethnic gap between Sunni and Shi’i Arabs and Kurds, 
[emphasizing] cultural commonalities…rather than differences.”71 And to a large extent, their 
efforts succeeded. For five years Qasim “demonstrated that a nonsectarian state could be 
formed in Iraq,” extending rights and privileges to Shiites, Kurds, women and other minorities 
on a scale unmatched before or since.72 Though Qasim’s wataniyya-supporting regime was not 
by any means a democracy, Davis argues that it was decidedly less repressive than any other 
government in the history of 20th century Iraq, allowing for essentially unrestricted intellectual 
ferment and rapid growth in civil society.73  
 But Qasim’s inclusive approach would not last. Pressured by communists on one side 
and pan-Arabists on the other, he increasingly struggled to walk the political tightrope, and in 
February 1963 was overthrown by an Arabist military coup. After several years of infighting 
between factions aligned with the Ba’ath Party and those aligned with Nasser’s Egypt, the 
former group prevailed. Like the Bashir regime in Sudan, the party “enjoyed little support 
when it seized power,” but it made up for its lack of popularity by using new and 
unprecedented forms of violence to suppress its opponents.74 Using the potent combination of  
“terror and co-optation,” it rapidly “eliminated all overt opposition and destroyed much of civil 
society.”75 
 With its political position secure, the Ba’ath regime set about enforcing its hallmark 
pan-Arabist identity discourse. It immediately launched a “Project for Rewriting History,” 
seeking to “negate Iraqist nationalism’s inclusive legacy” by eliminating positive memories of 
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Qasim’s tenure in power.76 Rather than acknowledging the diversity of Iraqi society, the 
Ba’ath Party ignored and repressed it, recognizing only Sunni Arabs as legitimate members of 
the nation. From the moment it took power, the regime “used sectarian criteria to fill all 
important posts,” allowing non-Sunnis to fill only token roles in its administrative apparatus.77   
 Throughout the 1970s, the Arabist regime parlayed a sudden influx of oil wealth and 
widespread popular desire for stability into increased popular support.78 Especially after 
Saddam Hussein consolidated power in 1979, the state also strategically deployed Iraqist 
symbols and motifs as parts of its official discourse, giving its Arab nationalism a distinctively 
“Mesopotamian” flavor. But resemblance with Qasim-era wataniyya was at best skin-deep: the 
regime’s true goal was to benefit from Iraqi nationalism without accepting its inclusivist 
content. In Davis’ analysis, the purpose of appropriating “Mesopotamian” imagery was “to 
argue that Iraq was uniquely suited to assume the role of primus inter pares among Arab states 
in creating a Pan-Arab nation.”79 This argument was increasingly couched in terms of Saddam 
Hussein himself. The dictator was portrayed as the heir of ancient kings from Hammurabi to 
Nebuchadnezzar, a fearsome demigod not to be questioned or crossed. As Dutch political 
scientist Gertjan Dijink argues, “the effect of all the symbolism was not that the Iraqi people 
became proud of their common past. Rather, it made the person of the leader even more 
threatening and intangible…Saddam Hussein [became] the personification of all national 
norms.”80 
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 In other words, the regime never recognized the existence of an Iraqi people or Iraqi 
nation—it simply argued that Iraq was a particularly illustrious part of the Arab world, ruled 
by a particularly illustrious Arab leader. As Iraqi journalist Dina al-Shibeeb puts it, there can 
be no doubt that “Baathists undermined Iraqi nationalism,” and that its “rhetoric of ‘Unity, 
Arabism, Socialism’” was ultimately severely damaging to state-based identity.81 Ghazi al-
Yawar, Iraq’s first post-Saddam president, agrees, contending that the Ba’ath regime “worked 
systematically to erase” Iraqi identity during its decades in power.82  
 Beyond slogans and symbolism, the regime took tangible—and violent—steps to 
ensure that Sunni Arabs maintained hegemonic status within the state. Its cruelest excesses 
were directed against the restive Kurds in the country’s north. From 1986 to 1989, Hussein 
deployed chemical weapons, airstrikes and mass executions as part of the genocidal al-Anfal 
campaign, ultimately killing over 100,000 unarmed Kurdish civilians and driving millions out 
of the country. Shiites, Christians, Yezidis and Turkmen were also targeted by the regime, 
enduring exclusion from positions of power, the destruction of religious shrines, forced 
Arabization, and utter intolerance for political expressions of group identity. 
 After a long, bloody campaign against Iran and ignominious defeat in the Gulf War, 
Hussein’s regime became increasingly unpopular, even among the Sunni Arabs that constituted 
its base. The dictator thus “found it increasingly necessary to rely on torture and violence” 
during his last decade in power.83 In an attempt to shore up his standing, he also closely 
aligned himself with Iraqi Islamists. Though the Ba’ath regime had once been almost 
militantly secular, it undertook an overt “return to faith,” empowering Sunni clerics, turning 
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Qur’anic study into a national focus, and opening the Saddam Center for Islamic Studies.84 By 
the late 1990s, it had integrated religion into its rule so extensively that many observers began 
to refer to its ideology as “Ba’athi-Salafism.” Its approach to national identity became nearly 
indistinguishable from that of the Muslim Brotherhood, replete with calls for a “pan-Islamic 
state” built on an Arab foundation.85   
 The legacy of Saddam Hussein’s sectarian assault on wataniyya has haunted Iraq since 
the dictator was deposed in 2003. As Western policymakers know only too well, the near-total 
absence of trust between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds has severely damaged efforts to build an 
inclusive, democratic state. And while the sheer level of commitment from the United States 
has gradually made the government in Baghdad more liberal than most others in the region, 
sectarian conflict—and not elections—continues to dictate the fabric of life for most Iraqis. 
Yet there is room for hope: history shows that Iraqi national identity has the potential to unify 
disparate groups and lay the groundwork for more democratic modes of politics. If current 
efforts to cultivate a renewed sense of wataniyya succeed, the nation’s decades-long cycle of 
sectarian violence and repression might finally be broken.  
 
Yemen 
 
 Yemen’s experiences with national identity and democracy defy easy categorization. 
This is, at least in part, a function of the country’s complex past. Yemen is a highly tribal 
society, and its constantly-shifting political borders have historically mattered less than the 
powerful clans operating within them. Yemen only acquired its present form after the 1990 
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merger of the northern Yemen Arab Republic with the southern People’s Democratic Republic 
of Yemen, making it difficult to speak in any uniform way about “Yemeni history” or “modern 
Yemen.”  
 Nevertheless, the fierce independence of Yemeni tribesmen and the country’s relative 
isolation have historically kept Yemen out of foreign hands, endowing the territory with a 
distinctive cultural character. In both the north and south, a definite form of local nationalism 
thus emerged by the middle of the 20th century, and developed along similar lines to wataniyya 
elsewhere in the Arab world. As portrayed by Irish political scientist Fred Halliday, Yemeni 
nationalism adopted a “characteristically inclusive” attitude, embracing Himyaritic, Sabatean, 
Arabic, Amharic, Hebrew and Greek influences.86 It also insisted on its own uniqueness: 
Yemeni nationalists defined their identity at least partially “in opposition to that of the Arab 
world outside.”87 Saudi Arabia was viewed as a particularly important rival, to the point that, 
as Halliday argues, “the main ‘national’ enemy of Yemen is a neighboring Arab state.”88 
Nationalist antipathy was also directed against Nasser’s Egypt, which in the 1960s occupied 
North Yemen in an attempt to overthrow its monarchy and install a republican, Arabist 
government.89 Though this effort ultimately succeeded, even the Egyptian-backed rebels 
tended to feel “a strong sense of antipathy toward the supposed liberators, one amply 
reciprocated…by the Egyptians themselves.”90 
  Despite Yemenis’ deeply independent streak, neither the Yemen Arab Republic nor 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen successfully advanced a clear vision of state-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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based nationalism. Instead, the identity discourse in both settings was confused and unsettled, 
making regular use of both pan-Arabist and state-specific rhetoric. In South Yemen, for 
example, the 1970 constitution referred to Yemen as a mere district (iqlim) of the Arab world, 
but the 1978 constitution called Yemen a watan, or homeland.91 The north called itself the 
“Yemen Arab Republic,” but continued to celebrate major aspects of Yemen’s non-Arab 
heritage.92  
 According to Halliday, there are two explanations for this apparently contradictory 
position. First, Yemen’s own internal division meant that calls for “Arab unity” were at their 
heart also calls for “Yemeni unity”; slogans that on their face supported qawmiyya thus 
doubled as statements of wataniyya. Second, public support of pan-Arabist goals could help 
Yemen attract badly-needed “military, political and financial help” from other Arab countries. 
To a major degree, then, support for Arab nationalism was a “[reflection of] Yemen’s relative 
isolation and poverty.”93 
 This lack of ideological fervor may help to explain why North Yemen—on its face the 
more “Arabist” of the two Yemens—was in fact somewhat more democratic than the south. 94 
Because North Yemen’s Arab nationalism was adopted for mostly cosmetic reasons, it did not 
include the same Husri-esque ideological fire as Arabism under Nasser, Assad, Ghadhafi, 
Bashir or Hussein, and was thus less oppressive. Of course, the difference between the two 
Yemens also illustrates that Arabism is not always worse than its alternatives—the “austere 
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Marxism” of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was more tyrannical than the ruling 
ideology of the north, even though it was slightly more wataniyya-oriented.  
 Though Yemen was never passionately committed to Arabism, and thus avoided some 
of the ideology’s most negative excesses, its flirtation with qawmiyya did undermine the 
degree to which it could continue articulating its own unique national identity. The Yemeni 
states’ confusing and contradictory definitions of nationalism provided little of substance for 
their populations to hold on to, allowing regional and tribal loyalties to remain as strong—and 
divisive—as ever.  
 When the two states merged in 1990, they promised to base their shared political 
system on democratic principles. And throughout the 1990s, Yemen was indeed often cited as 
an “Arab success story,” holding periodic elections and allowing for the development of a 
wide range of political parties.95 The regime of president Ali Abdullah Saleh was not nearly as 
authoritarian as most others in the region, allowing opposition groups significant latitude and 
repeatedly making concessions when pressured.96 
  However, weak national identity and persistent tribal tensions limited the extent to 
which democracy could become a reality. For all of its liberal trappings, the Saleh regime 
deliberately exploited this situation. In the words of Yemeni journalist Afrah Nasser, “Saleh's 
approach to leadership…was based on divide and rule,” and his tactics deliberately “deepened 
the rift between disparate groups and [undermined] the idea of a Yemeni national identity.”97 
By creating a climate of communal mistrust and uncertainty, the regime filled opposition 
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groups with a “fear of the alternatives,” convincing them that without Saleh, Yemen would 
descend into chaos.98 
 As in Libya, Egypt and Syria, the state’s unwillingness to institutionalize a well-
defined nationalism created an environment in which Islamist groups could grow and thrive. 
With much clearer and better-developed ideologies than any of their competitors—and with 
enough strength to ensure that they were rarely challenged by the regime—hard-liners and 
extremists became increasingly powerful political players.99 Between 1993 and 2003, the 
Islamist Islah party nearly quadrupled its support, and by the late 2000s it was unquestionably 
the dominant force in the Yemeni opposition.100  
 When Saleh was finally deposed in 2012, the country sunk into precisely the unrest 
democratic activists had long feared. With little to bridge the divides between north and south, 
Islamists and non-Islamists, Shiites and Sunnis, and above all between warring tribes, Yemen 
is now embroiled in a multi-factional civil war. Because of the weakness of state-based 
national identity, the country that was the “poster child of Arab democracy” just a decade ago 
has become synonymous with violence, sectarianism and humanitarian disaster.  
 
Jordan 
 Jordan is among the most transparently “artificial” of the states of the Arab Middle 
East. British colonial authorities carved it out of their Mandate for Palestine in 1921 and 
designated it as a kingdom for Hashemite prince Abdullah, intending both to reward him for 
his service against the Ottomans and to prevent him from invading French-controlled Syria. 
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Winston Churchill, who was colonial secretary at the time, famously boasted that he had 
created Jordan “with a stroke of a pen, one Sunday afternoon in Cairo.”101  
 However, the new kingdom quickly began to develop a degree of legitimacy. Strong 
British support allowed for significant economic and infrastructural development, and the 
population’s reliance on the state meant that by World War II, Abdullah had successfully 
“[convinced] his new subjects that Transjordan had a legitimate right to exist within its 
borders.”102  Unlike Idris in Libya, the Jordanian monarchy devoted focused attention to 
instilling loyalty to the state, and had the resources to do so. For example, Betty Anderson 
argues that in schools, the nationally-sanctioned curriculum successfully “began to generate a 
feeling of ‘Transjordanianness,” based largely on pride in the monarchy’s leadership of the 
1916 anti-Ottoman Arab revolt.103 By the time students graduated and attended university in 
other Arab countries, they were patriotic enough to “[form] and [join] specifically Jordanian 
political clubs,” shying away from pan-Arabist alternatives.104   
 Jordan’s burgeoning national identity faced twin challenges following independence in 
1946. First, the kingdom annexed the West Bank and with it a massive population of 
Palestinians, who by most accounts outnumbered Jordan’s initial inhabitants. Second, pan-
Arab nationalism became an increasingly potent regional force, orienting itself against 
precisely the “European-drawn” borders responsible for Jordan’s existence. In many regards, 
the two challenges were intertwined; newly-incorporated Palestinians were more likely than 
native Jordanians to support Arab nationalism.  
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 The Hashemites’ Arabist and Palestinian rivals landed several important blows against 
the monarchy. King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian militant in 1951, and in 1956 
massive street protests forced his son Hussein to appoint the Arab nationalist Sulayman al-
Nablusi as Prime Minister. But Nablusi, who openly aspired to incorporate Jordan into a 
broader Arab state, overplayed his hand by threatening the status of the Hashemites’ core 
supporters. These “king’s men”—identified by Anderson as “Bedouin tribesmen, urban 
merchants, and peasants”—backed the monarchy’s successful effort to oust Nablusi and regain 
control over the country.105 King Hussein proceeded to rebuild his legitimacy by 
simultaneously co-opting Arabist claims,106 asserting his Islamic credentials as a descendant of 
the Prophet Muhammad, and reinvigorating state-specific Jordanian identity with an emphasis 
on the nation’s “unique ‘tribal’ character.”107  
 In some ways, this multifaceted approach to national identity resembled the “fuzzy 
nationalism” used by Syria’s Assad, Iraq’s Hussein and others to ensure that the regime—and 
not any identity—remained the basis of the state.108 But there were also profound differences. 
Most importantly, the monarchy’s “Hashemite Arabism” had little in common with the 
authoritarian, exclusivist ideologies of Sati’ al-Husri and Michel Aflaq. Even at the height of 
Arabist fervor in the 1950s, the Hashemites never called for the elimination of the nation-state 
and never turned against non-Arab minorities. Theirs was an openly pragmatic rather than 
“messianic” vision, and thus had much less need than revolutionary Arabism to hide its 
failures and shortcomings. The Jordanian monarchy never attempted to build a “harmonic 
state,” but rather accepted the essential multipolarity of national society.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 This meant that, as the appeal of Arabism subsided, the state-sponsored identity 
discourse could easily pivot to a full-throated endorsement of wataniyya. By the 1970s, there 
could be no doubt that the state was making a “deliberate and conscious attempt to cultivate a 
particular Jordanian identity.”109 With a flurry of national events, festivals, and press attention, 
the monarchy emphasized Jordan’s wealth of pre-Islamic historic sites, its ancient Nabatean 
inhabitants, and its pivotal position in the Umayyad caliphate. In 1991, the Jordanian National 
Charter further clarified and articulated the monarchy’s stance, emphasizing the role of an 
“already extant Jordanian nation” in the state’s early history. In Asher Susser’s analysis, these 
moves are irrefutable proof that by the 1990s, “an authentic, territorial Jordanian identity” had 
come into existence, making the Hashemite monarchy an archetypal example of “a state 
[creating] a nation.”110  
 Under Hussein’s son, Abdullah II, the monarchy has continued to throw its weight 
behind wataniyya. The state trumpeted the slogan “Jordan first” in the early 2000s, and by the 
end of the decade had adopted “We are all Jordan” as its motto.111 King Abdullah regularly 
refers to the population as “one Jordanian family” and the nation as “the homeland.”112 As 
Christopher Phillips notes, when he does discuss Arab identity, his tone is “[noticeably] 
different” from Assad’s in Syria. Whereas Abdullah’s “emphasis is on Arab identity shaping 
Jordan’s international relations,” Assad goes much farther, “[suggesting that] Syria’s Arab 
identity affects its national character.”113 
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 Like wataniyya across the region, Jordan’s state-based national identity has proved to 
be fundamentally inclusive in character, incorporating Bedouins, Palestinians, and Christians 
in equal measure. Its approach to Palestinians is particularly noteworthy. Despite the 
newcomers’ early attempts to challenge the authority of the state, the Hashemites’ approach 
“was and remains to try to integrate the Palestinians of the East Bank. The monarchy seeks to 
instill in them a sense of belonging to Jordan…so that all of Jordan’s citizens will feel they are 
an integral part of Jordanian society.”114 While Palestinians, who dominate Jordan’s private 
sector, have historically been poorly represented in the state bureaucracy, the monarchy has 
made a point of appointing them to important advisory positions and consistently encouraging 
them to participate in national politics.115 This attitude extends to Christians and other 
minorities. King Hussein deliberately “stressed the fact that, in his view, all Jordanians ‘from 
every origin and of any descent’ were full-fledged citizens,” and today, Abdullah habitually 
refers to the people as “Jordanians of their various origins.”116 
 The most important result of Jordan’s inclusive national identity is the position and 
orientation of the nation’s Islamists. As in Tunisia and Lebanon, national identity is flexible 
enough to extend to conservative Muslims, and strong enough to ensure that Islamists cannot 
hope to impose their beliefs on the rest of society. The monarchy has thus readily invited 
representatives of Islamist parties into the political process. In the early 1990s, for example, it 
handed over control of several ministries to officials from the Muslim Brotherhood.  As a 
result, Phillips points out, “Jordan’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF), tacitly supports the regime, and, although the Hashemites would probably prefer 
it to be less popular, any poll victories it has do not fundamentally challenge the official !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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identity discourse.”117 The difference from Algeria, Egypt and Syria could not be more 
pronounced.  
 Indeed, the IAF has become such a “mainstream” political force that in 2016, it 
included four Christians on its list of parliamentary candidates. According to the party’s deputy 
leader, “We are no longer a religious movement, but a wider, national movement to 
provide a voice for all Jordanians.”118 Another official expressed himself similarly: “We 
are Jordanians going after the vote of the Jordanian people.”119 Whereas in the 1980s the 
IAF campaigned under the slogan ‘Islam is the solution,” in 2016 its banners proclaimed 
“Renaissance for the homeland, dignity for the citizens,” “Jordan for all segments of 
society” and “No to sectarianism.”120 Christians have been receptive to this message and 
tone. As one voter put it, “we are raised as Jordanians who put our Jordanian identity 
first.”121 So long as a party publicly shares in this identity, any citizen can feel 
comfortable supporting it.  
 Yet for all of its cohesive, inclusive wataniyya, Jordan still cannot be considered a true 
democracy. To be sure, it is vastly more free than most of the other Arab states; Freedom 
House has ranked its political rights a “5” fourteen times, a “4” nine times, and a “3” once 
since the mid-1980s. And even before liberalization began, Christopher Phillips argues that 
Jordan did not experience nearly the same “police state society” as nations like Syria, Iraq and 
Libya. Hafez al-Assad, for example, “relied far more on coercion than Hussein did,” 
illustrating the fact that the Jordanian people were to a large degree “[accepting] of Hussein 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Phillips 48 
118 Taylor Luck, “In a First for Middle East Politics, Christians and Islamists Stump Together,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, September 16, 2016 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
 ! 123 
and, by extension, his interpretation of Jordanian identity.”122 However, this lack of heavy-
handedness does not change the fact that the monarchy has remained effectively in charge of 
the country since independence. As Freedom House’s 2016 report noted, “King Abdullah II 
holds broad executive powers, appoints and dismisses the prime minister and cabinet, and may 
dissolve the bicameral National Assembly at his discretion.”123 Almost every decision of 
import is ultimately in his hands. Accordingly, Jordan is simultaneously an illustration of the 
power of wataniyya and of its limits. While a strong, state-based national identity has helped to 
build stability, internal cohesion, and a relatively high level of political rights, it has not yet 
been sufficient to turn Jordan into a democracy.  
 
Morocco 
 
 Morocco’s genesis could scarcely be more different from that of Jordan. According to 
Israeli political scientist Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “a political and societal center has existed in 
Morocco’s core area,” since the eighth century, constituting a distinct geographic and cultural 
entity that has tenaciously resisted outside attempts at domination.124 Save the remote inner 
core of the Arabian Peninsula, Morocco was the only part of the Arabic-speaking world to 
avoid falling under Ottoman rule, and except for a 40-year French interlude, has remained 
autonomous and independent for over a millennium. For its part, the current royal family has 
reigned in an unbroken chain since the mid-17th century. As a result, Maddy-Weitzman argues, 
“among the Arab countries, only Egypt can be said to have a greater, and historically more 
enduring, degree of ‘stateness.’”125  
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 This is certainly not to say that Morocco is somehow “charmed” with a perfectly 
homogenous, cohesive population. While close to 99% of the population adheres to the Maliki 
school of Sunni Islam, the religious practices of rural Moroccans, which emphasize saints, 
shrines and rituals, differ significantly from the more austere customs dominant in the cities. 
The country is also divided on ethnic and linguistic lines; close to 40% of the population 
continues to speak Berber rather than a dialect of Arabic.  
 Like Lebanon—and very unlike Syria, Sudan and Iraq—Morocco has responded to its 
internal diversity by developing an inclusive, state-based nationalism that binds together 
disparate groups without attempting to erase their differences. After independence from France 
in 1956, the monarchy steered clear of qawmiyya, instead working intently to “nurture patriotic 
sentiments among the Moroccan populace” and regularly criticizing the pitfalls of neighboring 
Algeria’s “competing socio-political model.”126 This approach resonated throughout society. 
While “pan-Arabism may have had some emotive appeal in the 1950s and 1960s to the rising 
urban classes,” even its most devoted Moroccan proponents regarded it “only as a factor which 
complemented Moroccan nationalism, not as an alternative to it.”127 
 As in Jordan, the Moroccan monarchy’s rejection of revolutionary Arabism meant that 
it had no need to construct a “harmonic state” when the ideology lost its luster. Instead, it has 
continued to define a “Moroccan national identity [that is] loose and flexible.”128 The first 
facet of this flexibility applies to the country’s Berber population. While Berbers experienced 
some discrimination in the post-independence decades, this was largely due to individual 
Arabists in the civil service and Arabist-minded teachers imported from Egypt.129 The 
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monarchy itself did not encourage anti-Berber activities, and in fact built deep ties with Berber 
tribal leaders and repeatedly placed Berber officers in charge of the military. By 1990s, King 
Hasan ordered that “the Berber ‘dialects’ should be taught in all Moroccan schools as part of 
the country’s national heritage.”130  He also created “a well-funded public academic institute 
charged with promoting all facets of Berber culture as an important feature of collective 
Moroccan identity.”131 Indeed, official efforts at inclusion have ensured that Berbers feel 
comfortable enough to split their support between various political and ideological factions. 
Unlike the beleaguered Kurds of Iraq or the Africans of Sudan, their “participation in 
discussions over national identity [are] far from monolithic.”132 
 The second area of flexibility within Moroccan wataniyya applies to the role of Islam. 
According to Turkish scholar Senem Aslan, “although the monarchy [has] appropriated Islam 
as the state religion and resorted to Islamic symbols to build its legitimacy, it [has been] 
careful not to promote only one interpretation of Islam and ask the society to conform to it.”133 
In other words, while the king is dubbed “Commander of the Faithful” and constantly touts his 
ancestral ties to the Prophet Muhammad, the state does not favor either rural or urban 
traditions of Islam. And while it has repeatedly shut down more radical Islamist groups, it has 
gone “to great lengths to nurture a moderate Islamic Party, the PJD (Justice and Development 
Party).”134 Like the Jordanian IAF, the PJD thus seeks to work within the system, advocating 
gradual change rather than revolution. It has proved adept at finding partners among non-
Islamist political parties, and currently leads a coalition government dedicated to “a limited 
reformist path of political action that…[operates] within the regime’s constitutional rules of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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game.”135 As a result, neither the monarchy nor secularly-oriented Moroccans view the PJD as 
an existential threat.  
 Morocco’s inclusive, state-based approach to national identity has created a cohesive 
polity, and the kingdom’s disparate groups have repeatedly proven that they are capable of 
working together. This collaborative environment has been conducive to one of the Arab 
world’s better democratic records; since 1973, Freedom House has ranked Moroccan political 
rights a “5” thirty times, a “4” eleven times, and a “3” twice. Yet, as is the case with Jordan, 
most observers hesitate to call Morocco a genuine democracy. The unelected monarchy 
remains the center of power in the country, retaining the authority to dissolve parliament 
(albeit in consultation with the prime minister), rule by decree, dismiss or appoint cabinet 
members, set national and foreign policy, command the security services, and preside over the 
judicial system.136 As a result, Aslan notes, the democratic field “has primarily acted as an 
arena for patronage distribution” rather than serving as the locus of national decision-
making.137 Moroccan wataniyya exerts an undeniable stabilizing effect, but it has not yet 
turned the nation into a consolidated democracy. 
 
Connecting the Dots 
 
 The states examined in the past two chapters can be sorted into three general classes: 
those defined by pro-wataniyya regimes (Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco), secular 
Arabist regimes (Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Yemen), and Islamo-Arabist regimes (Libya, 
Sudan, and Iraq). The latter two categories have a great deal in common. In both, state-based 
national identity has been actively undermined by the ruling elites, and violent and exclusivist 
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interpretations of Islam loom large on the political scene. Alignment with the state does little to 
reduce Islamists’ undemocratic impact: they either overwhelm liberals in the crossfire of their 
battles with secular Arabists, or crush them directly in partnership with sympathetic dictators.  
 Supporters of political rights are not the only group in danger when state-based 
nationalism is cast aside. Ethnic and religious minorities have also often found they have no 
place in qawmiyya-based regimes. This chapter has detailed the harsh repression employed 
against Berbers in Algeria, Jews and Kurds in Iraq, and ethnic Africans in Sudan; persecution 
in the latter two cases reached genocidal proportions.  
 But these chapters are more than a list of atrocities. They are filled with bright spots as 
well—and not just in the “exceptional” pro-wataniyya cases. Even in nations that eventually 
succumbed to Arabism, state-based nationalism generally enjoyed prominence first, serving as 
the dominant ideology for a short interlude of relative tolerance and coexistence. As hard as it 
is to imagine today, major political movements in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Sudan, Yemen and 
Iraq once celebrated diversity and state-based nationalism in equal measure, placing these twin 
values at the forefront of their ideologies.  
 The extent of the correlation between wataniyya and pluralism makes deep conceptual 
sense. As Chapter 1 argued, a border-based identity is inherently more likely than other forms 
of nationalism to prioritize inclusivity. This natural partnership arises because wataniyya 
celebrates a homeland rather than a given race, religion or ethnicity. Christians, Muslims, 
Kurds, Berbers, “Africans” and Arabs can all love their nation in the same way; but they 
cannot all be full citizens in a state based exclusively on Islam and the Arabic language.  
 Beyond simply inspiring tolerance, strong wataniyya is also a powerful identity of its 
own, able to forge active bonds of solidarity between segments of society that would otherwise 
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have very little in common. In particular, wataniyya enables Islamic traditionalists and their 
more secular, liberal counterparts to respect one another and even work together in the service 
of shared national goals. Chapter 4 illustrated this dynamic at work in Tunisia and Lebanon, 
and Chapter 5 has revealed how state-based nationalism fulfills the same unifying role in 
Jordan and Morocco. No mainstream Islamist party in any of these four “pro-wataniyya” 
countries advocates taking over the state, imposing sharia law, or persecuting minorities.  
 It would be foolish, of course, to presume that state-based identity is always a perfectly 
viable option. In one case, that of Libya, wataniyya was hamstrung by abnormally late state 
formation, powerful Arabists in neighboring Egypt, and above all by indifference from King 
Idris. Contrary to the region-wide pattern, a credible Libyan nationalist movement never 
developed. In a way, however, this failure puts wataniyya’s true strength in clearer perspective. 
Across an entire region where states are regularly branded as “artificial,” it is striking that only 
Libya has failed to articulate a clear national identity.  
 Just as Libya serves as an exception to the rule regarding the strength of wataniyya, 
Yemen presents a departure from the norm on its comparative desirability. In the Yemen Arab 
Republic, a mild strain of Arabism allowed for a somewhat freer polity than in the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, which adopted a slightly more pro-wataniyya stance. It would 
thus be incorrect to argue that Arabism was “all bad,” an ideology that is always worse than 
every alternative.   
 Indeed, the past two chapters have referred to several instances in which Arabism 
enjoyed strong levels of popular support. For brief periods, large groups in most of the region’s 
states did genuinely rally around qawmiyya. But what won them over? Certainly, anti-
imperialism and regional pride played a role. The personal charisma of Gamal Abdel Nasser 
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and the cultural power of Egypt under his rule were also highly important. But the case studies 
above have explained how explicit indoctrination campaigns were critical ingredients in almost 
every situation where Arabism rose to prominence. The paradigmatic instance of this strategy 
was Sati’ al-Husri’s own tenure as Iraq’s education minister, imitated by similar school-
focused crusades in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Sudan and beyond. Influenced by Husri’s command 
to “teach [objectors] the truth,” Arabists were often very open about their intent to 
indoctrinate.138 Algeria’s campaign of “Writing and Rewriting History,” Iraq’s “Project for 
Rewriting History,” and Syria’s effort to create a “new generation of Syrian Arab Patriots” all 
exemplified this unambiguous willingness to use state power to manipulate historical fact.  
 Supporters of qawmiyya did not limit themselves to classrooms and textbooks. When 
propaganda campaigns were not enough to sweep them into power, they distinguished 
themselves from their opponents by their readiness to use violence. In Syria in 1956, Iraq in 
1963 and Sudan in 1989, small pan-Arabist factions successfully banished wataniyya from the 
scene, murdering their key opponents and frightening everyone else into submission. In Libya, 
Muammar Gadhafi had little need for violence at first, but eventually became a fearsome killer, 
eliminating thousands of real or perceived rivals. In Egypt, Algeria, and Yemen, the bloodshed 
was less intense, but the role of “coercive apparatuses” and security services remained much 
greater than in the states where pro-wataniyya governments remained in power.  
 Despite the long list of abuses Arabists perpetrated, their tactics alone did not guarantee 
that they would sweep to regional dominance. The past two chapters have illustrated how each 
state’s political fate was ultimately determined by the choices made by its own leaders. Tunisia 
and Egypt would have charted very different courses had Bourguiba and Nasser reversed their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138  Translation by Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003): 72. 
 ! 130 
stances on national identity, and the same can be said for Idris in Libya, Hasan in Morocco, 
Hussein in Jordan, Assad in Syria, and Saleh in Yemen. Even in situations where Arabists 
forcefully overthrew pro-wataniyya governments, events could have still have unfolded 
differently had local nationalists followed the example of Lebanon’s Camille Chamoun and 
appealed for outside assistance.  
 In states Arabists did manage to capture, their propensity for violence, widespread use 
of indoctrination, and links to strong Islamist movements devastated the prospects for 
democracy. Table 5.2 shows the extent to which political rights suffered in nations where 
Arabism defined the political environment.  
Table 5.2: Mean Freedom House political rights rating (1973-2017) 
 
 And the table understates the case: from 1973-2017, a pro-wataniyya nation earned a 
Freedom House political rights rating of 4 or better on 38 occasions, amounting to 21% of the 
“country-years” in which they were evaluated.  In contrast, “secular Arabist” and “Islamo-
Arabist” nations only produced 11 ratings of 4 or better, reaching this benchmark just 3.5% of 
the time. In other words, Arabist countries were almost seven times less likely than their 
wataniyya-supporting counterparts to receive a favorable democratic evaluation.  
 This disparity is clear evidence that the states of the Arab Middle East would be well-
served by working to reinforce state-based national identity. Though the legacy of Arabism is 
to some extent irreversible, and has produced definite obstacles, wataniyya is not permanently 
doomed. As the case of Jordan proves, no state—even the most “artificial”—need despair of 
building a strong, inclusive national identity. With the right leadership, a popularly supported, 
inclusive and border-based nationalism can always be developed
“Wataniyya-supporters” (Tunisia, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco) 
“Secular Arabists” (Egypt, 
Syria, Algeria, Yemen) 
“Islamo-Arabists” (Libya, 
Sudan, Iraq) 
5.03 5.95 6.52 
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6 The Case for Wataniyya 
   
 The preceding chapters have sought to decipher the famed “Arab democracy deficit,” 
endeavoring to explain why, with just two exceptions, the Arabic-speaking states present the 
world’s largest single bloc of authoritarian governments. This is a large and complex 
problem—especially given the near-impossibility of making sweeping generalizations about 
the vast region bounded by the Atlantic Ocean in the west and the Persian Gulf in the east. 
Despite the intricacy of the issues involved, however, this thesis makes an audaciously 
simple claim: beyond the small “rentier states” of the Gulf, most of the democracy deficit can 
be explained by the relative weakness of state-based patriotism. Moreover, anemic state-
based national identity was never an inevitable fate for any of the Arab states. Rather, it was 
the result of distinct choices made by individual leaders, nearly all of whom were inspired by 
the ideal of qawmiyya, or pan-Arab nationalism. In other words, there is a fairly well-defined 
“villain” of the story of democracy in the Arab world.  
 Could pan-Arabism, an ideology that enjoyed its real heyday only between the mid-
1950s and 1967, really be the prime culprit behind the Arab Middle East’s contemporary 
woes? Is it really possible to blame so much on such a short-lived—and such a long-dead—
movement?  
 For four reasons, the answer is yes. First, this thesis has clearly shown the ways in 
which an “Arabist” approach to national identity lived on long after explicit calls for Arab 
political unity faded. In Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, leaders 
continued to find it to their advantage to restrict the growth of state-based patriotism, 
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preferring to emphasize Arab and Islamic identity instead. In general, they allotted local 
nationalism only enough space to “muddy the waters,” creating confused and conflicting 
official identity discourses. By encouraging such a discordant environment, leaders sought, 
with considerable success, to present their own cults of personality as the only viable grounds 
for peace and stability.  
 Second, pan-Arabism always entailed more than just a particular approach to 
nationalism. It represented a fundamentally authoritarian way of viewing the world. By 
denying the legitimacy of borders, it shifted the foundation of nationhood and identity to 
other criteria. The most important of these was language—specifically Modern Standard 
Arabic, a formal dialect so distant from natively spoken versions of Arabic that its speakers 
process it as a foreign language.1 By basing the nation on a language that was nobody’s 
mother tongue, pan-Arabism relied on separating people from their own roots—to say 
nothing of the fact that it justified outright persecution of Kurds, Berbers and ethnic Africans. 
Its founders were fully aware of this reality, and openly defended authoritarian political 
tactics, arguing that “cruelty” and indoctrination were fully necessary if their plans were to 
be realized. This was not just empty ideology: from the brutal suppression of Syrian 
nationalists in 1956 to the 1989 Sudanese coup, Arabists demonstrated time and time again 
that they were more willing than their rivals to make use of fear and coercion. They thus 
introduced a set of violent norms to political life across the Middle East, establishing 
repressive practices and expectations that have lingered on long after their original 
proponents have left the scene.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See "Literary Arabic Is Expressed In Brain Of Arabic Speakers As A Second Language," ScienceDaily, 
November 5, 2009.  
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 The third reason why pan-Arabism can be blamed for the region’s present woes is the 
ideology’s causal role in the rise of Islamist extremism. This is on its face a surprising 
connection to draw, given that the first Arabists were highly secular and are to this day 
despised by Muslim traditionalists. But pan-Arabism in fact naturally led into Islamism, 
laying the groundwork for religious radicalism in both indirect and direct ways. The indirect 
support was provided, in large part, because pan-Arabism was a revolutionary ideology that 
made a series of wildly ambitious political, economic and social promises. Especially after 
the 1967 defeat against Israel, alternatives to official narratives could not be permitted, lest 
regimes’ exaggerated claims be exposed as false. As a result, Arabist dictatorships devastated 
civil society, creating arid, empty public spaces in which Islamist groups could easily grow 
and thrive. This dynamic was intensified by the fact that many regimes attempted to use 
Islamists to combat their liberal critics, not realizing until it was too late that they had 
empowered groups far more threatening to their rule than the liberals had ever been. 
 Arabism also fed into Islamism in a more direct and organic way: despite their 
sometime rivalry, the two ideologies actually agree on multiple core issues. For example, the 
Arabist emphasis on regional identity and denigration of individual nation-states is very 
similar to the way radical Islamists refuse to recognize any divisions within the monolithic 
global umma. Both groups also share a devotion to classical Arabic and to the “golden age” 
of Arab culture under the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. Focused on this ideological 
overlap, Arabists and Islamists have openly joined forces in Sudan, Iraq, and Libya, and 
Arabist principles have led naturally to an Islamization of society elsewhere. Accordingly, 
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for states across the Middle East, a strong history of pan-Arabism is correlated very closely 
with the presence of strong and disruptive Islamist movements.2 
 The fourth and most important reason Arabism can be blamed for the region’s 
democracy deficit is that its alternative—wataniyya—was at every stage a tremendously 
more promising option for sociopolitical flourishing. Even more than Arabism’s direct 
consequences, it was thus ultimately the ideology’s “opportunity cost” that made it so 
destructive. For the opportunity offered by state-based nationalism was real. In Egypt, 
Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Morocco, state-based 
national identity developed strong followings in the decades immediately before and after 
independence. With very few exceptions, local nationalists emphasized inclusion of minority 
groups, adopted a pluralistic approach to history, and stressed a democratic political 
mindset.3 Unfortunately, wataniyya was in most cases violently suppressed by its Arabist 
rivals. But the states where wataniyya has survived most completely—Tunisia and 
Lebanon—are today the only democracies in the region. Similarly, the kingdoms of Jordan 
and Morocco also rejected Arabism and emphasized their own unique identities, and while 
they are not fully democratic, the two states boast significantly more stable, inclusive, and 
open societies than their neighbors.  
  Indeed, at its core, this thesis is much less a case against Arabism than it is a 
comprehensive case for wataniyya. The case receives its theoretical basis in Chapter 1, which 
lays out a clear argument for the way state-based nationalism has been closely tied, 
throughout history and around the world, to democracy. Unlike transnational aristocracies 
and monarchies, democracy requires a definite body, a clearly-demarcated demos that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See Table 5.1 
3 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
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determines who will vote and in whose name leaders will act. It also requires that disparate 
interest groups peacefully coexist within this demos, trusting one another to obey the rules of 
the political game and to respect one other’s rights. As it turns out, a strong national identity 
is the only way to meet both of these requirements. Only a nation can simultaneously clearly 
define the polity and create high levels of shared goodwill and solidarity within it.  
 The parallel rises of nationalism and democracy in the 19th century were thus no 
coincidence; the two movements were fundamentally intertwined. As Pierre Manent notes, 
peasants became citizens at the same time as they became Frenchmen, forging bonds of trust 
and respect with leaders whom they could now regard as countrymen rather than distant 
overlords. The connection between nationalism and democracy is even more striking beyond 
Europe. Indeed, the success of anti-imperialist independence movements was based on the 
reality that, while it is relatively easy to rule over a disconnected mass of people, it is nearly 
impossible to subjugate a nation. Even critics of nationalism have thus acknowledged that in 
the context of newly independent Asian and African states, the association between 
nationalism and democracy was “intimate” and “unmistakable.”4  
 The “case for wataniyya” continues in Chapter 2, which argues that state-based 
patriotism is good for minimizing religious radicalism, constructing strong economies, and 
minimizing the extent to which a state is willing to use violence against its own people. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 apply these ideas in eleven concrete case studies, demonstrating in great 
detail that wataniyya has been a force for inclusion, stability and democracy across the Arab 
Middle East.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1962): 223.  
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Competing arguments  
 As discussed at the start of this thesis, most debate over democracy in the Arab world 
has focused on the role of Islam. Scholars who argue against blaming religion for the 
democracy deficit are more than willing to mix and match the “oil,” “economics,” and 
“regime statecraft” explanations, but generally dismiss Islam-centric arguments altogether.  
Rather than attempting to incorporate Islam into their own lines of reasoning, they contend 
that it has almost nothing to do with the Arab world’s unique problems. This thesis does 
something different. It integrates both sides of the debate, fully accounting for the role of 
Islam without blaming it entirely for the democracy deficit.  
 According to the logic laid out in the preceding chapters, Islam itself does not 
automatically kill a nation’s chance for democratic development. Many scholars have rightly 
observed that outside of the Arab Middle East, many Muslim-majority countries are in fact 
functioning democracies. The problem, accordingly, is not Islam per se: the problem is the 
role Islam can sometimes play in society and politics. In settings like Malaysia and 
Indonesia, where the polity is unified around a “conservative consensus,” Islam enjoys a 
relatively uncontroversial place in the public sphere. In these states, even secular parties are 
open to explicitly Islam-based legislation, and no viable “Islamist” party seeks to 
fundamentally revolutionize society. However, the situation is very different in most Arab 
state. In these settings, the weakness of state-based nationalism makes it extremely difficult 
to build trust and respect between rival political and sectarian groups. Instead of 
compromising or finding common ground, factions are inclined to attempt to impose their 
will on the rest of the population, resorting to force whenever necessary. And in the identity 
vacuum that results from weak wataniyya, the clear narrative offered by radical Islamists 
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allows them to quickly become the strongest and most disruptive faction in the system. Even 
if they are not dominant enough to seize power altogether, they divide populations and sink 
into bitter conflict with their competitors. In such a polarized, conflicted setting, 
democracy—with its connotations of power-sharing and peaceful transitions between 
administrations—is all but impossible. In other words: Islamism is the superficial reason why 
democracy is out of the question, but weak national identity is the underlying reason why 
religious extremism is itself so strong.  
 Just as with the “Islam explanation,” this thesis incorporates the “economics” and 
“regime statecraft” arguments into its own narrative rather than dismissing them altogether. 
Economic factors alone, it contends, are not enough to explain the lack of Arab democracy. 
The region is neither too rich nor too poor; dozens of democracies around the world resemble 
the Arab states on measures of per-capita GDP, poverty, and income inequality. Indeed, 
within the Arab world itself, Egypt and Tunisia have almost identical economies but very 
different democratic situations. But to the extent that the Arab world’s specific economic 
conditions—for example, its weak private sectors—do impact the prospects for democracy in 
the region, the status of national identity is key to understanding why. First, weak 
intercommunal solidarity limits the strength and flexibility of markets, which rely on shared 
trust to survive. Second, the primacy of Modern Standard Arabic—as opposed to popularly-
spoken national dialects—severely undermines education, literacy, and social mobility across 
the region.  
 For its part, regime statecraft is clearly an important part of the puzzle, allowing for 
the consolidation of “coup-proof” dictatorships that can be shaken only by massive popular 
uprisings. Protests can be prevented and contained; dissent can be monitored and punished. 
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And when major challenges do arise, regimes from Syria to Sudan have weathered the storms 
thanks to their willingness to fire on their own people. But once again, authoritarian tactics 
are symptoms of a deeper ailment. Why are the security services in Syria willing to kill their 
fellow citizens, while their Tunisian counterparts are not? The answer is, once again, national 
identity. In Syria, wataniyya has been cast aside by decades of Arabist rule; in Tunisia, state-
based patriotism has since independence formed the very basis of the political community. 
The Tunisian security services share a strong national bond with the protestors on the other 
side of their bayonets, which dramatically reduces the chance that protestors will enact 
reprisals if they ultimately take power. The Syrian security services, on the other hand, share 
no such bond, and are thus embroiled in an existential struggle for their own survival, 
convinced that only death awaits if their grip on the state slips.  
 With regard to three competing explanations, then, this thesis makes room for rival 
arguments to have a role, but finds that wataniyya offers a deeper, more fundamental 
explanation of the dynamics blocking democratic growth.  
 Oil, the fourth competing explanation, receives slightly different treatment. Rather 
than arguing that wataniyya also underlies rentier-state dynamics, this thesis gives the “oil 
curse” theory significant credit, accepting that it likely explains the persistence of autocracy 
and the weakness of democratic advocacy in the six Gulf States. However, because these 
states contain barely seven percent of the total Arab population, it is clear that oil alone 
cannot come close to solving the overall puzzle of Arab democratic exceptionalism. Outside 
of the Gulf, oil is sparse enough—and populations are high enough—that no regime can 
realistically be described as “buying off” its people. Even when counting major producers 
such as Iraq, Libya and Algeria, a side-by-side comparison of oil-exporting and non-oil-
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exporting nations reveals that they have very similar GDPs, unemployment rates and taxation 
policies. In these states, something other than oil is making the difference between 
democracy and dictatorship.  
 While this thesis admits that oil is probably the prime culprit for the absence of 
democracy in the Gulf, even there, national identity is far from irrelevant. Kuwait, for 
example, boasts the strongest wataniyya of any of the rich “petrostates.” And, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, this has helped it to become by far the most democratic country in the Gulf, 
demonstrating once again that state-based nationalism can support a positive political culture 
in even the most difficult contexts.  
 
Addressing Potential Objections  
 This thesis makes a whole-hearted “case for wataniyya.” But it does not pretend to 
have all the answers or to make a completely watertight argument. There are undeniably 
several weak spots in its narrative, and there is room for legitimate objections to be made 
against it.  
 The first of these objections is clearly that, while nationalism might lead to inclusion 
and democracy internally, its international application is less obviously constructive. The 
same ideology that creates an ‘us’ does imply a ‘them.’ Yemeni nationalism, for example, is 
defined in partial opposition to Saudi nationalism. Lebanese identity is at least in part a 
rejection of Syrian identity. And all state-based identities in the region are in fundamental 
tension with transnational Arab identity.  
 But the fact is, Yemeni, Saudi, Lebanese and Syrian nations and identities, no matter 
how weak or beleaguered, are here to stay. The region’s leaders have already tried to pretend 
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otherwise, and they failed mightily in their effort to impose a one-size-fits-all Arabism on the 
diverse populations in question. Even when wataniyya had barely developed, as in early 20th 
century Iraq and Syria, locals quickly protested against Arabist regimes, demanding a “Syria 
for Syrians” and an “Iraq for Iraqis.” Indeed, efforts at regional merger have ultimately 
backfired so completely that today’s discussion of borders in the Middle East centers on the 
possibility of further partition, not increased unity. It has become common to hear proposals 
for multiple Iraqs, Syrias, Libyas and Yemens. But “going back to the drawing board” would 
solve few of the region’s problems. As argued extensively above, there are no perfect 
borders, no perfect Arab states that will finally strike the “right” demographic balance and 
end sectarian conflict once and for all. Tinkering with frontiers will never eliminate 
competition between groups. Rather than pursuing further attempts to reach utopic solutions, 
the states of the Arab Middle East must reach equitable settlements that actively seek to 
balance the competing religious, ethnic and ideological identities at play.5 This thesis argues 
that the best way to reach such settlements is to enshrine wataniyya and encourage it to be as 
inclusive as possible. If followed properly, this path will promote international stability just 
as much as it contributes to domestic reconciliation. For as Chapter 1 pointed out, respect for 
borders inherently means acknowledging the sovereignty of other states. Nationalism can and 
does provide a constructive outlet for group sentiment, channeling it into mutually acceptable 
and peaceful forms.  
 The second potential objection to this thesis’ argument is a mirror image of the first. 
Just as state-based nationalism can be accused of fomenting a level of division, it can 
certainly be argued that pan-Arab sentiment, at least in a non-revolutionary and apolitical 
form, creates salutary unity. To an extent, the ties forged by Modern Standard Arabic do link !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The continued bloodshed and suffering following the long-awaited partition of Sudan illustrates this point. 
 ! 141 
together otherwise disparate regions, encouraging economic growth and cultural dynamism. 
An educated Iraqi can travel to Morocco, read street signs, and make himself understood to 
an educated Moroccan. A student from Egypt can study in a Qatari university with little need 
for linguistic adjustment. And so on and so forth.  
 But while MSA does create a type of unity, it is a top-heavy unity, a unity made up 
disproportionately of elites. The wealthiest and most educated Arabs can jet from one capital 
to another, existing in a kind of super-national bubble.6 But like the European aristocrats of 
the 18th century, these Arab elites live in a sort of illusion. Their salons mask the deep and 
real distinctions between different Arab peoples, most of whom are either not comfortable 
with MSA, not wealthy enough to travel widely, or both. Indeed, rather than serving these 
average citizens, Arabism is often used to manipulate them. In prewar Syria, for example, the 
Assad regime consciously benefited from its subjects’ identification with suffering Lebanese, 
Iraqis and Palestinians, fully aware that the closer they felt to chaos in neighboring states, the 
more they would accept their own government’s oppressive security measures.7  
  To be sure, Modern Standard Arabic and pan-Arab solidarity do have some benefits 
that trickle down to ordinary citizens. The rapid spread of anti-authoritarian protests in 2011, 
for example, was enabled by an unmistakably “Arab” common consciousness. And regional 
peace and security is aided by a sense of shared culture. Accordingly, this thesis does not 
suggest abandoning MSA entirely or dispensing with all forms of regional fellowship. It 
simply suggests that the interests of Arab peoples are best served by combining transnational 
solidarity with much more explicit attempts to build state-based identity and community. It is 
possible, to an extent, for the region’s states to have their cake and eat it too, embracing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Martin Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," Daedalus 122, no. 3 (1993): 171-206. 
7 Christopher Phillips, Everyday Arab Identity: the Daily Reproduction of the Arab World. (New York: 
Routledge, 2012): 30 
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friendly pan-Arab relations while enjoying their own distinctiveness with much more pride 
and purpose than they have thus far.  
 A third possible objection to this thesis’ argument is that the “exceptions” it 
celebrates are not, by any means, pristine success stories. Apotheosizing Tunisia and 
Lebanon too much—overly glorifying either their past performance or their present-day 
situations—is unwise. For its part, Tunisia languished under authoritarian control for the first 
55 years of independence. Until the Arab Spring, it would have been nonsense to refer to it as 
a “democratic exception.” Today, the nation is battling deepening economic malaise, and has 
developed a severe problem with the radicalization of its youth. Although it has dealt 
remarkably well with integrating Islamists into its political system, it has struggled to prevent 
individual radicals from traveling abroad in the pursuit of violent jihad. In fact, the Islamic 
State has received more recruits from Tunisia than any other country.8 For Lebanon’s part, 
the problems are even more obvious. The nation was riven by a 15-year-long civil war that 
made it synonymous with chaos and dysfunction, and today remains a divided society with a 
deeply flawed, patronage-based political system.   
 But while wataniyya cannot solve every problem in every country, it does undeniably 
work to mitigate these problems. State-based nationalism is not a silver bullet, but states are 
plainly better off with it than without it. Consider Lebanon: with well over a million Syrian 
refugees straining its system and no elected president from 2014 to 2016, the nation 
nonetheless steered almost completely clear of political violence. Indeed, the degree to which 
“business as usual” continued is almost shocking. Few other nations could even imagine 
accommodating a refugee influx of the same relative size, or functioning without a head of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Carlotta Gall, “Tunisia Fears the Return of Thousands of Young Jihadists,” The New York Times, February 25, 
2017.  
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state, let alone managing both crises at the same time. 9 Lebanon’s national identity—
simultaneously strong enough to bind together its disparate groups and flexible enough to 
allow them to maintain their own customs and traditions—was a key reason it weathered this 
storm. Communal self-government kept the country from slipping into anarchy, and a shared 
patriotism and loyalty to Lebanon kept these communities from attacking one another.  
 A closer look at Tunisia also reveals that state-based national identity mitigates 
problems that would otherwise have been much worse. For example, part of the reason why 
so many young radicals leave the country is that there are so few opportunities for domestic 
jihad. Unlike their counterparts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and beyond, radical Islamists in 
Tunisia have extremely limited options for pursuing their goals at home. Islamism simply 
lacks the popular support to sustain a violent campaign against the state.10 In other words, the 
high number of foreign fighters produced by Tunisia is, at least in part, a testament to the 
success with which the nation has sidelined violent extremism in its own internal political 
culture.  
 As a final point regarding flaws in the “democratic exceptions,” it is worth noting that 
wataniyya still has room to grow in both Lebanon and Tunisia. To the extent that the two 
states continue to face democratic shortcomings, it is possible that a stronger alignment with 
state-based nationalism could help remedy them. For example, neither Lebanon nor Tunisia 
has institutionalized its local dialect of Arabic as an official idiom. While each gives its 
dialect more public respect than is common elsewhere in the region, neither has taken the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The refugees number at least 1.5 million, or roughly a quarter of Lebanon’s population. In the United States, 
an influx of the same relative size would amount to over 80 million refugees.  
10 See Geoffrey Macdonald and Luke Waggoner, “Why Are So Many Tunisians Joining the Islamic State?” The 
Washington Post, January 27, 2017. In interviews conducted by Macdonald and Waggoner, even “family and 
friends of foreign fighters… uniformly condemned their actions,” using “forceful and emotionally-charged 
language when rejecting violent extremism.” 
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final step toward formal recognition. For the time being, both states insist, like their Arabist 
neighbors, on legally favoring MSA over the native languages of their own populations.  
 A fourth plausible objection to the “case for wataniyya” is that in the past half-
decade, the Sisi regime in Egypt, and to a lesser extent the Assad regime in Syria, have in 
fact made distinct pivots toward state-based nationalism.11 But this has done little to reduce 
oppression in either state. Both Syria and Egypt are as un-democratic as they have been at 
any point since independence, and neither Sisi nor Assad appear to be going anywhere soon.  
 Once again, however, while this objection shows that wataniyya is not a fast-acting, 
catch-all solution, it does little to fundamentally invalidate the core argument of this thesis. 
State-based nationalism takes time to work, especially in contexts where it has been actively 
undermined for decades. A space of just three or four years is too short to see dramatic 
results. In Tunisia, of course, it took a full 55 years for strong, inclusive national identity to 
yield democratic fruit. But the long incubation period meant that when the time finally came, 
the nation was ready to make the most of its democratic opportunity.  
 It would thus be false to interpret dictators’ current turn toward state-based 
nationalism as inescapable proof of wataniyya’s moral and democratic bankruptcy. Rather 
than focusing on who is promoting it or why, it is more useful to judge a nation’s identity 
discourse on what is being said and how. Instead of sullying state-based nationalism by 
association, the dictators’ “patriotic turns” should thus be regarded with cautious approval, as 
potential first steps toward future liberalization. Perhaps Egypt is the next Tunisia; given the 
state’s historically high levels of national consciousness, such an outcome is certainly within 
the realm of possibility.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Eric Trager, “Stuck With Sisi: Amid Egypt’s Repression, Few Alternatives,” Foreign Affairs, January 24, 
2017 and Dave McAvoy, “In Isolated Syria, Assad Shifts Away From Pan-Arabism,” The National, October 23, 
2013.  
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Implications for future scholarship  
 This thesis presents an altogether new way of understanding the Arab democracy 
deficit, making a full-fledged addition to a field that has intrigued scholars since the 1990s. 
While most previous attempts to explain the region’s democratic exceptionalism have been 
limited to article-length contributions, this thesis expands on its argument over the course of 
multiple chapters and eleven detailed case studies. It does not claim to fully repudiate 
previous explanations; instead, it incorporates many of their key observations into its own 
logic. At the same time, its approach is not simply to combine every potential explanation 
and answer “all of the above.” Instead, it decisively contends that the region’s democratic 
fate hinges on state-based nationalism—and not Islam, economics, oil, regime statecraft or 
some other factor.  
 For all of its focus on the Arab Middle East, this thesis also has exciting implications 
for scholars of democracy and national identity elsewhere in the world. It makes a clear 
argument that strong, healthy state-based national identity is good—and perhaps even 
indispensable—for democratic flourishing. While multiple scholars have either hinted at the 
patriotism-democracy nexus or discussed it explicitly, this thesis provides the first sustained, 
region-specific defense of the theory. The next step, of course, is to apply its rationale 
beyond the Arab World.  
 Central Asia, in particular, is a prime candidate for further study. After the Arab 
Middle East, this region is the world’s next largest and most clearly defined “island of 
autocracy.” It is also overwhelmingly Muslim, has struggled significantly with questions of 
national identity, and must contend with ascendant Islamist movements.12 It does diverge !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See Kathleen Collins, “Clans, Pacts and Politics in Central Asia,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (2002), 
137-152. 
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from the Middle East in significant ways; there is no Arab parallel, for example, to the 
powerful legacy of Soviet communism. But communism—a messianic, dictatorial ideology 
that attempted, in the Soviet context, to paper over deep national differences—also contains 
uncanny echoes of revolutionary pan-Arabism. Extending this thesis’ method of analysis to 
Central Asia, and comparing the results to those from the Arab world, would thus be a 
fascinating and rewarding enterprise.  
 The connection between democracy and national identity should not only be of 
interest to scholars of undemocratic regions. This thesis’ findings also have profound 
implications for the global heartland of democracy—the West. After decades of decreased 
emphasis on state-based identity, Europe and the North America are experiencing a 
remarkable upsurge of populism, xenophobia, and political polarization, leading to what 
many commentators allege is a broad-based weakening of democratic norms. What if a 
reason for this increase in fragmentation and radicalism is that, in the decades leading up to 
the present situation, there was a paucity of legitimate outlets for constructive national 
sentiment? How different would today’s political climate be if robust, healthy patriotism had 
been given more of a role, and borderless regionalism had been pursued more carefully? For 
now, these are only questions—but the answers, which can be investigated via comparative 
case studies, are extremely important, and should be pursued by future researchers.   
 
Implications for policy 
 This chapter has dwelt at considerable length on the limits of wataniyya and on the 
ways it is not a catch-all, instant solution to all of the Arab Middle East’s problems. Such an 
emphasis, however, should not detract from the argument made by the thesis as a whole. 
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There can be little doubt that healthy, state-based national identity has the potential to 
undergird increased stability, inclusion and democracy across the Arab Middle East. 
Policymakers concerned with minority rights, civil liberties, counterterrorism and conflict 
resolution all should look to wataniyya as a force for good, a friend in the battle for a happier 
and more peaceful Arab World.  
 For actors who are themselves citizens of Arab states, the policy implications are 
obvious; wataniyya should be emphasized, nurtured, taught and practiced. Local dialects of 
Arabic should be elevated to official languages, taught in schools and used in the media. Of 
course, Arab identity will remain important, but extreme care should be taken to avoid 
confusing it with wataniyya or referring to it in ways that should be reserved for individual 
states.  
 For stakeholders in the United States, simply recognizing state-based nationalism as a 
source of democracy and pluralism will add important nuance to policy and increase the 
general likelihood that initiatives will succeed. And some direct action can also be taken to 
support the growth of healthy wataniyya. The United States can fund the creation of 
educational materials in local dialects, emphasize state-based patriotism in the various 
training programs it provides, and direct particular aid and support to the national 
governments of Lebanon and Tunisia.  
 Most importantly, all policymakers, whether Arab or foreign, would do well to 
remember that national identities are constantly in states of growth and change. They 
continuously have the opportunity to become more inclusive and authentic, and are never 
condemned to permanent “backwardness.” Building a national identity takes time. But 
transforming national attitudes is much more easily accomplished than reforming a religion, 
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fundamentally changing economic structures, or coaxing autocratic regimes to “play nice.” 
More than any of the other competing recommendations for remedying the Arab democracy 
deficit, the “case for wataniyya” thus encourages optimism and engagement. It is an 
argument convinced that well-conceived policies can, and ultimately will, secure a peaceful, 
prosperous and democratic future for the Arab Middle East.   
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